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STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant. J 
UNION PORTLAND CEMENT 
COMPANY, a corporatiou, 
vs. 
Pmintitt, 





BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE RESPECTIVE APPLICA-
TIONS OF PLAINTIFFS HEREm FOR 
WRITS OF PROHIBITION. 
Submitted by, 
DICKSON, ELLIS, LUCAS & ADAMSON, 
:l:s Amicus Curiae. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE OGDEN PORTLAND CEMENT 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
UNION PORTLAND CEJMENT 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 





BRIE·F IN OPPOSITION TO THE RESPECTIVE APPLICA· 
TIONS OF PLAINTIFFS HEREIN FOR 
WRITS OF PROHIBITION. 
This is an application by plaintiffs addressed to 
the original jurisdiction of this court for writs of 
prohibition directed to the Public Utilities Commission 
of this State. This court issued its alternative writs 
of prohibition in the premises and the matter now 
comes before the court on the return thereof and the 
defendant's return thereto. The two causes are sub-
stantitally identical in their facts, and are identical 
in principle, and therefore will be considered, discussed 
-1. and disposed of as one cause. 
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For convenience and brevity, the plaintiffs will 
hereinafter be referred to as the "Cement Company," 
and the defendant as the "Commission," and the Utah 
Power & Light Company as the "Power Company." 
The Commission filed a motion to quash the alterna-
tive writ. That motion operates as a demurrer and 
admits the truth of the facts set forth in the alternative 
writ and in the verified petition or affidavit whereon 
the same issued. The Commission also filed a verified 
return. The Cement Company has raised no issue 
of fact on such return, but on the face of the record 
seeks an absolute permanent writ. This is in the 
nature of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and 
the averments of the return are admitted to establish 
the facts therein set forth. (State vs. McQuillin, 262 
Mo. 256, 171 S. W. 72.) The face of this record dis-
closes the following: 
Statement of the Case. 
The Public Utilities Act of this State, enacted Febru-
ary 27, 1917, took effect upon its approval on March 8, 
1917. On April 8, 1918, the Commission issued its 
Tariff Circular No. 3 calling upon all public utilities, 
including the Power Company, to file with the Com-
mission before June 1, 1918, their rate schedules in 
the form prescribed therein. On October 23, 1918, 
by its Supplement No. 1 to Tariff Circular No. 3, the 
Co~mission ordered the utilities, including said Power 
Company, to file with the Commission copies of .all 
contracts and agreements "not included in its published 
schedules." In response thereto the Power Company 
filed with the Commission its schedules, and, also, its 
contracts and agreements, something over fifty in 
number, "not included in its published schedules." 
The Commission examined the contracts so filed by the 
Power Company, and found that on their face they 
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were different from the schedule rates, and were on 
their face prima f,acie preferential and discriminatory. 
Thereafter and on September 27, 1919, the Commission, 
of its own motion, issued an order directed to, not 
only the Rower Comprany, but also about seventy-five 
holders of special contracts, reciting "that for the 
purpose of making a full and complete investigation 
and inquiry into the provisions of such contracts, 
and each of them, and into all matters pertaining 
thereunto," the Power Company and the individual 
contract holders were "notified and cited to appear 
before the Commission," at a time fixed, "then and 
there to justify the continuing in effect of such special 
contracts, and the rates, charges, facilities and privi-
leges granted thereunder, and to show the reasonable-
ness and equity of such rates, charges, facilities and 
privileges, and further to show that they are not 
in contravention of the provisions" of the Utilties Act 
relative to preferences. Among such contracts were 
those of the Cement Companies, here involved, which 
contracts appeared upon their face to have been made 
prior to the passing of the Public Utilities Act. The 
Cement Company appeared before the Commission 
and objected to the jurisdiction of the Commission "to 
hear and determine the things set out in its order." 
The Commission overruled such objections, and was 
proceeding with the investigation and hearing, when the 
alternative writs of prohibition were issued in these 
causes. In its return the Commission admits its 
intention to proceed with the investigation and outlines 
its intention as to its future action in the premises 
by saying: 
"that unless there be some reason in 
the nature of a special and adequate considera-
tion for such special contracts and the service 
contemplated thereby given by the holders of 
such contracts to the utility and not given by 
the general public when contracting for like 
service, and for which an adequate return has 
not been furnished to the utility to the holders 
of such contracts, defendant proposes, if the 
same be found discriminatory and in contraven-
tion of the law, to apply to said contracts the 
same rates applied to the public for like service, 
to the end that for the sam~ class of service all 
rates and charges shall be uniform and the 
same." 
The Cement Company asserts that the Commission 
has no jurisdiction to proceed with the investigation 
proposed because: (1) Its contract is protected from 
abrogation or impairment by the appropriate pro-
visions of the Constitutions of the United States and 
of this State; and (2) the Utilities Act provides that 
nothing contained in said Act should or shall be con-
strued "to prevent the carrying out of contracts for 
free or reduced rate passenger transportation or other 
public utility service heretofore made, founded upon 
adequate consideration and lawful when made." 
The questions raised and argued before the court on 
the return of the alternative writ are of the gravest 
public importance, and while, in proceedings like 
this, formal intervention by others is not usual, under 
the circumstances here presented, counsel representing 
other interests were very properly permitted to appear 
and file briefs as amicus curiae (State vs. Rost, 49 La. 
Ann. 1451, 22 So. 421). 
The question of the jurisdiction of this court to issue the writs 
of prohibition sought herein is presented. 
This application is addressed to the original jurisdic-
tion of this court conferred upon it by Section 4 of 
Article 8 of the State Constitution. The court is con-
fronted at the outset with the question as to whether 
it has jurisdiction to issue the writs of prohibition 
prayed for herein. This question is presented by the 
Commission's motion to quash. But whether it is or 
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not, the court will investigate and determine this ques-
tion of its own motion. 
The source and right of this court to assume juris-
diction of the subject-matter-the issuance of a writ 
of prohibition in the exercise of original jurisdiction-
must be found in the provision of the Constitution 
referred to. A question of constitutional original juris-
diction is involved. That being true, the court will, of 
its own motion, investigate its jurisdiction over the 
subject-matter of the cause, whether the issue is raised 
by the parties or not, because constitutional jurisdic-
tion of the nature here involved should rest on some-
thing stronger than a mere failure of parties to raise 
the issue, and to hold otherwise would be, or at least 
might be, to here assume and usurp original jurisdic-
tion in matters other than as authorized by the Consti-
tution. Furthermore, the issuance of a writ of pro-
hibition is an extraordinary proceeding and a power that 
will only be cautiously assumed and used, and therefore 
it is highly proper for the court to take the precaution 
and responsibility upon itself to investigate the entire 
11ubject, lest it exercise so mandatory a prerogative 
without complete justification. These principles have 
been enunciated by other courts in prohibition pro-
ceedings. 
State vs. District Court, 46 Okla. 654, 149 
Pac. 140; 
State vs. Taylor, 54 Wash. 150, 102 Pac. 
1029; 
State vs. Stutsrnan, 24 N. D. 68, 139 
N. W. 83; 
State vs. Ewert (S. D.), 156 N. W. 90. 
This is but in line with the principle that an absolute 
want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter cannot be 
waived, and that neither a failure to object to the 
jurisdiction of a court, nor consent to its exercise, 
when the court would otherwise have none, will confer 
6 
it, the doctrine of waiver having no application in 
such a case. 
Davidson vs. Mun.sey, 27 Utah, 87, 74 
Pac. 431; 
15 Cor. Jur. 844; 
17 Stand. Encyc. Pro. 900. 
Thus it is said in 17 Stand. Encyc. Pro., 900 that: 
"Since jurisdiction of the subject-matter can· 
not be conferred by consent or waiver, it is not 
only the power but it is the duty of the court 
to inquire whether the facts give jurisdiction 
over the subject-matter even though the question 
is not raised by the parties, and even if both 
parties assert jurisdiction." 
And in 15 Cor. Jur., 852, it is said: 
"Courts are bound to take notice of the limits 
of their authority, and accordingly a court may 
of its own motion, even though the question is 
not raised by the pleadings or is not suggested 
by counsel, recognize the want of jurisdiction, 
and it is its duty to act accordingly by staying 
proceedings, dismissing the action, or other-
wise noticing the defect, at any stage of the 
proceedings." 
This court has the power, under its original jurisdiction, to 
issue a writ of prohibition to restrain the Commission from 
exercising jurisdiction or power which it does not possess 
in the premises, because the function which the Commis-
sion is attempting to exercise at this time is judicial and 
not legislative in character. There is a clear line of de-
marcation and differentiation between the functions of 
the Commission, which are judicial, or quasi judicial, and 
those which are legislative. 
The jurisdiction and authority of this court to issue 
writs of prohibition depends upon the constitutional 
7 
organic law under which this court functions (21 Stan. 
Encyc. Pro., 814). 
Section 4 of Article VIII of the State Constitution 
provides that this court "shall have original jurisdic-
tion to issue writs of" prohibition. That provision 
of the Constitution fixes the jurisdiction of this court; 
and the jurisdiction of this court as so fixed cannot 
be abridged or limited by the Legislature. (State vs. 
Durand, 36 Utah, 93, 104 Pac. 260). Hence nothing 
contained in, or omitted from, the Public Utilities Act 
can abridge or limit the jurisdiction of this court in 
the premises, whatever force or effect as a matter 
of persuasive policy or procedure that Act, or any 
other legislative enactment, may have as respects the 
exercise by this court of a discretion in allowing or 
refusing the writ, a question which we shall hereafter 
discuss. On the other hand, it is equally obvious 
that except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, 
this court has appellate jurisdiction only. 
On the argument of this cause before the court it 
was contended that the writ of prohibition mentioned 
in the Constitution was the writ of prohibition only 
as known to the common law, and that it did not 
extend to embrace the restraint of ministerial acts or 
functions as the writ existed under the laws of the 
Territory of Utah with functions as therein defined, and 
as applied by the courts of the Territory when the 
Constitution was adopted. This question was discussed 
by this court in State vs. Durand, 36 Utah 93, 104 
Pac. 260, but the court there found it unnecessary to 
determine the question. Other decisions of this court 
bearing upon the determination of that question are: 
Godbe vs. Salt Lake City, 1 Utah 68; 
Shepperd vs. Court, 1 Utah 340; 
Ducheneau vs. House, 4 Utah 363, 10 Pac. 
938; 
People vs. Spiers, 4 Utah 385, 10 Pac. 609. 
On the whole the weight of the argument as well 
as the weight of authority would seem to require a hold-
ing that the writ mentioned in the Constitution was the 
writ of prohibition only as known to the common 
law, particularly as the decision in Williams vs. Lewis, 
6 Ida. 184, 54 Pac. 619, referred to by this court in 
State vs. Dur,and, supra, has been overruled in Coats 
vs. Harris, 75 Pac. 246, 9 Ida. 426. The authorities 
from other states bearing upon this question because 
of their constitutional provisions and legislative enact-
ments being similar to ours, are: 
Maurer vs. Mitchell, 53 Cal. 289; 
Camron vs. Kenfield, 57 Cal. 550; 
Farmers Union vs. Thresher, 62 Cal. 407; 
Hobart vs. Pillson, 66 Cal. 210; 
Winsor vs. Commissioners, 24 Wash. 540, 
64 Pac. 780; 
State vs. Taylor, 54 Wash. 150, 102 Pac. 
1029; 
State vs. District Court, 22 Mont. 220, 56 
Pac. 219; 
State vs. Hogan, 24 Mont. 379, 62 Pac. 
493; 
Co,ats vs. Harris, 9 Idaho 426, 75 Pac. 
246; 
O'Brien vs. Trousdale (Nev.), 167 Pac. 
1007; 
State vs. Ewert (S. D.), 156 N. W. 90. 
It is equally unnecessary for the court to determine 
that question in this case. Whatever the functions 
of the Commission may be in a given instance, and as 
respects a given subject-matter, whether judicial or 
quasi judicial on the one hand, or legislative on the 
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other, they are not ministerial, certainly not as respects 
the matters covered by this application with which the 
Commission is dealing or attempting to deal. And our 
territorial legislation (Laws of Utah, 1884, p. 326; 
Comp. Laws 1888, Sec. 3743) went no further than 
extending the operation of the writ to include minister-
ial functions. 
The distinction between ministerial and judicial and 
other official acts seems to be that where the law pre-
scribes and defines the duty to be performed with such 
precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exer-
cise of discretion or judgment, tne act is ministerial, but 
where the act to be done involves the exercise of discretion 
or judgment in determining whether the duty exists, it 
is not to be deemed merely ministerial. 
The term "ministerial" is generic rather than specific, 
and includes acts which are ministerial only and involve 
no judgment or discretion, and those which are qu.asi 
judicial; a purely ministerial act being one which a 
person performs on a given state of facts, in a pre-
scribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal 
authority, with regard to his own judgment on the 
propriety of the act. (State vs. Stutsman (N. D.), 139 
N. W. 83, 88.) A purely "ministerial duty" is one as 
to which nothing is left to discretion. (City of Biddle-
ford vs. Yates, 72 Atl. 335, 337, 104 Me. 506.) So in 
State vs. Parker (S. D.), 166 N. W. 309, it is said: 
"A ministerial act or duty is one which is 
to be performed under a given state of facts, 
in a prescribed manner in obedience to the 
mandate of legal authority, and without regard 
to or exercise of the judgment of the one doing 
it upon the propriety of the act being done." 
Many other authorities defining a ministerial act 
or duty are cited in the appropriate volume of Words 
and Phrases, but it is unnecessary to refer to or discuss 
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them because this court in Garff vs. Smith, 31 Utah, 
102, 86 Pac. 772, says at pages 107 and 108: 
"We are of the opinion that the character of 
the acts performed by appellant are quasi judicial 
in their nature, and not ministerial. It has well 
been said that: 
'Official duty is ministerial when it is 
absolute, certain, and imperative, involving 
merely the execution of a set task, and when 
the law which imposes it prescribes and 
defines the time, mode and occasion of its 
performance with such certainty that noth-
ing remains for judgment or discretion. 
Official action is ministerial when it is the 
result of performing a certain and specific 
duty arising from fixed and designated 
facts.' (People vs. Bartels et al., 138 Ill. 
322, 27 N. E. 1091.) 
"It has also been defined as follows: 
'A ministerial act is one which a public 
officer is required to perform upon a given 
state of facts in a prescribed manner in 
obedience to the mandate of legal authority 
and without regard to his own judgment 
or opinion concerning the propriety or 
impropriety of the act to be performed.' 
(State ex rel. vs. Meier, 143 Mo. 439, 45 
S. W. 306.) To the same effect are also 
the following: Grider vs. Tally, 77 Ala. 422, 
54 Am. Rep. 65; Throop. Pup. Officers, Sec 
tion 535; 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 376.'' 
We shall hereafter discuss the nature of the Utilities 
Commission. Whatever its character, it is a body of 
limited jurisdiction, and, of course, as we shall hereafter 
see, it is not the exclusive or final judge of its juris-
diction or the limitations thereon. In Collier on Public 
Service Corporations, Sec. 176, p. 416, it is well said: 
"To say that a commission is a tribunal of con-
ferred powers is to say also that if it transcends 
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those powers it acts without jurisdiction. It is a 
truism to declare that it is not the sole judge of 
when its so transcends." 
As we shall hereafter see, the Commission, even when 
exercising legislative functions, may exercise or attempt 
to exercise incidental judicial or quasi judicial power. 
Accordingly, where such a Commission is exercising 
judicial or quasi judicial functions, or attempting so to 
do, in excess of its jurisdiction, a proper case is pre-
sented where the court may, in the exercise of its dis-
cretion, stay the proceedings and keep the Commission 
within the limits and bounds of law by the issuance of a 
writ of prohibition. To hold otherwise would be to vest 
in the Commission an omnipotent and tyrannical power 
contrary to every principle of a free government. Ac-
cordingly in a proper case this court may restrain the 
Commission from exercising power which it does not 
possess. 
State vs. Clendening, 93 Ohio St. 264, 
112 N. E. 1029; 
Allen vs. Railway Commission, (Cal.), 175 
Pac.446; 
A., T. & S. F. Ry. vs. Commission, (Okl.), 
170 Pac. 1156; 
Quinby vs. Commission, 223 N. Y. 244, 
119 N. E. 433; 
In re Pennsylvania Gas Co., 225 N. Y. 397, 
122 N. E. 260; 
In re Pennsylvania Gas Co., 169 N. Y. S. 
820; 
Fleming vs. Commissioners, 31 W.Va. 608, 
8 S. E. 267; 
State vs. Stutsman, 24 N. D. 68, 139 N. W. 
83; 
Superintendent vs. Taylor, 105 Ky. 387, 
49 S. W. 38; 
Harriman vs. Commissioners, 53 Me. 83; 
Connecticut Ry. vs. Commissioners, 127 
Mass 50, 34 Am. Rep. 538; 
Day vs. Board of Aldermen, 102 Mass. 310; 
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Speed vs. Detroit, 98 Mich. 360, 57 N. W. 
406; 
State vs. Young, 29 Minn. 474, 9 N. W. 
737; 
State vs. Goodier, 195 Mo. 551, 93 S. W. 
928. 
Thus the rule is stated in 21 Stand. Encyc. Pro. 913, 
that: 
"A writ of prohibition will issue to prevent a 
commission from proceeding with a matter be-
yond its jurisdiction." 
So in 32 Cyc. 601, it is said: 
"A public board acting in a quasi judicial char-
acter becomes an inferior tribunal amenable to the 
writ whenever it exceeds its authority or exercises 
an authority which it does not possess." 
So, also, in 32 Cyc. 602, it is said: 
"Prohibition will not lie to restrain a public 
officer from performing purely ministerial duties, 
or from performing judicial acts within his juris-
diction. But any abuse or usurpation of judicial 
power on the part of a public officer acting in a 
judicial or quasi judicial character will be re-
strained by prohibition." 
On the other hand, our Constitution (Sec. 1, A.rt. V) 
divides the powers of our State government into three 
distinct departments, the legislative, the executive, and 
the judicial. Those are co~ordinate branches of the 
government. It is of course well settled that a writ of 
prohibition will not run against the Legislature, and, 
:furthermore, as stated in 32 Cyc. 601: 
"The writ will not lie against a public board 
having the power to legislate for the purpose of 
arresting the progress of any legislation pending 
therein." 
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Spring Valley Water Works vs. Satn Fran-
cisco, 52 Cal. 111; 
Spring Valley Water Works vs. Bartlet, 
63 Cal. 245; 
Commissioners vs. State, 151 Ala. 561, 
44 So. 465; 
McWhorter vs. Dorr, 57 W. Va. 608, 50 
S. E. 838; 
Patton vs. Stephens, 77 Ky. (14 Bush.) 
324; 
Smith vs. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 29 L. Ed. 
601. 
It has been urged in this case that this court has no 
jurisdiction to issue the writ prayed for in this case, and 
that the issuance of the same would be an invasion by 
judicial writ of another and independent branch of the 
State government, and an attempt to control legis-
lative and administrative power and authority. But this 
contention begs the question upon which the jurisdiction 
of this court in the premises must turn. 
The jurisdiction of this court to issue a writ of pro-
hibition directed to the Commission depends in a general 
way upon the nature or character of the tribunal which 
the Commission constitutes; and that having been 
determined, the nature of the act here and now about to 
be done by the Commission determines the jurisdictional 
propriety of the issuance of the writ of prohibition 
sought. For if the court finds that the Commission is 
exercising or attempting to exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial power without cause, without grounds, without 
right, without authority, and without jurisdiction, and 
there is no other adequate remedy or relief from its 
usurped power when executed, then the court has the 
jurisdiction and can and should issue the writ. So we 
pass to a discussion of these questions whereon the 
jurisdiction of the court depends in this particular case. 
The Commission is a mere creature of statute, and has 
no judicial power as such, except as incidental quasi-
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judicial power is to be exercised by it in conjunction 
with, or as a preliminary to, the operation of its legis-
lative and administrative functions. It is elementary 
law that a commission of this character is purely a 
creature of statute and as such possesses only such 
authority and powers as have been conferred upon it by 
express grant or arise therefrom by implication as 
necessary and incidental to the full exercise of the 
powers granted. Whatever power the Commission has 
must be found and contained within the act. It cannot 
be inferred or assumed. The power of the Commission 
fixed by express provision of the statute, cannot be 
expanded by construction or implication from consider-
ations of mere policy or convenience. The Commission 
possesses naked statutory power. Any reasonable doubt 
of the grant of a particular power to a Commission, is 
held to deny its having been conferred. The power of 
the Commi,ssion is not to be taken by implication, but 
must be given by language which admits of no other 
reasonable construction. 
United Railways Co. vs. Commission, 270 
Mo. 429, 192 S. W. 958; 
Municipal Gas Co. vs. Commission, 224 N. 
Y. 156, 129 N. E. 132; 
Cincinnativs. Utilities Com'n, (Ohio), 117 
N. E. 381; 
21 Stand. Encyc. Pro. 908, 909; 
Commission vs. Telephone Ass'n, 282 Ill. 
336, 118 N. E. 760; 
Commission vs. Illinois C. Ry., 27 4 Ill. 36, 
113 N. E. 36; 
N. Y. Rys. Co. vs. Commission, 223 N. Y. 
373, 119 N. E. 848; 
Kelly vs. Public Serv. Com'n, 157 N. Y. S. 
703; 
Pennsylvania Ry. vs. Towers, 126 Md. 59, 
94 Atl. 330; 
2 Elliott on Railroads, Sec. 675, 683; 
32 Cyc. 47, 48; 
15 
Collier Pub. Serv. Corp., Sec. 171; 
Gulf Etc. Ry. vs. Commission, 94 Miss. 124, 
49 So. 118; 
Commission vs. Ry. Co., 17 Or. 65, 19 Pac. 
702; 
Siler vs. L. & N. Ry., 213 U. S. 175, 53 L. 
Ed. 753; 
People vs. Wilcox, 200 N. Y. 423, 94 N. E. 
212; 
State vs. L. & N. Ry., (Fla.), 49 So. 39; 
Libby vs. Cana,dian P. Ry., 82 Vt. 316, 75 
Atl. 593; 
People vs. N. Y., L. E. & W. Ry., 104 N. Y. 
58, 9 N. E. 856; 
K. C. 0. B. & B. E. Ry. vs. R. R. Coms., 
73 Kan. 168, 84 Pac. 755; 
State vs. R. R. Com'n, 47 Wash. 627, 92 
Pac. 457; 
State vs. F. E. & M. Ry., 23 Neb. 17, 36 
N. W. 305; 
United Rys. Co. vs. Com's, 123 Md. 561, 
91 Atl. 552; 
State vs. C., M. & St. P. Ry., 16 S. D. 507, 
94 N. W. 406; 
U. S. vs. L. & N. Ry., 236 U. S. 318, 59 
L. Ed. 598; 
I. C. C. vs. D. L. & W. Ry., 216 U. S. 538, 
54 L. Ed. 608; 
I. C. C. vs. L. & N. Ry., 227 U. S. 88, 57 
L. Ed. 43; 
F. E. C. Ry. vs. U. S., 234 U. S. 167, 58 
L. Ed. 1267; 
Jones vs. So. Ry., 76 S.C. 67, 56 S. E. 666; 
Bonham vs. R. R. Com'n, 26 S. C. 363, 2 S. 
E. 127; 
Richards vs. So. Ry., 97 S. C. 77, 81 S. E. 
314; 
Gulf, Etc., Ry. vs. State, 56 T. C. A. 353, 
120 s. w. 1028; 
G. & W. Ry. vs. G. El. Ry., (Tex.), 123 S. 
w. 1140; 
Blake vs. Concord, Etc., Ry., 73 N. H. 597, 
65 Atl. 202; 
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T. & P. Ry. vs. R. R. Com'n, 137 La. 1059, 
69 So. 837; 
State vs. Tel. Co., 65 Fla. 270, 61 So. 506; 
State vs. A. C. L. Ry., 60 Fla. 465, 54 So. 
394; 
State vs. Termina,l Co., 71 Fla. 295, 71 So. 
474; 
State vs. A. C. L. Ry., 51 Fla. 578, 40 So. 
875; 
23 A. & E. Encyc. L. (2 Ed.) 653; 
R. R. Com'n vs. L. & N. Ry., 57 Fla. 526, 
49 So. 39; 
N. C. & St. L. Ry. vs. State, 137 Ala. 439, 
34 So. 401; 
Chester vs. Ry., 41 Conn. 348; 
R. R. Com. vs. 0. R. & N. Co., 17 Ore. 65, 
19 Pac. 702; 
I. C. C. vs. N. P. Ry., 216 U. S. 538, 54 L. 
Ed. 608; 
State vs. Yazoo, Etc., Ry., 57 Miss. 679, 
40 So. 263; 
Merrill vs. Boston, Etc., Ry., 63 N. H. 259; 
Eastern Ry. vs. Concord Ry., 47 N. H. 108; 
Neal vs. Portland, 85 Me. 62, 27 Atl. 994; 
Collier Pub. Serv. Corp. Co., Sec. 176, 171; 
Water Co. vs. Pub. Serv. Com., 83 Wash. 
130, 145 Pac. 215; 
Power Co. vs. Commission, 272 Mo. 645, 
199 s. w. 909; 
Ry. Co. vs. Commission, (Okl.), 170 Pac. 
1156; 
Ry. Co. vs. Commission, (Mo.), 210 S. W. 
386. 
This same principle has been applied to the Industrial 
Commisison of this State. 
Commission vs. Evans, (Utah), 174 Pac. 
825. 
Section 1 of Article VIII of our State Constitution 
provides that : 
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"The judicial power of the State shall be vested 
in the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment, 
in a supreme court, in district courts, in justice 
of the peace, and in such other courts inferior to 
the supreme court as may be established by law." 
Section 1, Article V, of our State Constitution provides 
that: 
"The powers of government of the State of 
Utah shall be divided into distinct departments, 
the legislative, the executive and the judicial; and 
no person charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of these departments 
shall exercise any functions appertaining to either 
of the othevs, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted." 
By virtue of those constitutional provisions, it is clear 
that authority of a strictly judicial nature, that is 
judicial power to hear and determine controversies and 
to make binding orders and judgments respecting them, 
may not be vested in, or exercised by, executive or 
legislative boards or commissions. This is elementary. 
(12 Cor. Jur. 902.) This principle is applied to Public 
Utility Acts and Commissions. 
C,. M. & St. P. Ry. vs. Commission, 94 
Wash. 27 4, 162 Pac. 523. 
This principle is undoubtedly what the court had in 
mind when in Commission vs. Evan.s, (Utah), 17 4 Pac. 
825, it said : 
"It is universally held by the courts, and there 
is no escape from the conclusion, that boards or 
bodies like the commission possess only adminis-
trative and ministerial functions, and are not 
clothed with judicial powers, and therefore can-
not exercise such powers. 
"Whatever the jurisdiction or power that may 
be conferred upon such a commission, such juris-
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diction and powers are, nevertheless, special and 
limited, and, as before stated, are merely admin-
istrative and ministerial as c-ontradistinguished 
from judicial." 
This principle is what this court had in mind when, in 
Salt Lake City vs. Utah Light & Traction Co., (Utah), 
173 Pac. 556, it said that the Utilities Commission: 
"* * * is merely an arm of the Legislature, 
through whom that body acts in matters of this 
kind." 
Hence it is clear that the Public Utilities Commission 
is not a court and does not exercise any strictly judicial 
power. It has no such judicial power, and could not con-
stitutionally be given any such power. It does not exer-
cise any strictly judicial function. 
A., T. & S. F. Ry. vs. Commission, (Mo.), 
192 s. w. 460; 
Lusk vs. Atkinson, 268 Mo. 109, 186 S. W. 
703; 
Venner vs. N. Y. C., Etc., Ry., 164 N. Y. 
s. 626; 
Mississippi Ry. Com'n vs. Ill. Cent. Ry., 203 
U.S. 335, 51 L. Ed. 209; 
L. & N. Ry. vs. Garrett, 231 U. S. 295, 58 
L. Ed. 229; 
Prentis vs. A. C. L. Ry., 211 U. S. 210, 
53 L. Ed. 150; 
Ry. Co. vs. Redmond, 189 Fed. 683; 
Commission vs. N. Ala. Ry., 182 Ala. 357, 
62 So. 749; 
Telegraph Co. vs. Railroad Com'n, 7 4 Miss. 
80; 
W. N. Y. & P. Ry. vs. Refining Co., 137 
Fed. 343; 
Commission vs. Cincinnati, Etc., Ry., 64 
Fed. 981; 
Bridge Co. vs. L. & N. Ry., 37 Fed. 610. 
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So, also, while the Commission is an arm of the Legis-
lature, administering, in some instances, legislative func-
tions, it is not the Legislature. 
A., T. & S. F. Ry. vs. Commission, (Mo.), 
192 s. w. 460; 
State vs. Canning Co., 164 Wis. 228, 157 
N. W. 777; 
State vs. Northern Ry., 100 Minn. 445, 
111 N. W. 289; 
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. vs. Commission, 
94 Wash. 274, 162 Pac. 522. 
The true nature of the Utilities Commission is well 
expressed in the language of the following authorities. 
In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. vs. Public Service Com-
mission (Mo.), 192 S. W. 460, the court says, at page 
!162: 
"The Public Service Commission is not a Legis-
lature (Sta,te vs. Canning Co., 164 Wis. 228, 157 
N. W. 777; State vs. Northern Ry., 100 Minn. 
445, 111 N. W. 289, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 250) ; 
nor a court (Lusk vs. Atkinson, 186 S. W. 703). 
It is ,simply a committee created by the Legisla-
ture to make findings of fact and orders based on 
such findings, which, if reasonable and within the 
power of the Commission, may be enforced by the 
action of the courts." 
The court says again at page 462: 
"We have not overlooked the sections of the 
statutes cited by the learned counsel of the Pub-
lic Service Commission, nor the view expressed 
on its behalf; but none of these touch the funda-
mental proposition which circumscribe the power 
and duty of the Public Service Commission as the 
mere administrative agency of the Legislature, 
without power to enact a,ny law, and, a fortiori, 
without power to prescribe ,and regula.te or make 
an order which the Legislature would have no 
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constitutional pCYWer to enact into the form of 
law." 
In Lusk vs. Atkinson, 268 Mo. 109, 186 S. W. 703, the 
court says at page 7 04 : 
"The design of the act was to create an admin-
istrative agency of the lawmaking power. The 
board of commissioners thus established was not 
intended to be vested with the essential functions 
and powers of a court of law and equity; for 
under the express provisions of the Constitution 
of Missouri the Legislature could establish courts 
only in the classes of cases, and in the manner 
and to the extent provided by that instrument, 
and the board does not fall under the head of 
any of the courts described in the Constitution. 
Const. Mo. art. 6 Sec. 1, 28, 31; State ex rel vs. 
Fort, 210 Mo. 512, 109 S. W. 737; State ex rel 
Haughey vs. Ryan, 182 Mo. loc. cit. 355, 81 S. W. 
435; State ex rel. vs. Woodson, 161 Mo. loc. cit. 
453, 61 s. w. 252. 
Since the Legislature has no power to create 
a court not falling within the classes specified in 
the Constitution nor in any other manner than 
therein empowered so to do, it follows that the 
Public Service Commission is only a representa-
tive agency established by the Legislature, whose 
powers and duties are specifically set forth, none 
of which include the prerogatives of a court; for 
neither the Legislature nor any of its delegated 
agencies could exercise these under our Consti-
tution, and, if the act had been passed for that 
purpose, it would be void. The findings and 
orders which the Public Service Commission is 
empowered to make, though bearing some re-
semblance to some of the judicial actions of a 
court of law and equity, are yet merely incidents 
of the work of investigation and determination 
of facts and questions developed upon that body 
by the Legislature, and do not imply on its part 
the possession of any of the essential attributes 
or machinery of constitutional courts in this 
State. The Public Service Commission has no 
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power to expound authoritatively any pritnciple 
of law or equity, and has no machinery for en-
forcing its orders. 
In Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. vs. Dougherty, 39 S. D. 
147, 163 N. W. 715, the court says at pages 719 and 
720: 
"Here the state has seen fit to create an ad-
ministrative body or commission, and charge it 
with the duty and authority to take certain steps 
when in the judgment of such board 'it shall 
appear that any common carrier fails in any 
respect to comply with the terms of its charter 
or the laws of the state.' Laws 1911, c. 207, 
sec. 2. This board is not given authority to 
enforce its own orders or judgments, but can only 
apply to the proper courts for a decision and 
judgment upon the matters involved. It is a 
strictly administrative body. Southern Ind. R. R. 
Co. vs. R. R. Commissioner, 172 Ind. 113, 87 N. 
E. 966; State ex rel. R. R. Commissioners vs. 
Wilmington & W. R. Co., 122 N. C. 877, 29 S. E. 
334; R. R. Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 6 
Sup. Ct. 334, 388, 1191, 29 L. Ed. 636; State ex 
rel. Taylor vs. No. Pac. Ry. Co., 76 Kan. 467, 92 
Pac. 606. 
Any order made by such board in compliance 
with statutory notice and procedure constitutes 
an exercise of administrative authority only, and 
not of judicial power. Nor can such order be 
enforced except through the order or judgment 
of a duly constituted judicial tribunal having 
jurisdiction to hear and determine the matters 
involved, and in which the corporation is given 
the right to be heard" 
In Bessette vs. Goddard, 87 Vt. 77, 88 Atl. 1, the court 
says at page 3 : 
"At a special term in December of that year, 
the case of Sabre vs. Rutland R. R. Co., 86 Vt. 
347, 85 Atl. 693, was heard, and decided in 
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January. In that case it became and was neces-
sary to decide whether the Public Service Com-
mission is a legal body and, if so, to define its 
nature and character as such. The court met 
that necessity and decided that it is a legal body 
and defined it as being an administrative body, 
clothed, in some respects with functions of a 
judicial nature (quasi-judicial functions the court 
said they might be called), authorized in the 
exercise of the police power to make rules and 
regulations required for the public safety and 
convenience, and to determine facts on which 
existing laws shall opemte; that in a sense it has 
auxiliary or subordinate delegable legislative 
powers; and that, though it is not a court in a 
strict sense, yet, like many administrative bodies, 
it may exercise quasi judicial functions and is a 
governmental agency provided for the adminis-
tration in respect to certain specific matters of 
what, in a broad, though true, sense, may be 
called the police power. This practically puts 
the Commission where the federal Supreme Court 
puts the Interstate Commerce Commission, be-
tween which and our Commission there is much 
similarity in purpose and function." 
In Railroad Commission of Alabama vs. Northern 
Alabama R. Co., 182 Ala. 357, 62 So. 749, it is said: 
"Indeed, the power of the Legislature to 
create a railroad or corporation commission, and 
through them to exercise its power of regula-
tion over railroads, has been repeatedly sus-
tained, subject to the limitations that they can-
not be invested with strictly legislative or judicial 
powers, and that their power and proceedings 
must be within constitutional restrictions relating 
to due process of law, and equal protection of 
the laws, and that a state cannot authorize a 
railroad commission to regulate interstate com-
merce. 
So a railroad commission legally constituted is 
an administrative body, and not legislative, or a 
court, although they do in some cases exercise 
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some functions of a judicial character; nor are 
their decisions judgment in the ordinary sense 
of the term. 33 Cyc. 45, and cases cited in note." 
In State ex rel. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. vs. 
Public Service Commission of Washington, 94 Wash. 
274, 162 Pac. 522, it is said at page 525: 
"On the general proposition that the Legisla-
ture cannot delegate the power to make purely 
substantive law, there can be no difference of 
opinion. We shall therefore consume no space 
in discussing the several authorities cited as 
announcing and sustaining that principle. Nor 
can there be any difference of opinion as to the 
soundness of the correlative proposition that the 
Legislature can delegate the power to determine 
the facts or state of things upon which the law 
makes its own operation depend. Locke's Appeal, 
72 Pa. 491, 13 Am. Rep. 716; Carstens vs. De 
Sellem, 82 Wash. 643, 144 Pac. 934; Cawsey vs. 
Brickey, 82 Wash. 653, 144 Pac. 938. The diffi-
culty lies, not in determining the governing prin-
ciple, but in its application to concrete cases. 
The constitutio'IULl division of all governmental 
powers into legislative, executive, and judicial is 
abstract and general. Their complete separa-
tion in actual practice is impossible. The many 
complex relations created by modern society and 
business have produced many situations which 
can be adequately met only by vesting in the 
same administrative officers or bodies powers 
inherently partaking, to some extent, of any two 
or all of these three functions. 
"The intricate, complex, and technical nature 
of the business of common carriers in their rela-
tion to the pubic makes this peculiarly true of 
legislation looking to the regulation of such 
business. The power of regulation of such car-
riers is inherent in the State. In this State that 
power may be exercised either directly by the 
Legislature or through the medium of a Com-
mission. State Constitution, art. 12, Sec. 18. 
Though the Legislature must itself determine a 
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standard for regulation by which the Commis-
sion must be guided, that standard need not be, 
and in the nature of the case, cannot be, detailed 
and specific. It may be couched in general 
terms as that the rules and orders of the Com-
mission shall be just, fair, and reasonable. 
"We have repeatedly held that the Legislature 
may constitutionally confer on the Commission 
judicial powers as a mediatory tribunal, since 
the constitutional division of governmental 
powers into the three separate departments ap-
plies only in a limited sense, and does not re-
strict one set of officers to one department 
exclusively. State ex rel. Oregon R. & N. Co. 
vs. R. R. Commission, 52 Wash. 17, 100 Pac. 
179; State ex rel R. R. Commission vs. Oregon 
R. & N. Co., 68 Wash. 160, 168, 123 Pac. 3; 
State ex rel. R. R. Commission vs. Great North-
ern Ry. Co., 68 Wash. 257, 262, 264, 123 Pac. 8. 
It is therefore clear that, before this court can 
hold that any attempt of the Legislature to con-
fer on the Commission a given power is void 
as an unconstitutional delegation of either legis-
lative or judicial power, it must clearly appear 
that the power in question is purely legislative 
or judicwl, and not merely incidental to some of 
the administrative powers for the exercise of 
which the Commission was created." 
In Interstate Commerce Commission vs. Cincinnati 
No. & T. P. R. R. Co., 76 Fed. 183, it is said at page 
184: 
"The interstate commerce commission is not 
invested, and cannot be invested, under the con-
stitution, with either legislative power or purely 
judicial power. Its functions are necessarily 
restricted to the performance of administrative 
duties, with such quasi-judicial powers as are 
incidental and necessary to the proper perform-
ance of those duties." 
In Interstate Commerce Commission vs. Cinmnnati 
No. & T. P. R. R. Co., 64 Fed. 981, it is said at page 
982: 
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"It has been held that the interstate com-
merce commission is not a court. It is an ad-
ministrative body (see Commission vs. Brimson, 
154 U. S. 447, 474, 489, 14 Sup. Ct. 1125), law-
fully created, and lawfully exercising powers 
which are quasi judicial, as are the powers 
exercised by the commissioner of patents, and, 
in many respects, by the heads of the various 
departments of the executive branch of the 
government." 
In Western New York & P. R. R. Co. vs. Penn. Re-
fining Co., 137 Fed. 343, it is said at page 349: 
"The Commission, ,although clothed with quasi 
judicial functions, is ~an administrative body in 
contradistinction to a judicial tribunal." 
In Bridge Co. vs. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 37 Fed. 
567, it is said at page 610: 
"In respect to the question presented by the 
first, counsel for respondent takes the position 
that the interstate commerce law confers judicial 
powers upon the Commission; that such judicial 
powers are exercised in its proceedings; that its 
orders are judgments of a court not lawfully 
created, since its members are not appointed and 
commissioned in accordance with Article 3, Sec. 
1, of the Constitution, inasmuch as they hold 
office only for designated periods, and not 'dur-
ing good behavior,' which latter 'constitutional 
tenure of office judges must possess before they 
can become invested with any portion of the 
judicial powers of the union,' and that the pro-
ceedings before, and the order or judgment of, 
the Commission are and were consequently void. 
In respect to the second question it is claimed 
by counsel for respondent that, aside from the 
judicial character and power attempted to be 
conferred upon said Commission, the interstate 
commerce law imposes upon this court non-
judicial powers which it cannot properly exer-
cise, inasmuch as it is limited and restricted by 
the sixteenth section of the act to the mere en-
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forcement of the commissioner's orders, if found 
to be lawful, with no authority to go into the 
merits of the controversy between the parties, 
and make its own adjudication thereon; but if 
not so limited and restricted to the mere enforce-
ment of an order made by another body, and 
the proceeding in this court can be regarded 
and treated as an original and independent suit 
to determine the rights of the parties, that the 
court has no jurisdiction of the case, because 
the parties complainant and defendant are both 
corporations of the State of Kentucky. In sup-
port of their position that judicial powers are 
conferred upon and exercised by the Commission, 
counsel refers to various provisions contained 
in sections 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, of the 
act, which, together with the rules of practice 
adopted, show, as they insist, that a proceeding 
before the commission, like the one in question, 
involves and embodies features and ear-marks 
of judicial procedure and action in the following 
particulars, viz.: First, a petition, corresponding 
with the petition or bill in equity, is filed; 
second, notice is issued for and service thereof 
made upon, the defendant or party complained 
of, conforming to, and corresponding with, the 
process of subpoena in courts of the United 
States, requiring such defendant to satisfy the 
complainant, or to appear and answer the same; 
third, the filing of defendant's answer, as in 
equity, which makes up or forms the issue or 
issues; fourth, the issuance of subpoenas requir-
ing the attendance of witnesses, or for the taking 
of depositions, upon the issues made up by the 
answer; fifth, the assignment of a time and 
place for the hearing, when and where the 
parties appear in person or by attorney, wit-
nesses are sworn and examined, and arguments 
are made orally or by brief; sixth, when the 
conclusion is reached, a written report, corres-
ponding in all respects to an opinion, is delivered, 
filed, and published; seventh, the order of the 
Commission is recorded by its secretary, as de-
crees in equity are recorded by clerks of court; 
and, eighth, a copy of such order, under the seal 
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of the Commission, issues to the defendant, 
requiring obedience thereto. This mode of pro-
cedure cwrtainly conforms in many respects to 
the regular practice of courts, arnd is no doubt 
authorized by the law; but does it involve the 
performance of judicial acts, and the exercise 
of judicial powers, by the Commission, as 
claimed? It is well settled that congress, in 
ordaining and establishing 'inferior courts,' and 
prescribing their jurisdiction, must confer upon 
the judges appointed to administer them the 
constitutional tenure of office,-that of holding 
'during good behavior,'-before they can become 
invested with any portion of the judicial power 
of the government; and if the act to regulate 
interstate commerce does in fact establish an 
inferior court, the commissiOners appointed 
thereunder for certain fixed periods are clearly 
not such judges as can be invested with any 
portion of the judicial power of the United 
States, and their decision in matters affecting 
personal or property rights could have no force 
or validity. But does the interstate commerce 
law undertake either to create an 'inferior court' 
or to invest the Commission appointed there-
under with judicial functions? We tMnk not. 
While the Commission possesses and exercises 
certain powers ,and functions resembling those 
conferred upon and exercised by regular courts, 
it is W!anting in several essential constituents of 
a court. Its action or conclusion upon matters 
of complaint brought before it for investigation, 
and which the act designates as the 'recom-
mendation,' 'report,' 'order,' or 'requirement' of 
the board is neither final nor conclusive; nor is 
the commission invested with any authority to 
enforce its decision or award. Without reviewing 
in detail the provisions of the law, we are clearly 
of the opinion that the commission is invested 
with only adimnistrative powers of supervision 
and investigation, which fall far short of making 
the board a court, or its action judicial, in the 
proper sense of the term. The commission 
hears, investigates, and reports upon complaints 
made before it, involving alleged violations of or 
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omission of duty under the act; but subsequent 
judicial proceedings are contemplated wnd pro-
vided for, as the remedy for the enforcement, 
either by itself or the party interested, of its 
order or report in all cases where the party com-
plained of or against whom its decision is ren-
dered does not yield voluntary obedience thereto. 
By the fourteenth and sixteenth sections of the 
act it is provided that the report or findings made 
by the commission 'should thereafter, in all 
judicial proceedings, be deemed prima facie evi-
dence as to each and every fact found.' 
"The comjmssion is charged with the duty of in-
vestigating and reporting upon complaints, and 
the facts found or reported by it are only given 
the force and weight of prima facie evidence in all 
such judicial proceedings as may thereafter be 
required or had for the enforcement of its recom-
mendation or order. The functions of the com-
mission are those of referees or special commis-
sioners, appointed to make preliminary investi-
gation of and report upon matters for subsequent 
judicial examination and determination. In re-
spect to interstate commerce matters covered by 
the law, the commission may be regarded as the 
general referee of each and every circuit court of 
the United States, upon which the jurisdiction is 
conferred of enforcing the rights, duties, and 
obligations recognized and imposed by the act. 
It is neither a federal court under the constitu-
tion, nor does it exercise judicial powers, nor do 
its conclusions possess the efficacy of judicial pro-
ceedings. This federal commi,ssion has assigned to 
it the duties and performs for the United States, 
in respect to that interstate commerce committee 
by the constitution to the exclusive care and juris-
diction of congress, the same functions which 
State commissioners exercise in respect to local 
or purely internal commerce, over which the 
States appointing them have exclusive control. 
Their validity in their respective spheres of oper-
ation stands upon the same footing. The validity 
of State commissioners invested with powers as 
ample and large as those conferred upon the 
federal commissioners, has not been successfully 
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questioned, when limited to that local or internal 
commerce over which the States have exclusive 
jurisdiction; and no valid reason is seen for 
doubting or questioning the authority of congress, 
under its sovereign and exclusive power to regu-
late commerce among the several States, to create 
like commissions for the purpose of supervising, 
investigating, and reporting upon matters or com-
plaints connected with or growing out of inter-
state commerce. What one sovereign may do in 
respect to matters within its exclusive control, the 
other may certainly do in respect to matters over 
which it has exclusive authority." 
It is perfectly obvious, therefore, that the Commission, 
in a given case, may exercise, or at least may attempt to 
exercise, functions of a judicial or quasi-judicial power, 
which would render it amenable to the original juris-
diction of this court relative to the issuance of a writ 
of prohibition. The only remaining question, then, on 
this phase of the matter, is whether or not the facts of 
this case show an exercise, or an attempted exercise, of 
judicial or quasi-judicial power in the premises by the 
Commission. 
And it must be constantly remembered, on this bmnch 
of the case, that the jurisdiction .of this court is not 
limited to or by the jurisdiction of the Commission, and 
that the jurisdictional power of this court to entertain 
an application for a writ of prohibition is dependent only 
on the nature of the act which the Commission is under-
taking, and not on the question whether such act is 
either within or without the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion, when it is claimed, in good faith, that the act is in 
excess of the jurisdiction of the Commission. 
In this case the Commission, according to the express 
language of its order, is making an "investigation and 
inquiry" into the provisions of the contracts with a view 
to determining whether the rates therein named are 
reasonable and equitable. There can be absolutely no 
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question but that such action on the part of the Com-
mission involves the exercise of judicial power and 
judicial functions in contradistinction to legislative func-
tions. The establishment of a rate is the making of a 
rule for the future, and therefore is an act legislative, 
not judicial, in kind. (Prentis vs. Atlantic Coast Line 
Co., 211 U. S. 210, 53 L. Ed. 150; Bluefield vs. Water 
Works Co., (W.Va.), 94 S. E. 121; Randall Gas Co. vs. 
Glass Co., (W. Va.), 88 S. E. 840; Spring Valley Water 
Works vs. San Francisco, 52 Cal. 111). On the other 
hand, it is equally well settled that an inquiry as to 
whether or not existing rates are reasonable or not, is a 
iudicial act or function. (Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion vs. C. N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 167 U. S. 479, 42 L. Ed. 
243). Hence, if the Commission is usurping jurisdiction 
in respect to the determination of the reasonableness of 
existing contract rates, it is exercising or attempting to 
exercise a judicial function, rendering it amenable, in 
that respect, to the original jurisdiction of this court 
to issue a writ of prohibition. 
So, also, an attempted determination by the Commis-
sion as to whether or not contract rates are unjustly 
discriminatory or preferential, and therefore in violation 
of the act, is nothing more or less than determining 
whether the existing contract rate has been legally estab-
lished, or whether the same is or is not reasonable, and 
hence is the exercise of a judicial function. (Chicago, 
Etc., Ry. Co. vs. Railroad Com'n of Indiana, 38 Ind. A. 
439, 78 N. E. 338). The determination of the existence 
or non-existence of discrimination as respects existing 
contracts, is clearly a judicial function, because it in-
volves the exercise of judgment and discretion and 
affects the rights of property of the citizens, and involves 
an exposition and application of the statute, and is a 
declaration of what the law is rather than what it shall 
be, and it is a determination of the rights and duties of 
parties under existing law with relation to existing facts. 
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In re Revisor of Statutes, 141 Wis. 592, 124 
N. W. 670; 
People vs. Salsbury, 134 Mich. 537, 96 N. 
w. 936; 
Board, Etc. vs. Briede, 117 La. 183, 41 So. 
487; 
Gulnac vs. Board, Etc., 7 4 N. J. L. 543, 
64 Atl. 998. 
That which distinguishes a "judicial" from a "legis-
lative" act is that the one is a determination of what 
the law is in relation to some existing thing already 
done or happened, while the other is a predetermination 
of what the law shall be for the regulation of future 
cases falling under its provision. (Tyson vs. Washington 
County, 110 N. W. 634, 636, 78 Neb. 211.) 
Hence, if the Commission is usurping jurisdiction in 
that respect, it is amenable to a writ of prohibition, as 
that is a judicial function. (Garff vs. Smith, 31 Utah 
102, 86 Pac. 772.) 
An attempt by the Commission to determine whether 
the contract in question was "lawful when made," is the 
exercise of a strictly judicial power. This is too plain 
for discussion. Hence, if the Commission is usurping 
jurisdiction in that respect it is amenable to a writ of 
prohibition. 
An attempt by the Commission to determine whether 
the contract in question was "founded upon an adequate 
consideration," is likewise clearly the exercise of a 
judicial function. It involves an interpretation and ex-
position of that clause of the act. It would involve an 
adjudication of legal rights. It would involve the 
exercise of judgment. It would involve a determination 
of the legality of the contract under the statute. It 
would undertake to determine a question of right or 
obligation or of property. There can be absolutely no 
question but that such a determination would be the 
exercise of a judicial function or power. 
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People vs. Apfelbaum, 251 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. 
995; 
In re Revisor of Statutes, 141 Wis. 592, 124 
N. W. 670; 
Garff vs. Smith, 31 Utah 102, 86 Pac. 772; 
Newell vs. Franklin (R. I.), 7 4 Atl. 1009; 
In re Commissioners, 22 Okl. 435, 98 Pac. 
557; 
Tyson vs. County, 78 Neb. 211, 110 N. W. 
634; 
Board vs. Briede, 117 La. 183, 41 So. 487; 
Metz vs. Maddox, 105 N.Y. S. 702; 
Biddleford vs. Yeates, 104 Me. 506, 72 Atl. 
235; . 
People vs. Salsbury, 134 Mich. 537, 96 N. 
w. 936. 
Hence, it is clear that as respects those functions or 
an attempt to exercise them, this court has the juris-
diction to inquire into the authority and power of the 
Commission to exercise such function, and to restrain 
by writ of prohibition the usurpation of power in those 
respects. 
We pass therefore from the question of the existence 
of the jurisdiction or power of this court to issue the 
writ, to the question of whether or not, under the facts 
of this case, the court, in its discretion, should allow 
or refuse to allow the writ. 
Even assuming that this court has jurisdiction to issue the 
writ, and even assuming that the commission is exceeding 
its jurisdiction in the premises, nevertheless a writ of 
prohibition ought not to issue because the Cement Com-
pany has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law by writ of review or certiorari to 
this court to supervise and review whatever action Com-
mission may take in the premises. 
Section 4834 of the Compiled Laws of Utah of 1917, 
provides that: 
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"Within thirty days after the application for 
a rehearing is denied, or, if the application is 
granted, then within thirty days after the ren-
dition of the decision on rehearing, the applicant 
may apply to the supreme court of this state 
for a writ of certiorari or review (hereinafter 
referred to as a writ of review) for the purpose 
of having the lawfulness of the original order 
or decision or the order or decision on rehearing 
inquired into and determined. Such writ shall 
be made returnable not later than thirty days 
after the date of the issuance thereof, and 
shall direct the Commission to certify its record 
in the case to the court. On the return day, 
the cause shall be heard by the supreme court, 
unless for a good reason shown the same be 
continued. No new or additional evidence may 
be introduced in the supreme court, but the 
cause shall be heard on the record of the com-
mission as certified to by it. The review shall 
not be extended further than to determine 
whether the commission has regularly pursued 
its authority, including a determination of 
whether the order or decision under review vio-
lates any right of the petitioner under the Con-
stitution of the United States or of the State 
of Utah. The findings and conclusions of the 
Commissions on questions of fact shall be final 
and shall not be subject to review. Such ques-
tions of fact shall include ultimate facts and 
the findings and conclusions of the Commission 
on reasonableness and discrimination. The Com-
mission and each party to the action or proceed-
ing before the Commission shall have the right 
to appear in the review proceedings. Upon the 
hearing the supreme court shall enter judgment 
either affirming or setting aside the order or 
decision of the Commission. The provisions of 
the code of civil procedure of this State relating 
to writs of review shall, so far as applicable 
and not in conflict with the provisions of this 
title, apply to proceedings instituted in the 
supreme court under the provisions of this sec-
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tion. No court of this State (except the supreme 
court to the extent herein spectfied) shall have 
jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul 
any order or decision of the Commission, or to 
suspend or delay the execution or opera,tion 
thereof, or to enjoin, rest~ain, or interfere with 
the Commission in the performance .of its official 
duties; provided, that the writ of mandamus 
shall lie from the supreme court to the Commis-
sion in all proper cases." 
It is seen, therefore, that the statute provides that 
this court may review any order the Commission may 
make by writ of certiorari, and on such review may 
determine "the lawfulness" of the order, and may de-
termine "whether the Commission has regularly pursued 
its authority" and may determine whether the order 
violates any constitutional right of a party. The statute 
has been so construed by this court in Salt Lake City 
vs. Umh Light & Tmction Co., 173 Pac. 556. It was 
absolutely essential that the act provide for a review 
by this court of any judicial questions involved in the 
proceeding before the Commission, and "the right to 
a judicial review must be substantial, adequate, and 
safely available." (Wa,dley, S. R. Co. vs. Georgia,, 235 
U. S. 651, 59 L. Ed. 405.) 
It is sometimes held that the method provided by 
the Utilities Act for reviewing an order of the Com-
mission is exclusive. 
Chicago vs. O'Connell, 278 Ill. 591, 116 
N. E. 210; . 
Ga,tes vs. Commission, 86 Ore. 442, 168 
Pac. 939; 
N. Y. vs. Commission, 171 N. Y. S. 830. 
In any event it is well settled law that a writ of pro-
hibition is a high prerogative writ. It is not a writ 
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of right granted ex debito justitiae, but one of sound 
judicial discretion under the circumstances of each 
particular case, to be used with great caution to further 
justice when no ordinary remedies are applicable. 
The Utilities Act (Section 4834, C. L. 1917) expressly 
provides for a review by this court on a writ of cer-
tiorari of the lawfulness of any order or decision the 
Utilities Commission might make in the premises. And 
of course it is elementary that a writ of prohibition 
is an extraordinary remedy to be resorted to only in 
cases of extreme necessity, and that the writ will not 
issue where the plaintiff has any other adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of law. In this connection, 
it has been held in innumerable cases that a right 
of review presents such an adequate remedy, and that 
inconvenience and expense involved in a hearing be-
fore the inferior tribunal is not a sufficient ground 
for granting the writ. And moreover, it is well settled 
that the fact that more time must be consumed in the 
pursuit of another remedy than prohibition, does not, 
in itself, make such other remedy inadequate. 
Where there is an adequate remedy by certiorari, 
the court will exercise its discretion and refuse a writ 
of prohibition. 
Ducheneau vs. Ireland, 5 Ut. 108; 
People vs. Hills, 5 Ut. 410, 16 Pac. 405; 
State vs. Court, 27 Ut. 336; 
Board, etc., vs. Maughan, 35 Ut. 516, 101 
Pac. 581; 
Campbell vs. Durand, 39 Ut. 118; 
Carrigan vs. Bowman, 40 Ut. 91; 119 Pac. 
1037; 
32 Cyc. 613-617 ; 
Hudson vs. Preston, 134 Ga. 222, 67 S. E. 
800; 
State vs. McQuillin, 262 Mo. 256, 171 
s. w. 72; 
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Heaton vs. Hooper, 134 Ga. 577, 68 S. E. 
297; 
In re Price, 155 U. S. 396, 39 L. Ed. 198; 
People vs. Bostlemann, 144 N. Y. S. 148; 
Crittendon vs. Booneville (Miss.), 45 So. 
723) ; 
Parks vs. Ryan (N.Mex.) 173 Pac. 858; 
Ex Parte Okla., 220 U. S. 191, 55 L. Ed. 
431; 
People vs. Foley, 172 N. Y. S., 279; 
Whitaker vs. Manson, 84 S. C. 91, 65 S. E. 
952; 
Olden vs. Paxton, 27 Ida. 597, 150 Pac. 
40· 
City 'vs. Court (Cal.), 152 Pac. 731; 
State vs. Court (Nev.), 149 Pac. 178; 
Silver Mines vs. Court, 33 Nev. 97, 110 
Pac. 503; 
Lewis vs. Hogg, 22 Wash. 646, 62 Pac. 
143; 
Cann vs. Moore, 23 Wash. 115, 62 Pac. 
441; 
Calumet Co. vs. DeFrance, 29 Colo. 309, 
68 Pac. 367; 
Hill vs. Court, 21 Cal. Appeals 424, 131 
Pac. 1061; 
Hayes vs. Oceanside, 6 Cal. Appeal 520, 92 
Pac. 492; 
State vs. Court, 46 Okla. 654, 149 Pac. 
140; 
2 Spelling ex rel., Sec. 1716, 1728; 
C. & N. W. Ry. vs. Dougherty, 163 N. W. 
715; 
State vs. Bowerman, 40 Mo. Appeals, 576; 
People vs. Clute, 42 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
157; 
The trouble and expense involved in a hearing before 
inferior court or tribunal is not ground for granting 
writ of prohibition, where there is a remedy by appeal 
from an adverse judgment. (Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. 
vs. Dougherty, 163 N. W. 715; Carran vs. Court, 30 
Wash. 700, 71 Pac. 648; Olden vs. Paxton, 27 Ida, 597, 
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150 Pac. 40; Carrigan vs. Bowman, 40 Ut. 91, 119 Pac. 
1037.) 
In Carrigan vs. Bowman, 40 Ut. 91, 119 Pac. 1037, 
this court in denying a writ of prohibition, says: 
"The necessary delay and expense of an 
appeal ordinarily furnish no sufficient reasons 
for holding that the remedy by appeal is not 
adequate or speedy. To hold otherwise is to 
hold that all appeals are not adequate or speedy, 
for all involve some delay and expense." 
In Olden vs. Paxton, 27 Ida. 597, 150 Pac. 40, the 
court says: 
"In view of the congested condition of the 
calendar of this court, it becomes absolutely 
necessary; in order to expedite the business of 
the court, that, in granting writs of prohibition, 
mandamus, and review, we adhere strictly to 
the law governing these writs, and, in the ex-
ercise of the court's discretion in matters of 
this kind, we cannot take into consideration the 
annoyance, expense, or delay in determining 
whether or not these extraordinary writs should 
issue. The number of applications for the issu-
ance of extraordinary writs is increasing so 
rapidly that it is apparent to our minds a strict 
observance of the law, as applied by the greater 
weight of authority in the issuance of such writs, 
should be adopted by this court, and such a 
writ should not issue where the aggrieved party 
has another adequate remedy." 
The remedy by certiorari provided for in the act is 
certainly plain. Under the authorities, it must be 
regarded as sufficiently speedy. Therefore, the only 
question is whether or not it is adequate. It is an 
ample remedy if the parties' rights are fully pro-
tected. It is an adequate remedy, unless the case pre-
sents features indicative of some jeopardy to the parties' 
rights. It is an adequate remedy if the questions 
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which the party desires to litigate and determine in 
this proceeding can be reviewed on the certiorari. On 
the other hand the remedy is inadequate if the rights 
of the parties in interest will be jeopardized by re-
mitting them to the remedy by certiorari. It is an 
adequate remedy unless it will result an injury for 
which no other adequate remedy exists. It is an in-
adequate remedy unless it affords to the party every 
right to which he would be entitled in this proceeding. 
It is an inadequate remedy if it will result in an irre-
parable damage. The parties are entitled to a judi-
cial review of the questions of law which the Com-
mission must be deemed to have decided in making 
any order. (Wadley S. R. Co. vs. Gq,., 235 U. S. 651, 
59 L. Ed. 405; People vs. Commission, 166 N. Y. S. 
825.) If a certiorari affords such a review, it is 
adequate, otherwise, it is not. 
It would certainly seem that a certiorari would afford 
an adequate remedy in the premises. The jurisdiction 
of the Public Utilities Commission is by the very terms 
of the act confined to the regulation and control of 
property devoted to a public use by the Utility cor-
porations confined in the act. The Commission's juris-
diction is confined by the statute to the control of 
the Utilities mentioned, and it has no jurisdiction over 
the Cement Company (Commission vs. Telephone Ass'n., 
282 Ill. 336, 118 N. E. 760). Even if the Commission 
had power to interfere with this contract, how could 
such power be exercised? The Power Company is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. The 
Cement Company is not. It is beyond the authority 
of the Commission to issue any order directed to the 
Cement Company requiring it to do or refrain from 
doing anything. All the Commission could do would 
be to make an order directed to the Power Company 
to terminate the contract. In obedience to that order, 
the Power Company could proceed in one of two 
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ways, either by bringing an action seeking the cancel-
lation of the contract, or by serving notice on the 
Cement Company that electricity would no longer be 
furnished under the contract rate, but that all hereafter 
furnished and accepted by the Cement Company would 
be charged for at the increased tariff or schedule 
rate. It probably wouid pursue the latter course. The 
Cement Company would then have the right to bring 
an action to test the validity of the contract, or rather 
the efficacy of the attempted termination thereof. 
Chapter 1 of Utilities Act creates the Commission 
and Chapter 2 defines the Public Utilities subject to 
the jurisdiction and regulation of the Commission and 
the provisions of the act. The Cement Company is 
not embmced within the Utilities subject to the act 
or over which the Commission is given jurisdiction. 
The Commission has no power to regulate or control the 
business or contracts of the Cement Company or any 
part or portion thereof. 
It was competent for the legislature to withhold 
from the Commission such power or jurisdiction as its 
wisdom or choice determined. (Gas Co. vs. Commission, 
224 N. Y. 156, 120 N. E. 132.) It withheld from the 
Commission jurisdiction over the Cement Company, 
and hence it could not enforce any order made by 
it directed to the Cement Company. 
The Cement Company is not under the jurisdiction 
of the Commission. It is not embraced within the 
Public Utilities defined in the act. It is beyond the 
authority of the Commission to issue any orders 
directed to the Cement Company requiring it to do 
or refrain from doing anything. All the Commission 
can do would be to make an order directed to the 
Power Company to terminate the contract or to no 
longer furnish service under the contract rate, leav-
ing it optional to the Cement Company to take the 
service or not as it might see fit. 
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It follows that the Commission could not make 
any order which would be binding upon or res adjudi-
cata as to the Cement Company, and the Cement 
Company would be at perfect liberty, not only to test 
the order by a certiorari under the act, but also to 
test its validity and restrain its enforcement in any 
other appropriate action or proceeding in law or in 
equity in either the State or the Federal courts. 
The Commission could not make any binding deter-
mination of the validity of the contract concluding 
the Cement Corrt'pany. 
People vs. Peoria, etc., Ry., 273 Ill. 440, 
113 N. E. 68; 
Hanlon vs. Eshleman, 169 Cal. 200, 146 
Pac. 656; 
Commission vs. Tel. Ass'n., 282 Ill. 336, 
118 N. E. 760; 
A. T. & S. F. Ry. vs. Commission, 173 Cal. 
577, 160 Pac. 828. 
As the Commission would have no jurisdiction to 
apply the Act to persons or corporations not subject 
to or within the regulatory control of the Commission, 
the evidence certified in the record could be examined 
and reviewed in detail to determine the question of 
the Commission's jurisdiction. The Commission would 
have no final or conclusive power to determine any 
question of either fact or law whereon its jurisdiction 
depended. The question is a judicial one for the 
court. Hence purported findings of fact whereby the 
Commission determines itself clothed with jurisdiction 
are reviewable by the court upon all the evidence and 
would be sustained only when justified by both the 
ultimate and evidenciary facts. 
Commission vs. Evans (Utah), 17 4 Pac. 
825; 
Allen vs. Commission (Cal.), 175 Pac. 
466; 
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Miller vs. Commission (Cal.), 178 Pac. 
960; 
Donlon Bros. vs. Commission (Cal.), 159 
Pac. 715; 
Coal Co. vs. Commission, 123 N. E. 28; 
Thede Bros. vs. Commission, 285 Ill. 483, 
121 N. E. 172; 
In re Amsinck's Estate, 169 N. Y. S. 336; 
School Dist. vs. Commission (Cal.), 168 
Pac. 392; 
Petersen vs. Industrial Board, 281 Ill. 326, 
117 N. E. 1033; 
Holbrook vs. Hotel Co., 200 Mich. 597, 166 
N. W. 876; 
Construction Co. vs. Allen (Ky.), 201 
s. w. 567; 
Retmier vs. Cruse (Ind.), 119 N. E. 32; 
Steel Co. vs. Lambert (Ind.), 118 N. E. 
162· 
Hospital vs. Board, 282 Ill. 316, 118 N. E. 
766· Rayne~ vs. Company (Ind.), 119 N. E. 
809; 
Manufacturing Co. vs. Board, 283 Ill. 468, 
119 N. E. 615. 
In Commission vs. Evans (Utah), 17 4 Pac. 825, the 
court holds and says : 
"Where, however, as here, the right of the 
Commission to proceed under the act is chal-
lenged at the very threshold of the proceeding 
to allow compensation upon the ground that the 
injury is not one provided for by the act----nay, 
more, that it is one which is expressly excluded 
therefromr-the question is quite different. 
Where such a condition exists we find nothing 
in the act which prevents the right of any 
employer from assailing the decision of the 
Commission respecting ultimate liability. In 
other words, we find nothing in the act which 
authorizes the Commission to deplete the in-
surance fund by devoting it to claims not covered 
by the act or to require employers or insurance 
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carriers to pay any such claims. Nor do we 
find anything in the act which authorizes the 
Commission to determine without right of re-
view the question of ultimate liability under the 
act. To do that clearly is a judicial question, and 
when it arises, as in this case, the right to an ad-
judication by the courts cannot be denied. While, 
as is well said by the Supreme Court of Ohio in 
State ex rel. vs. Creamer, supra, 'the authority 
to ascertain facts, and to apply the law to the 
facts when ascertained, pertains as well to other 
departments of government as to the judiciary,' 
yet it is also said in the same case, 'but the 
ultimate question of actual liability cannot be 
removed from the courts.' That statement, 
it seems to us, expresses the real distinction 
between judicial and mere administrative or 
ministerial functions. While no doubt the Com-
mission may, under certain circumstances, hear 
evidence and may determine the facts and apply 
the law to them when found, yet when its 
right to proceed under the act at all events is 
challengedr-that is, when, as stated by the 
Supreme Court of Ohio, the 'ultimate question 
of actual liability' under the act is involved-
then a judicial question is presented which can-
not be withdrawn from the courts, and recourse 
to them must be permitted in some form." 
In Allen vs. Railroad Commission (Cal.), 175 Pac. 
466, it is held that under the Public Utilities Act of 
1915 (St. 1915, p. 161), Sec. 67, authorizing the Supreme 
Court to review orders or decisions of the Railroad 
Commission by a writ of certiorari or review, and 
providing that the review shall not extend further 
than to determine whether the Commission has legally 
pursued its authority, including a determination of 
whether the order or decision violates any constitutional 
right of the petitioner, and that the findings and con-
clusions of the Commission on questions of fact shall 
be final, and not subject to review, the findings and 
conclusions which are not subject to review are those 
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on questions of fact within the jurisdiction of the 
Commission, and the question of mixed law and fact, 
as to whether or not a corporation is a public utility, 
so as to give the Commission jurisdiction over it, is 
reviewable. The Supreme Court may restrain the 
Railroad Commission from exercising powers which 
it does not possess, or annul its decree when such un-
warranted powers have been exercised. The court says 
at pages 468 and 469: 
"This review is held under Section 67 of the 
Public Utilities Act of 1915. It is plain, and 
indeed it has in effect been decided, that the 
declaration in that section that 'findings and con-
clusions of the Commission on questions of fact 
shall be final and shall not be subject to review' 
has to do with the Commission's determinations 
upon questions of fact within its jurisdiction. 
When the question, ever one of mixed law and 
fact, goes, as here, to the jurisdiction itself, 
when the whole controversy revolves around the 
inquiry as to whether or not the corporation 
is a public utility, to say that the determination of 
the Commission upon this matter is final and 
conclusive, and is not subject to review, is the 
equivalent of denying to a petitioner a hearing 
upon a right carefully preserved to him by the 
language of Section 67 itself-a hearing and a 
determination of whether the order and decision 
under review 'violates any right of the petitioner 
under the Constitution of the United States or of 
the State of California.' So it will be found that 
in such petitions as P,acific Telephone Co. vs. 
Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 137 Pac. 1119, 50 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 652, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 822; 
Del Mar Water Co. vs. Eshleman, 167 Cal. 666, 
140 Pac. 591, 948; Title, etc., Co. vs. Railroad 
Commission, 168 Cal. 295, 142 Pac. 878, Ann. 
Cas. 1916A, 738; Marin W,ater, etc., Co. vs. 
Railroad Commission, 171 Cal. 706, 154 Pac. 
864, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 114; Atchison Ry. Co. 
vs. Railroad Commission, 173 Cal. 577, 160 Pac. 
828; Western Association, etc., vs. Railroad Com-
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mwswn, 173 Cal. 802, 162 Pac. 391-this court 
has uniformly and without a dissenting voice in-
vestigated every complaint where the petitioners 
upon reasonable grounds asserted that the Com-
mission had either exceeded its jurisdiction or 
refWJed to exercise the jurisdiction which in 
law it possessed. In the last-cited case the Com-
mission, believing it did not have jurisdiction 
to entertain the application of the petitioner, 
refused to do so, and this court, reviewing its 
powers, held that it did possess this jurisdiction 
and issued mandate to the Commission to exer-
cise it. The converse of this proposition must 
be equally plain. If this court by mandate may 
compel the Commission to exercise powers which 
it does possess, upon the other hand it may 
restrain the Commission from exercising powers 
which it does not possess, or annul its decree 
when such unwarranted powers have been ex-
ercised." 
Where the jurisdiction of the Commission depends 
upon questions of fact and law of a justiciable charac-
ter, or a question attempted to be determined by the 
Commission involves the exercise of judicial functions 
even incidentally, the courts must be free and untram-
meled in their review of the question, and a statute 
cannot constitutionally make the Commission's deter-
mination of the facts inclusive on the courts. 
C. M. & St. P. Ry. vs. Minnesota, 134 
U. S. 418, 33 L. Ed. 970; 
Prentis vs. A. C. L. Ry., 211 U. S. 210, 
53 L. Ed. 150 ; 
Commission vs. Fla. E. C. Ry., 72 Fla. 379, 
73 s. 171; 
Columbia Co. vs. Atkinson, 271 Mo. 28, 
195 s. w. 7 41. 
Both this court and the district court are constitu-
tional courts, and as is held and said in Public Service 
Company vs. Commission, 88 N. J. Law 603, 96 Atl. 
1013: 
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"The legislature cannot impair the jurisdiction 
of a constitutional court, either by preventing its 
exercise or creating a co-ordinate authority." 
To the same effect is the decision of this court in 
State vs. Durand, 36 Ut. 93, 104 Pac. 760. 
The propriety of the courts issuing a writ of prohi-
bition at this time is to be tested by the nature of the 
proceeding in its present status, as determined by the 
.order already made, and not by an anticipated decision, 
which it is assumed or said that the Commission will 
make. 
N. Y. vs. Commission, 171 N.Y. S. 830; 
A., T. & S. F. Ry. vs. State, 47 Okla. 645, 
150 Pac. 108; 
Romberger vs. Water Valley, 63 Miss. 218. 
At this time the Commission is merely proceeding to 
investigate the provisions, rates and character of the 
contra_cts. The Cement Company does not state in its 
application any facts showing that it has been or will 
be injured by such investigation, much less that it has 
been or will be irreparably injured. The Commission 
certainly has jurisdiction over the Power Company, as a 
Public Utility, to inquire into its affairs, and the Com-
mission might through an ex parte hearing to which only 
the Power Company was a party, acquire all the in-
formation its desires, either in this proceeding or in the 
general Rate Increase Case, No. 248, pending before 
the Commission. The Commission might act upon such 
information without the Cement Company having had a 
chance to present its side of the matter under investi-
gation. It is seldom that a writ of prohibition runs to 
prevent a party's being given a hearing to which he has 
a right, both moral and legal, and which has been 
afforded him. Certainly the Cement Company cannot 
have been injured by the Commissions affording it an 
opportunity to be heard. 
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But the Cement Company seeks the writ on the theory 
that the Commission may or will hereafter make an 
order abrogating or impairing its contract in violation 
of its constitutional or statutory rights. It will be time 
enough for this court to examine into the validity of such 
an order and restrain its enforcement, when it is made. 
It may be that the decision Df the Commission would be 
favorable to the Cement Company, in which event it 
would have no cause for complaint. If, on the other 
hand, it should be adverse and the adjudication void for 
the want of jurisdiction, the enforcement of the order 
might be prevented and the order declared void and 
annulled under a writ of review. (Hill vs. Superior 
Court, 21 Cal. App. 424, 131 Pac. 1061.) 
A writ of prohibition will not be awarded on the 
theory that the Commission will in the future make an 
order beyond it8 jurisdiction or that it is void because 
unconstitutional or contrary to the statute. The court, 
on this application, will not undertake to anticipate what 
order the Commission will make, because if the Com-
mission makes an error, it can be rectified by this court 
on a writ of review or by some other court in an 
appropriate proceeding. The likelihood of the Cement 
Company being injured or not being injured depends 
necessarily upon the facts as established by the evidence 
offered before the Commission. This court cannot 
assume that the Commission will not act fairly and im-
partially, and cannot assume or determine in advance 
what the Commission will do. It must be presumed that 
the Commission will perform its duty and not violate 
the safeguards of the constitution or disobey the mandate 
Df the statute. The fallacy of this application consists 
in the assumption that the Cement Company is threat-
ened with a wrong. It cannot be assumed that the 
Commission will not recognize and give due effect to any 
contractual rights which the Cement Company may have. 
It would be premature and unnecessary to decide the 
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merits of the Cement Company's contractual rights in 
the premises before action by the Commission. The 
court only deals with the record as at present made, and 
will not, on this application, anticipate the ruling of the 
Commission or correct imaginary errors in its future 
rulings, and thereby take over unto itself at this time, 
jurisdiction of the cause on the merits as an inter-
mediate step arresting the evolution of the proceeding 
before the Commission. A writ of prohibition will not 
issue on any such theory or for any such purpose. 
State vs. McQuillin, 262 Mo. 256, 171 S. W. 
72; 
School Dist. vs. Sims, 186 S. W. 4; 
People vs. Smith, 184 N. Y. 96, 76 N. E. 
925; 
State vs. Homer, 164 Mo. App. 334, 145 
s. w. 497; 
Dalton Co. vs. Comm., 213 Fed. 888; 
Trenton Co. vs. Trenton, 227 Fed. 502. 
In Trenton & M. C. T. Corp. vs. Inhabitants of Tren-
ton, 227 Fed. Rep. 502, it is held that: Where the ques-
tion whether an increase in rate by a street railroad 
company is just and reasonable is pending before a 
State board vested by the Legislature with power to 
determine the same, a federal court will not, before the 
State board has passed upon the question, or has had an 
opportunity to do so, interfere by injunction to restrain 
action by such board because the right to so increase the 
rates is based on ordinances claimed to constitute con-
tracts which the State cannot constitutionally impair. 
At pages 505-506 the court says: 
"If the plaintiffs, in fact, have contracts which 
are beyond the power of either the municipality or 
the State to change or impair, the act of the board 
in temporarily depriving them of the benefit 
thereof did not infringe their constitutional rights 
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to any greater extent than like rights are in-
fringed, without violating constitutional pro-
visions, when a court of competent jurisdiction, 
upon ex parte application, restrains the exercise of 
them pendente lite in order to preserve the status 
quo, pending a hearing and decision. The board 
did not attempt to determine whether any con-
tract rights existed, or what they were, or 
whether they were beyond the right of the 
municipality or State to abrogate or change them. 
It merely held the whole matter in abeyance until 
there could be an investigation and a determina,.. 
tion could be reached. The plaintiffs cannot 
assume that the board's decision will not recog-
nize and give due effect to any contractual rights 
which they have. Under these circumstances it 
would, in our fudgment, be improper for this 
court to attempt to adfudicate these questions, 
before the board which the Legislature of New 
Jersey has clothed with the legislative power over 
rates and whose jurisdiction has already been in-
voked, has done so, or had an opportunity to do 
so. In this respect this case cannot be distin-
guished from Prentis vs. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 
211 U. S. 210, 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. 150. It 
was urged there, as here, that the plaintiffs had 
contracts with the State, which could not be 
changed except under certain conditio:p.s, which 
did not exist in that case. The court, after 
remarking that if the State had bound itself by 
contract not to cut down the rates as contemplated, 
there would seem to be no reason why the suit 
should not then be entertained in the federal 
court, said: 
" 'But it would be premature and is unnecessary 
to decide whether the State has done so or not. 
No rate is irrevocably fixed by the State until the 
matter has been laid before the body having the 
last word. It may be that that body will adhere 
to the old rate or will establish one that will not 
be open to the charge of violating the contracts 
alleged. * * * On the question of contract, 
as on that of confiscation, it is reasonable and 
proper that the evidence should be laid, in the first 
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instance, before the body having the last legis-
lative word.' " 
The court should not, at this time on this application, 
pass on the constitutional question raised. As is said 
by this court in Carrigan vs. Bowman, 40 Ut. 91, 119 
Pac. 1037, at page 94: 
"Where the validity of a statute or ordinance 
is involved, we think the general and better rule 
obtains that a writ of prohibition will not be 
granted in advance of the trial or determination in 
the inferior court, where the question is presented, 
when a plain remedy by appeal is afforded, though 
it may be that the higher court will, when the 
question is presented to it, determine that the 
statute or ordinance is invalid, and the inferior 
court without jurisdiction, unless it is made to 
appear that to require the applicant to pursue the 
remedy by appeal or writ of review will deprive 
him, or seriously embarrass him in the exercise 
of some present right. (Notes to cases in the 
case of State vs. Superior Court, 111 Am. St. 
Rep. 964.) We may here say, as was well said by 
the court in the case of State vs. Rost, 49 La. Ann. 
1451, 22 South 421, that: 
" 'Ordinarily we exercise supervisory jurisdic-
tion by writs of certiorari and prohibition only in 
unappealable cases, leaving errors comm.itted in 
appealable cases, or questions affecting the valid-
ity of the statute upon which the prosecution is 
based, to be corrected or decided in due course on 
appeal. * * * Cases may arise where the 
court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, and in 
furtherance of the ends of justice, will exert the 
control and supervision of inferior courts' by pro-
hibition, 'even in cases where an ultimate appeal 
lies. But they must be cases of peculiar circum-
stances or extreme urgency or necessity, which 
take them out of the general rule referred to. We 
do not deem the instant case to be of that char-
acter.' " 
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The same principle applies where there is an adequate 
remedy by certiorari (State vs. Rost, 49 La. Ann. 1451, 
22 s. 421). 
In Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. vs. Winnett (C. C. A. 
8 Cir.), 162 Fed. 242, the court in refusing to interfere 
by injunction to control in advance proceedings before 
a State Railway Commission, says at page 248: 
"It is argued that if the Railway Commission 
is permitted to fix the rate and to fix the time 
within the limits of the law when the same shall 
go into effect, and shall mail copies of the schedule 
or schedules of rates so fixed, appellant would be 
without remedy in a federal court of equity, for 
the reason that the law fixes the time when the 
rates shall go into effect, and that after notice 
has been mailed there would be nothing to enjoin, 
as the court has no power to restrain the passing 
of time. We will first consider the objections 
that stand in the way of granting such relief 
on the present bill, and then consider whether or 
not appellant would have a remedy in a federal 
court of equity after notice of the fixing of the 
rate had been mailed to it. 
"The first objection against granting the relief 
claimed is that prior to the fixing of the rate this 
court is bound by a conclusive presumption that 
the Railway Commission will act fustly, fairly, and 
within the limits of its power." 
In State vs. McQuillin, 262 Mo. 256, 171 S. W. 72, it is 
said at page 75: 
"We need not pursue that line of thought be-
cause the record we are dealing with is no such 
record. In this case we are, in effect, asked to 
anticipate the ruling of the judge on the suffici-
ency of the bill, or on the facts, correct im.aginary 
errors in his future rulings, and take over juris-
diction to ourselves, not only on the sufficiency of 
the bill, but on the merits as an intermediate step 
arresting the evolution of a case pending below. 
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That we ought not to do this is, we think, well 
within the doctrine and reasoning of a line of 
cases. State ex rel. vs. McQuillin, 256 Mo. loc. cit. 
702 et seq., 156 S. W. 713; State ex rel. vs. Mc-
Quillin (not yet officially reported), 168 S. W. 
924. Says Bond, J., speaking acceptably for us all 
in the latter case: 
"'We must assume that the said court will con-
duct the proceedings before it according to correct 
principles of law and equity, and, if the hearing 
should disclose no matter for which relief could 
be given, it will be denied, or vice versa.' " 
While the court, on this application, should not and 
will not go into the merits of the case, it may be re-
marked in passing that there would seem to be, at this 
late date, little substance in the question presented as to 
the constitutional power of the legislature to abrogate 
or impair service contracts made with Public Utilities. 
Both the Constitution of the United States (Art. 1, 
Sec. 10), and that of the State of Utah (Art. 1, Sec. 18), 
inhibit legislation impairing the obligation of a contract. 
The Power Company is, and from its organization 
was, a public service corporation. The power to regulate 
and control the rates of public service corporations is 
within the legitimate exercise of the police power of the 
State. This power may be exercised by the legislature 
itself directly 'by enacting a law fixing rates, or the 
legislature may delegate the power to fix rates to a 
properly constituted commission. The State has not and 
could not surrender or bargain away its police power. 
No citizen, and no number of citizens, can by contract 
estop the State from, or prevent it from, legitimately 
·exercising Tts police power. A statute enacted within 
the scope of the police power of the State is constitu-
tional and valid notwithstanding any effect it may have 
on previous contracts. In short, all contracts, whether 
made by the State itself, by municipal corporations, or 
by private corporations or individuals are subject to 
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being impaired or abrogated by subsequent statutes 
enacted in the exercise of the police power, and do not, 
by reason of the contract, or due process of law, or 
equal protection, or just compensation clauses of the 
constitutions, State and Federal, enjoy any immunity 
from such legislation. The rule is that contracts upon 
subjects that are within the police power of the State, 
even though valid when made, must be taken to have 
been entered into with knowledge of the infirmities of 
its subject matter and in view of the continuing power 
of the State to control the rates to be charged by public 
service corporations within its jurisdiction. In like 
manner, all rates fixed by contract between public service 
corporations and third persons are subject to be term-
inated by rates subsequently established by the State in 
the exercise of its police powers. Accordingly, it must 
be and is recognized that it was and is within the con-
stitutional power of the State, acting through the legis-
lature, or a properly constituted commission with duly 
delegated authority, to bring about the abrogation, 
cancellation or termination of the contracts in question. 
These propositions have been determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in two recent 
decisions rendered in Union Dry Goods Co. vs. Georgia 
Public Service Corporation, 248 U. S. 372, 63 L. Ed. 309, 
and Producers Transportation Company vs. Railroad 
Commission of California, 64 L. Ed. 166, decided Janu-
ary 5, 1920, and reported in the advance sheets of 
February 1, 1920. They are also established by the 
following authorities: 
St. Clair vs. Railway, 259 Pa. St. 462, 103 
Atl. 287; 
Leiper vs. Baltimore Ry., 262 Pa. St. 328, 
105 Atl. 551; 
Limoneira Co. vs. Commission, 174 Cal. 
232, 162 Pac. 1033; 
12 Cor. Jur., 991, 992, 1036, 1064; 
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Lumber Co. vs. Water Co., 92 Wash. 330, 
159 Pac. 133 ; 
Dry Goods Co. vs. P. S. Co., 142 Ga. 141, 
83 S. E. 946; 
Minneapolis Ry. vs. Menasha Co., 159 Wis. 
130,150 N. W.411; 
Hite vs. Cincinnati Ry., (Ill.), 119 N. E. 
904; 
Gas Co. vs. Pub. Ser. Corp., 73 W.Va. 571, 
80S. E. 931; 
Power Co. vs. Bloomquist, 26 Ida. 222, 141 
Pac. 1083; 
State vs. Pub. Ser. Corp., (Mo.), 204 S. W. 
497; 
Bolt Co. vs. PoWier Co., (Mo.), 204 S. W. 
1074; 
Dry Goods Co. vs. Pub. Ser. Corp., (Ga.), 
89 S. E. 779; 
Portland Ry. vs. Commission, 229 U.S. 397, 
57 L. Ed. 1248; 
Elec. Co. vs. CommYission, 238 U. S. 174, 
59 L. Ed. 1254; 
L. & N. Ry. vs. Motley, 219 U. S. 467, 
55 L. Ed. 297; 
Chicago Ry. vs. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 18, 
42 L. Ed. 948; 
Piano Co. vs. Utilities Co., (Ill.), 123 N. 
E. 631; 
Yeatman vs. Power Co., 126 Md. 513, 95 
Atl. 158; 
Woodburn vs. Commission, 82 Or. 114, 161 
Pac. 391; 
Shrader vs. Traction Co., (W. Va.), 99 S. 
E. 207; 
Salt Lake City vs. Traction Co., (Utah), 
173 Pac. 556; 
Dry Goods Co. vs. Pub. Ser. Comm., (U. 
S.), 63 L. Ed. 116; 
St. Clair vs. Elec. Ry. Co., 259 Pa. St. 462, 
103 Atl. 287; 
L. & N. Ry. vs. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 
58 L. Ed. 229. 
The Cement Company also asserts the validity of its 
contract as being "founded upon an adequate consider-
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ation." The jurisdiction of the Commission to interfere 
with the contract depends upon the existence or non-
existence of that fact. Hence the Commission has the 
right to inquire into that fact as an incident to its 
regulation of the utility, although its determination in 
that respect, being jurisdictional, will be subject to com-
plete review in the court. Thus, in 21 Stand. Encyc. 
Pro. 806, it is said : 
"Where jurisdiction depends upon contested 
facts which the inferior tribunal is competent to 
determine, prohibition will not be granted, even 
though the court errs in its determination. Like 
other extraordinary remedies, prohibition is to be 
resorted to only in cases of extreme necessity, and 
never in a case which presents a mere abstract or 
hypothetical question, nor where the excess of 
jurisdiction complained of cannot result in injury 
to the relator." 
It was held that under the provisions of Const., Art. 
12, Sec. 22, and the Public Utilities Act (St. Extra 
Sess. 1911, p. 18), giving the Railroad Commission juris-
diction to regulate a public utility by fixing rates, the 
Commission has power, subject to review by the court, 
to determine the validity of asserted rights or property 
which affect the exercise of its jurisdiction. The court 
says at page 1037: 
"A large part of the briefs of learned counsel 
for petitioner is devoted to discussion of a claim 
that the Railroad Commission was without juris-
diction to determine any question as to the 
validity of petitioner's asserted rights of property 
in regard to the waters claimed by them in good 
faith. In view of the provisions of our Constitu-
tion and the Public Utilities Act, and our de-
cisions thereunder, we do not see how it can be 
doubted that the Railroad Commission had the 
power to determine for the purpose of the exercise 
of its jurisdiction to regulate a public utility by 
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the fixing of rates, subject to such power of re-
view as is possessed by this court, all questions of 
fact essential to the proper exercise of that juris-
diction. And, of course, as said in Palermo Land 
& Water Co. vs. Railroad Commission, 160 Pac. 
228, 'Wherever a court or board is authorized to 
act upon the existence of a certain state of facts, 
it has jurisdiction to determine the existence or 
non-existence of the requisite facts,' and 'its juris-
diction cannot be affected by the circumstance 
that these facts are denied.' " 
The issuance of the writ is in the court's discretion. 
There is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in ordinary 
course of law by certiorari. 
As thus construed the statute imposes no hardship 
upon or barrier to the speedy determination of plain-
tiffs' rights in the premises. The remedy given by this 
statute is more summary and is calculat·ed to lead to 
better and quicker results because of the peculiar 
powers and functfons of the Commission, than resort to 
a court in the first instance. 
Not only is the right given to the Cement Company 
to apply for relief in the first instance to the Com-
mission, a form having quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial powers, but if aggrieved by the entry of any 
final order of the Commission affecting it, it may apply 
to this court for suspension of such final order, and 
for a full hearing upon the merits of its case as pre-
scribed by the act, and as interpreted and construed by 
this court in Salt Lake City vs. Traction Co., supra. 
The Commission was created by the Legislature to 
perform very important functions in the community, 
namely, to regulate the great public service corporations 
of the State in the conduct of their business, and compel 
those corporations adequately to discharge their duties to 
the public and not to exact therefor excessive charges. 
It was assumed, perhaps, by the Legislature that the 
members of the Commissions would acquire special 
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knowledge of the matters intrusted to them by experience 
and study, and that when the plan of their creation was 
fully developed they would prove efficient instrumentali-
ties for dealing with the complex problems presented by 
the activ1ties of these great corporations. It was not in-
tended that the courts should interfere with the Com-
missions or review their determinations further than is 
necessary to keep them within the law and protect the 
constitutional rights of the corporations over which they 
were given control. 
Argument is unnecessary to support the conclusion 
that primary interference of the courts with the admin-
istrative functions of a commission, like our Public 
Utility Commission, is incompatible with the proper 
exercise of governmental powers. 
The Utilities Act (Sec. 4834, Com. Laws 1917) in-
hibits interference by the court with the proceedings of 
the Commission. That provision cannot limit the juris-
diction of this court. But that provision does declare a 
legislative policy, which should have persuasive force 
in impelling this court to deny the writ independently 
of all questions as to the jurisdiction of the Commission 
or a usurpation of jurisdiction by the Commission, as 
there is an adequate remedy otherwise in the ordinary 
course of law. 
The CoPimission should not be interfered with by a 
writ of prohibition at this time. 
If such procedure could be tolerated, all advantage in 
vesting power in Public Utility Commissions to control 
these public service corporations would be lost; and such 
corporations could readily tie the hands of the Public 
Service Commissions by suits in equity, wherein the 
legal machinery of the courts could be clogged by in-
junctions, stays, and appeals, and all the other dilatory 
and technical procedure. And so we find that this 
Section 74, written into our Public Utilities Law as 
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originally passed, and continued without change until 
the present time, wisely provided that the Commission 
should not be so interfered with. 
The Legislature intended, by this provision, to abolish 
the delays and technicalities which in the ordinary course 
of judicial proceedings seem inevitably associated with 
the practice of the law. The court should therefore, 
whenever called upon, act according to the spirit of this 
statute, as well as to its letter. 
It is not necessary that the court should, at this time, 
pass upon or define the limits of the Commission's juris-
diction in the premises. That question would involve an 
exhau~tive study of a large portion of the act. It should 
not be passed upon without full hearing upon notice to 
all the other contract holders whose interests might be 
adversely affected by the decision. 
It is submitted that even assuming th(l)t this court has 
jurisdiction to issue the writ, and even assuming that the 
Commission is exceeding its jurisdiction in the premises, 
nevertheless a writ of prohibition ought not to issue be-
cause the Cement Company has a plain, speedy and ade-
quate remedy in the ordinary course of law by writ of 
review or certiorari to this court to supervise and 
review whatever action Commission may take in the 
premises. 
The matter of these contracts should not be brought 
before this court piece-meal. It can best be dealt with 
when all the contracts and some definite order of the 
Commission is before the courts. 
Some questions on the merits which should not be passed on at 
this time lest other interested parties be adversely affected 
by the establishment of a precedent without a full hearing 
on their individual contracts and cases. 
It is, of course, elementary law that on an application 
of this character the court will not determine the merits 
of the main controversy (Hirsch vs. Twyford, 40 Okla. 
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220, 139 Pac. 313; State vs. Muench, 225 Mo. 210, 124 
S. W. 1124). The record here shows that there are 
over fifty other contract holders who are vitally in-
terested in the main questions revolving around the 
construction of the State and the Constitution. The 
record shows that their interests involve millions of 
dollars. The Power Company is interested adversely 
to its customers. Accordingly the Power Company has 
filed in this cause a brief on the merits seeking to 
make this proceeding, on this one application on two 
out of over fifty contracts, a dragnet by means of 
which all the controverted and litigated questions in-
volved on all the contracts may be here and now sum-
marily determined. This proceeding has a proper but 
limited purpose, and it cannot be enlarged so as to 
bring within its scope the matters urged by the Power 
Company bearing on the future possible action of 
the Commission. The Power Company seeks to "knock 
out" all of the rest of its customers without a hearing 
by a side-stroke on prohibition. It is but an endeavor 
to put the Commission in leading strings when it comes 
to pass on these contracts after all the evidence is 
in. It is but an effort to preclude or handicap all the 
rest of the contract holders in the presentation of their 
cases to the Commission and to this court. A great 
public injury would follow a summary and almost 
ex parte determination by this court of the questions 
the court is invited by the Power Company to pass 
upon. The court should purposely and carefully, and 
no doubt will, avoid so undesirable result when it can, 
in the exercise of its discretion, dispose of this appli-
cation on the ground of the adequacy of another remedy, 
without discussing the jurisdiction of the Commission 
or the immunity of these contracts from interference 
under the phraseology of our statute. Such a discus-
sion or determination under the circumstances would 
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be apt to create a precedent which would be more 
likely to defeat than promote the ends of justice. 
The Power Company, in its brief, says much of its 
being a public utility and representing the public in-
terest and getting a fair return on its investment. 
It will be time enough to advance these considerations 
when the questions of padded figures, watered stock, 
extravagant management, etc., have been investigated 
and passed upon. 
And there are two sides to this controversy. The 
record here shows that the contract holders embrace 
metal mines, coal mines, irrigation companies, inter-
urban railways, steam railways, municipalities, smelt-
ing companies, canal companies, elevator companies, 
etc., each and all of which are as much a public use 
and benefit of, in and to the community and state 
as is the Power Company. 
Mining is the paramount industry of this State. It 
promotes the public interest and develops the resources 
of the State. It is a public use and benefit. (Highland 
Boy G. M. Co. vs. Strickley, 28 Utah 215, 78 Pac. 296; 
Ketchum Coal Co. vs. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 50 Utah 
395, 168 Pac. 86; Montmaire Co. vs. Columbus Rexall 
Co., 174 Pac. 172.) So also is irrigation (Nash vs. 
Clark, 27 Utah 158, 75 Pac. 371; Salt Lake City vs. 
Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 126, 121 Pac. 593; Gunnison 
lrr. Co. vs. Canal Co., 174 Pac. 852). So are railroads, 
both steam and electrical. (Ogden Ry. Co. vs. Ogden, 
7 Utah 207, 26 Pac. 288; Stockdale vs. R. G. W. Ry., 
28 Utah 201, 77 Pac. 849.) The mining companies 
contributed to the wealth and prosperity of this State 
long before such companies as the Power Company were 
thought of. All the Power Companies in the State 
could cease operations with but a fraction of that 
detriment to the welfare of the State which would be 
occasioned by a serious restriction of the mining in-
dustry. 
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Thus in the case of Ohio and Colorado Smelting & 
Refining Co. vs. Public Utilities Commission of Col-
orado (No. 9458), just decided by the Supreme Court 
of Colorado, and not yet reported, in a proceeding 
identical with this where the Colorado Commission 
undertook to abrogate the contract entered into prior 
to the passage of the Utilities Act of that State, the 
court, in reversing the order of the Commission and 
dismissing the case, well says : 
"It is not the purpose of the Public Utilities 
Law to make the State the insurer of unlawful, 
unwise or unnecessary investments by public 
utilities corporations, and in the absence of the 
required certificate of necessity, and certainly in 
the absence of clear proof to the contrary, we 
must presume that such extensions were at least 
unnecessary. 
"The equities of the case are not with the 
Power Company. The Smelting Company is 
as much affected in fact with the public interest 
as is the Power Company. It performs a pub-
lic service in the treatment of ores from mines 
from various parts of the State. Without smel-
ters and mills to perform this service for the 
public, the mining industry of the State must 
of necessity seriously suffer. Besides the Smelter 
Company, in this case, is of vast public interest 
to the community in which it is located. It 
furnished a payroll of about $300,000 per annum, 
to which that of the Power Company in the 
locality is compamtively insignificant. 
"The testimony discloses that there has been 
about $1,000,000 invested in the plant of the 
Smelter Company, including replacements. Its 
losses for the year 1908 were $32,198.97. The 
plant lost an average of $70,000 for eleven years. 
In 1917 there was a profit of $185,795.52. In 
1916 the profit was $82,072.32, allowing nothing 
for salaries or depreciation. It was unable at 
the time of the hearing to operate at a profit 
and was continuing only in the hope that it 
might make a profit some time in the future. 
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"To pay the rate fixed by the Commission will 
either compel it to cease operations or increase 
the price of treatment to its customers. It is 
a competitor of the Leadville smelter. Such is 
the testimony in these particulars. 
"It cannot be said that to sustain one public 
utility at the expense of another is in the ir~r 
terest of the public welfare, and if we are to 
rely upon the showing here, this must be the 
result, if the order of the Commission is to be 
sustained. 
"Yet the interest of the public weal is the only 
theory upon which the Commission can exercise 
the power to abrogate the contract between the 
parties. 
"I may repeat toot this power is so grave, with 
such possibilities of being erroneously exercised, 
through want of proper understanding of the 
facts and of the principle upon which it is based, 
tlw.,t it should be denied or greatly curtailed by 
amendment to the statute. 
"The Commission in this case made no 
investigation of its own, and determined the 
matter wholly upon the testimony of the con-
tending parties. In such a case the burden is 
upon the petitioner clearly, which it has not 
sustained. 
"The sufficiency of the rate prescribed to pro-
duce a fair profit upon the value of the property 
employed in the business is to be strongly pre-
sumed. The burden of showing its confiscatory 
character rests, therefore, upon the complaining 
company. Lincoln Gas Co. vs. Lincoln, 223 U. S. 
349. The presumption must be correspondingly 
stronger wfLere the rate rests upon a contract 
between the parties, understandingly entered 
into." 
So this court in Mining Co. vs. Strickley, 28 Utah 
215, 78 Pac. 296, well says at pages 233 to 235: 
"The same reasons that hold that manufactur-
ing is necessary to the public welfare in New 
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Hampshire and other New England States can 
be urged in behalf of mining in Utah and other 
Western States. The mining industry in this 
State, and in others similarly situated, not only 
produces a home market for the products of 
the farm, and furnishes thousands of men with 
ste1ady employment at liberal and remunerati-ve 
wages, but also produces wealth which has en-
abled other industries to be created and to flour-
ish, which, without the stimulus thus furnished, 
would languish. In Dayton Mining Co. vs. 
Seawell, supra, Mr. Chief Justice Hawley, speak-
ing for the court, aptly portrays some of the 
conditions and disadvantages under which the 
mining industry is prosecuted in this inter-
mountain region, as well as some of the benefits 
derived therefrom, as follows: 'The mining and 
milling interests give employment to many men, 
and the benefits derived from this business are 
distributed as much ,and sometimes more among 
the laboring classes than with the owners of the 
mines ,and mills. The mines are fixed by the 
laws of nature, and are often found in places 
almost inaccessible. For the purpose of suc-
cessfully constructing and carrying on the busi-
ness of mining, smelting, or other reduction of 
ores, it is necessary to erect hoisting works, to 
build mills, to construct smelting furnaces, to 
secure ample grounds for dumping waste, rock, 
and earth; and a road to and from the mine 
is always indispensable. The sites necessary for 
these purposes are often confined to certain 
fixed localities.' We have in this State, in 
addition to the extensive deposits of gold, silver, 
lead, and copper ores, large areas of lands con-
taining coal in almost limitless quantities, and 
we depend almost exclusively upon the coal 
mines for the fuel used in our manufacturing 
establishments and for domestic purposes. Now, 
it is of vital import,ance to the people that the 
coal, as well ,as the other hidden resources of 
the State, be opened up and developed, and that 
the mining industry in general, which has been 
the source of so much wealth to the people of 
this and other Western Staets, be conducted on 
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the same extensive soale in the future that has 
characterized its opemtions in the past. There-
fore the public policy of the State, as .exempli-
fied by the act of the Legislature under consider-
ation, is to encourage the people to open up 
and exploit the mines with which the State 
abounds, and thereby not only give to the State 
the wealth which will enable other industries 
to be created, but furnish thousands of laborers 
with remunerative employment. 
"It being conceded, and this court having held, 
that the construction and operation of irrigat-
ing ditches in this State is a public use (Nash vs. 
Clark, supra), it follows that the construction 
of roads and tramways for the development 
of the mining industry is a public use, as the 
same line of reasoning that applies in support 
of the doctrine in the one case holds good in 
the other. Otherwise a party owning a few 
acres of farming land, or only a few square rods 
for that matter, could invoke the law of eminent 
domain, and by condemnation proceedings ac-
quire a right of way across his neighbor's land 
for an irrigation ditch to convey water to his 
small holdings; whereas the owners of mines 
and of works for the reduction of ores, the opera-
tions of which furnish thousands of men in this 
State with employment at good wages, and to 
which the general prosperity of the State is 
largely due, would be denied the right to invoke 
this same rule of law in order to acquire, when 
necessary to the successful operation of their 
business, rights of way for the transportation 
of ores from the mines to the mills and smelters, 
and for the construction of tunnels for drain-
age and other purposes. And parties holding 
the title to ground necessary and suitable for 
these purposes ,which, in many cases, except 
for such purposes, might be entirely worthless, 
would be clothed with power to demand and 
compel payment of an unconscionable price for 
their lands before parting with the title, or 
they could refuse, absolutely, to grant the ease-
ment required on any terms, and thereby in 
some cases cripple mining enterprises, or destroy 
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them altogether. Such a policy would not only 
be inconsistent and unreasonable, but would 
greatly retard the development of one of the 
gre,atest natural resources of the State." 
These other contract holders were, and are, mainly 
interested, not in the procedural questions, but in 
the questions going to the merits of the validity of 
their individual contracts, and it was and is utterly 
impossible to properly or fully present the issues 
on the merits before this court on an application for. 
a writ of prohibition. Mo:r;eover, obviously, proceed-
ings upon such a writ are inappropriate to determine 
the merits of the controversy involved. That is not 
the function or office of such a writ. Yet they are 
constantly confronted with the possibility that the 
court might in passing upon such a writ, either neces-
sarily or unnecessarily, intentionally or inadvertently, 
go beyond the mere decision of the questions involved 
in allowing or refusing a permanent writ of prohibi-
tion, or in short, beyond the mere jurisdictional ques-
tions, and by construing the statute, decide or under-
take to decide questions affecting the merits of the 
controversy prejudicially to the interests of other 
contract holders, without their being afforded an 
opportunity to be heard fully, and to be heard fully 
with respect to the facts of their individual cases, 
independently of other individual contract cases. 
Furthermore, there are some objections and matters 
going even to the jurisdiction of the Commission to 
make an order affecting some of the contracts, which 
objections and matters are not presented upon the 
face of the contracts, nor at present upon the face 
of the record before the Commission, and which can 
only be properly and appropriately interposed and 
presented upon the introduction of available evidence 
whereon to predicate the same. 
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What is now asked is that the status quo of the 
interested parties be preserved until the questions here 
presented and other important questions presented can 
be fully briefed, discussed and receive from this court 
that attentive considemtion which they demand. 
Let us illustrate the magnitude and the gravity of 
some of the questions involved. We can only do this 
by replying to some of the suggestions and arguments 
of the Power Company. We have not yet seen the 
brief of the Attorney General on behalf of the Com-
mission, nor the supplemental brief of the Cement 
Company. But the following is a brief cursory analysis 
of some of the arguments that may or will be made by 
or on behalf of some of the individual contract holders. 
Even if the Commission has the power to abrogate this contract 
it has absolutely no power to compel the consumer to accept 
service from the Power Company for the remaining term . 
of the contract at an increased rate. 
As we have seen, the State, in the exercise of its police 
power, can control public utility corporations, and as an 
incident of such control can regulate the rate of such 
corporations, even though such regulation invalidates 
pre-existing contracts. 
A serious constitutional question would be involved 
should the Commission attempt, as suggested and urged 
by the Power Company, to change the rate in the con-
tract and then further attempt to enforce performance 
by the consumer of the impaired contract for the balance 
of the contract term at the new rate prescribed by the 
Commission. 
The Legislature, acting directly, or through this Com-
mission, can prescribe the particular rate at which the 
Power Company shall render a given service, and can 
forbid the Power Company from rendering the given 
service at a less rate. When it does so, all contracts for 
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the given service at a rate less or different from that 
fixed by the Legislature would thereby be rendered un-
lawful, and would go down and be cancelled, abrogated, 
and terminated as illegal and void. In such a case the 
contract would be at an end. 
A valid reduction of the rate for the service specified 
in the contract would relieve the Power Company from 
the obligation to perform that contract for its remaining 
term; controversy, a valid increase in rate for the service 
specified in the contract would discharge the consumer 
from the obligation of further performance of the 
contract. 
An increase of the rate by the Commission, if valid, 
would render the performance of the contract unlawful. 
It is a general principle, that when a contract is lawful 
when made, and a law afterwards renders performance 
of it unlawful, neither party to the contract shall be 
prejudiced but the contract is to be treated as at an end. 
It is discharged. In short, where the performance of an 
executory agreement, which was lawful in its inception, 
is made unlawful by subsequent enactment, the agree-
ment is thereby dissolved, and the parties are discharged 
from its obligation. 
2 Elliott on Contracts, Sec. 685, p. 40; 
13 Cor. Jur., 646; 
Heart vs. Brewing Co., 121 Tenn. 69, 113 
s. w. 364; 
2 Parsons Contracts, p. 674; 
2 Hammond on Contracts, Sec. 210, pp. 345, 
346; 
Clark on Contracts, 681; 
Lawson on Contracts, Sees. 423, 424; 
Mississippi Ry. vs. Green Heisk, (Tenn.), 
592; 
Odlin vs. Ins. Co., 2 Wash. C. C. 312, Fed. 
Cas. 10433; '' 
Gray vs. Sinns, 3 Wash. C. C. 276, Fed. 
Cas. 5729; 
Sauner vs. Ins. Co., 41 Mo. A. 480; 
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Corrigan vs. Chica,go, 144 Ill. 537, 33 N. E. 
746; 
Hooper vs. Muller, 158 Mich. 395, 123 N. 
w. 24; 
Stratford vs. Brewing Co., 94 Wash. 125, 
162 Pac. 31; 
Burgett vs. Loeb, 43 Ind. App. 657, 88 N. 
E. 346; 
Amerioan Exchange vs. Blunt, 102 Me. 128, 
66 Atl. 212; 
Jameson vs. Gas Co., 128 Ind. 555, 28 N. 
E. 76; 
Presbyterian Church vs. New York, 5 Cow. 
538; 
U. S. vs. Dietrich, 128 Fed. 671; 
Advertiser Co. vs. State, 193 Ala. 418, 69 
So. 501; 
Greil Co. vs. Madsen, 179 Ala. 444, 60 So. 
876; 
Lawrence vs. White, 131 Ga. 840, 63 S. E. 
631; 
Fought vs. Brewing Co., 193 Ill. A. 572; 
Wood vs. Bldg. Assoc., 126 Ia. 464, 102 N. 
w. 410; 
Exchange vs. Blunt, 102 Me. 128, 66 Atl. 
312; / 
Smith vs. Stroughton, 185 Mass. 329, 70 
N. E. 195; 
Baylies vs. Mueller, 158 Mich. 395, 123 N. 
w. 24; 
Cordes vs. Miller, 39 Mich. 581, 33 Am. 
R. 430; 
Rosenberger vs. Wells, 258 Mo. 112, 167 
s. w. 433; 
Rosenberger vs. Express Co., 258 Mo. 97, 
167 s. w: 429; 
Electric Co. vs. Utility Com., 87 N. J. L. 
128, 93 Atl. 707; Affd., 88 N. J. L. 603, 
96 Atl. 1013; 
People vs. Ins. Co. 91 N.Y. 174; 
Monacha vs. St. Ry. Co. 247, Pa. St. 242, 
93 Atl. 344; 
Irrigation Co. vs. Watkins, (Tex.), 183 S. 
w. 431; 
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Blins vs. Supply Co., (Tex.), 105 S. W. 
543; 
Cowley vs. Ry. Co., 68 Wash. 558, 123 Pac. 
998; 
Hite vs. Ry. Co., (III.), 119 N. E. 904; 
Bunch vs. Short, (W.Va.), 90S. E. 810; 
Speliohoulus vs. Schick, 129 Wis. 556, 109 
N. W. 568. 
Both the State and Federal constitutions inhibit the 
taking of one's property without due process of law and 
inhibit the denial of the equal protection of the law. 
And it is fundamental that the requirement of due 
process of law applies administrative and executive 
action by which one may be deprived of his property ae 
well and just the same as it does to judicial action. 
Caldwell vs. Pierson, (S. D.), 159 N. W. 
124; 
Watson on Const., pp. 1449-1458; 
Fallbrook Co. vs. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 
41 L. Ed. 369; 
G. W. Ry. vs. Minnesota, 238 U. S. 340. 
Neither the Legislature, the Commission, nor the 
Power Company could compel the &lnier' '{;l;··~ to 
continue to accept power under the contract at an in:-
creased rate. If the increased rate were in excess of 
what it would cost the Copj ~-'U.ir'dt'i"t to produce the 
power, then this would be clear, not only for the reasons 
hereinafter stated, but for the additional reason that 
such increased rate in excess of productive cost would 
be unreasonable and confiscatory, and therefore uncon-
stitutional. The Legislature may not, under the guise of 
the police power impose on property burdens so ex-
cessive as to work a confiscation thereof. Such an 
excessive rate would work a confiscation of the cus-
tomer's steam plant, and take its property by depleting 
its treasury. 
69 
But suppose the increased rate was not in excess of, 
or was less than, what it would cost the consumer to 
produce the power, what then? Nevertheless the con-
sumer could not be compelled to accept power under the 
contract at the increased rate, but could elect to treat 
the contract as terminated, and generate its own power. 
While the police power of the State is very broad and 
far-reaching, it has its limitations. To be valid under 
that power, a statute must oove a direct connection with 
the preservation of the public health, safety, morals or 
general welfare. 
12 Corpus Juris, 929, 930; 
Lawton vs. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. Ed. 
385; 
Nolen VB. Riechman, 225 Fed. 812; 
Block VB. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 Pac. 
22. 
Police power is the power inherent in a government to 
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote 
order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of 
society. But the police power is not the power to dis-
regard fundamental principles of free government and 
private property rights. To extend the exercise of the 
power beyond the point of necessity, would make the 
interference unlawful. It has for its object the improve-
ment of social and economic conditions affecting the 
community at large and collectively with a view of bring-
ing about the "greatest good of the greatest number." 
It is founded largely on the maxim, Sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas, and also to some extent on that 
other maxim of public policy, Salus populi suprema lex. 
The rule is that: 
"In order that a statute or ordinance may be 
sustained as an exercise of the police power, the 
courts must be able to see that the enactment has 
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for its object the prevention of some offense or 
manifest evil or the preservation of the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare, that 
there is some clear, real and substantial connection 
between the assumed purpose of the enactment 
and the actual provisions thereof, and that the 
latter do in some plain, appreciable, and appropri-
ate manner tend toward the accomplishment of the 
object for which the power is exercised. The 
mere restriction of liberty or of property rights 
cannot of itself be denominated 'public welfare,' 
and treated as a legitimate object of the police 
power. The legislature may not, under the guise 
of the police power, impose on property burdens so 
excessive as to work a confiscation thereof. Nor 
may such power be used in any other way as a 
cloak for the invasion of personal rights or private 
property, neither may it be exercised for private 
purposes, nor for the exclusive benefit of par-
ticular individuals or classes." 
12 Cor. Jur., 929, 930, 931. 
In the language of State vs. Gilman, 33 W. Va. 146, 
10 S. E. 283: 
"If, therefore, a statute purp.orting to have been 
enacted to protect the public health, the public 
morals or the public safety, has no real or sub-
stantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable 
invasion of rights secured by the fundamental 
law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and 
thereby give effect to the Constitution." 123 
U. S. 661 (31 L. Ed. 210). 
And in the language of Commonwealth vs. Campbell, 
133 Ky. 50, 117 S. W. 383: 
"Man in his natural state has a right to do 
whatever he chooses and has the power to do. 
When he becomes a member of organized society 
under governmental regulation, he surrenders, of 
necessity, all of his natural right the exercise of 
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which is, or may be, injurious to his fellow citi-
zens. This is the price that he pays for govern-
mental protection, but it is not within the com-
petency of a free government to invade the sanc-
tity of the absolute rights of the citizen any 
further than the direct protection of society re-
quires. Therefore the question of what a man will 
drink, or eat, or own, provided the rights of others 
are not invaded, is one which addresses itself alone 
to the will of the citizen. It is not within the 
competency of government to invade the privacy 
of a citizen's life and to regulate his conduct in 
matters in which he alone is concerned, or to pro-
hibit him any liberty the exercise of which will not 
directly injure society." 
No law commanding that to be done which does not 
promote the health, safety or welfare of society can b~ 
sustained. (Ex. p. Whitwell, 98 Cal. 73, 32 Pac. 870.) 
The health, safety and welfare of society would be the 
same whether the consumer purchased its electricity 
from the Power Company or generated the same itself. 
Hence, an attempt to compel the consumer to take elec-
tricity from the Power Company, would be void, as it 
would not have the slightest connection with or relation 
to the health, safety or welfare of the public. 
The legislature can, within the legitimate exercise of 
the police power, abrogate or terminate a contract, or 
render its future performance unlawful, but it cannot 
make a new contract for the parties to which they, or one 
of them, has never assented, and compel its performance. 
Liberty of contract has its limitations, but liberty . of 
refraining from contracting is untrammeled. One party 
cannot be bound to the contract and the other not. If 
the Power Company has the right to refuse performance, 
the consumer will have the same right. 
The consumer entered into a contract with the Power 
Company, which contract was fair and reasonable and 
valid in all respects. It agreed to take the power but 
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only at the rate named. It is under no obligation to take 
the power at any other rate. It never assumed any such 
obligation. 'l'he legislature can destroy the contract 
under the police power but it cannot infringe upon the 
consumer's inherent, fundamental, inalienable and indi-
visible right to refuse to perform an obligation, con-
tractural in its nature, which it has never voluntarily 
assumed. No legislative restriction can be imposed upon 
the exercise of that right of refusal. In the language of 
Judge Cooley on Torts (lst Ed.), page 278: 
"It is part of every man's civH rights that he be 
left at liberty to refuse business relations with any 
person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests 
upon reason, or is the result of whim, caprice, 
prejudice, or malice." 
It would seem to be only necessary to state this propo-
sition to enable one of ordinary intelligence, endowed 
with a reasonable share of moral sense, to perceive the 
monstrous injustice of thus placing the large investments 
of the consumer, made under the stimulus of the induce-
ment held out by its right of contract, at the absolute 
mercy of an irresponsible public utility sentiment, or of 
public cupidity. It would seem to offer a large premium 
for the perpetration of a wrong. 
The consumer could not be compelled to take the power 
at an increased rate, to which it never assented, and 
with respect to which it never contracted. To even at-
tempt to make it do so would be a palpable mockery of 
either administrative or remedial justice. It would work 
a fraud on the consumer. It would outrage every idea 
of common justice and common sense. It would be un-
conscionable. None but the over-heated conscience 
of a greedy utility corporation could sanction such ,a 
suggestion. The first principles of common honesty 
between man and man would prevent it. The eternal 
73 
principles of right would forbid it. From the mere asser-
tion of such a thing the mind recoils in disgust. Even in 
these arbitrary times, such an act must be recognized as 
pure tyranny and the first born child of anarchy. Such 
a principle would absolutely paralyze some of the indus-
tries holding contracts with the utility company. The 
contract must either stand as it is made or it must fall. 
You cannot make fish of one party and flesh of the other. 
The consumer cannot be ambushed in any such manner. 
Equity and good conscience forbid it. The consumer is 
willing to stand up for the justice of its bond and all 
that is therein found nominated. More than that no 
power on earth can demand under "a government of 
laws, and not of men." More than that would be nothing 
but injustice, oppression and robbery. It is incon-
ceivable that such a thing should even be attempted 
much less that it should be allowed to be done. 
The guaranty of due process of law is a guaranty 
against any abuse of government power under the plea of 
public policy (Fruend Police Power, Sec. 21, p. 16). The 
public interest is at once the measure and limit of the 
police power as its is its source. The public interest 
absolutely demands that the consumer and particularly a 
consumer such as a mining company, which is itself a 
public use and benefit, shall obtain its power at the low-
est cost. It follows that if the consumer can generate its 
own power for less than the Power Company can supply 
it, the consumer not only should but must be given the 
right so to do. 
But further than this, if the consumer in good faith 
and upon oath and under the advice of competent 
engineers, believes that it can generate its power for less 
than the Power Company can supply it, then at least the 
public interest, as well as the constitutional right to 
freedom of contract, dictates and demands that the con-
sumer be allowed the privilege and right of attempting 
so to do. 
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The mmmg industry is of vital importance to the 
people of the State and is the paramount industry of the 
State, as we have seen, and as this court has recognized. 
(Mining Company vs. Strickley, 28 Utah 215, 78 Pac. 
296.) Neither the Utilities Act, nor the police power of 
the State, ever contemplated that the Commission 
should be clothed with the authority to demand and 
compel the mining interest to pay an unconscionable 
price for its power, or with the authority, by making 
compulsory new contracts against the will of the mining 
company, to thereby, in some cases, cripple mining enter-
prises or destroy them altogether. Such an authority 
and such a policy would not only be inconsistent and 
unreasonable, but would be unconstitutional and would 
greatly retard the development of that, the greatest of 
the natural resources of the State. 
But whatever the power of the legislature in this 
respect, the Commission has no such power as respects 
a non-utility consumer. 
Even if the Commission had the power to interfere 
with this contract, how could such power be exercised? 
The Power Company is subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Commission. The consumer is not. It is beyond 
the authority of the Commission to issue any order 
directed to the consumer requiring it to do or refrain 
from doing anything. All the Commission could do 
would be to make an order directed to the Power Com-
pany to terminate the contract. In obedience to that 
order, the Power Company could proceed in one of two 
ways, either by bringing an action seeking the cancel-
lation of the contract, or by serving notice on the con-
sumer that electricity would no longer be furnished 
under the contract rate, but that all hereafter furnished 
and accepted by the consumer would be charged for at 
the increased tariff or schedule rate. It probably would 
pursue the latter course. The consumer would then 
have the right to bring an action to test the validity 
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of the contract, or rather the efficacy of the attempted 
termination thereof. 
Chapter 1 of Utilities Act creates the Commission 
and Chapter 2 defines the Public Utilites subject to 
the jurisdiction and regulation of the Commission 
and the provisions of the act. The consumer is not 
embraced within the utilities subject to the act or 
over which the Commission is given jurisdiction. The 
Commission has no power to regulate, dictate or control 
the business or contracts of the consumer or any part 
or portion thereof. 
It was competent for the legislature to withhold 
from the Commission such power or jurisdiction as its 
wisdom or choice determined. (Gas Co. vs. Commis-
sion, 224 N. Y. 156, i20 N. E. 132.) It 'Yithheld .from 
the • • • •d•t• the i.J,'I(I~J•tL• e omm1sswn JUriS 1c 10n over eopper GllliJpmcy", 
and hence it could not enforce any order made by it 
directed to the eoillier 'eornpauy. 
The consumer is not under the jurisdiction of the 
Commission. It is not embraced within the public 
utilities defined in the act. It is beyond the authority 
of the Commission to issue any orders directed to the 
consumer requiring it to do or refrain from doing 
anything. All the Commission can do would be to 
make an order directed to the Power Company to 
terminate the contract or to no longer furnish service 
under the contract rate, leaving it optional to the 
consumer to take the service or not as it might see 
fit. 
In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Railroad Commis-
sion, 173 Cal. 577, 160 Pac. 828, it is held that the 
function of the Railroad Commission, like that of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, is to regulate public 
utilities and to compel the enforcement of their duty 
to the public, and not to compel them to carry out 
their contract obligations to intl.ividuals. The court 
says at page 830: 
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"Even if it granted that the burdens of the 
agreement rest on the petitioner, the railroad 
commission is not a body charged with the 
enforcement of private contracts. See Hanlon vs. 
Eshleman, 169 Cal. 200, 146 Pac. 656. Its func-
tion like that of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, is to reguW.,te public utilities, and to 
compel the enforcement of their duties to the 
public. (Southern Pacific Co. vs. Interstate 
Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 433, 31 Sup. 
Ct. 288, 55 L. Ed. 283) ; not to compel them to 
carry out their contract obligations to indi-
viduals." 
It is not the function of the Commission to under-
take to enforce contracts. 
Colorado Springs vs. Hotel Co. (Colo.), 
P. U. R. 1917-D, p. 272; 
Fowler vs. Electric Co. (Okla.), P. U. R. 
1916-F, p. 560; 
Newman vs. Railway Co. (Wis.), P. U. R. 
1916-F, p. 455. 
The Commission's jurisdiction is confined by the 
statute to the control of the utilities and it has no 
jurisdiction over the consumer. (Commission vs. Tele-
phone Assn., 282 Ill. 336, 118 N. E. 760.) 
If the contract violates the statute, the purpose of 
the act is fully accomplished by terminating, abrogating 
and canceling the contract, without attempting to make 
a new contract for the parties. 
In United States vs. Dietrich, 126 Fed. 671, the court 
holds and says, at pages 67 4-675 : 
"The purpose of the statute is then accom-
plished by terminating the contract or agreement 
in so far as it remains exec-utory, but without 
extinguishing or avoiding, even if that were 
permissible, the rights of either party acquired 
by its lawful performance, or by its breach, 
up to that time. It is well established by the 
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English courts and by the courts of this country, 
Federal and State, that where performance of 
a contract or agreement, lawful in its inception, 
becomes unlawful by reason of any subsequent 
event, the contract or agreement is thereby dis-
solved or terminated, in so far as it remains 
executory, and both parties are excused from its 
further performance. Sheppard's Touchstone, 
373; 1 Chitty on Contracts (11th Ed.) 
1076; 2 Parsons Contracts, 674; Cla,rk 
on Contracts, 507; Bishop on Contracts, 
Sec. 594; Abbott's Merchant Shipping 
(13th Ed.) 754; Melville vs. De Wolf, 4 El. & Bl. 
844, 850; Reid vs. Hoskins, Id. 979, 984; Newby 
vs. Sharpe, 8th Ch. Div. 39; Englesea vs. Ruge-
ley, 6 Q. B. 180; Brick Presbyterian Church vs. 
New York, 5 Cow. 538; Mississippi, etc., Co. vs. 
Green, 9 Heisk. 588, 592; Knoxville vs. Bird, 
12 Lea, 121, 49 Am. Rep. 326; Cordes vs. Miller, 
39 Mich. 581, 33 Am. Rep. 430; Brown vs. 
Dillahunty, 4 Smedes & M. 713, 723, 43 Am. Dec. 
499; Bradford vs. Jenkins, 41 Miss. 328, 335; 
Irion vs. Hume, 50 Miss. 419, 427; Macon, etc., 
Co. vs. Gibson, 85 Ga. 1, 17, 11 S. E. 442, 21 
Am. St. Rep. 135; Odlin vs. Ins. Co., 18 Fed. Cas. 
p. 583 (No. 10,433); Tait vs. Ins. Co., 23 Fed., 
Cas. p. 620 (No. 13,726); Hangner vs. Abbott, 
6 Wall. 532, 535, 18 L. Ed. 939; New York Life 
Ins. Co. vs. Stathann, 93 U. S. 24, 23 L. Ed. 789; 
Ins. Co. vs. Davis, 95 U. S. 425, 24 L. Ed. 453; 
Jones vs. Judd, 4 N. Y. 411; Heine vs. Meyer, 
61 N.Y. 171, 176; Bennett vs. Woolfolk, 15 Ga. 
213." 
The making of this contract subject to the police 
power of the State may have been a recognition of 
the power of the State to terminate it and abrogate 
it; but it was not a recognition of any power in 
the State by legislative enactment to transmute the 
making of the contract into an assent to an entirely 
new and different contract. There is no power lodged 
in the Commission to make a new contract for the 
parties and to require the consumer to perform the 
78 
new contract. There is no authority that recognizes 
the existence of such a power in any legislature, court 
or Commission. 
As we have seen, the determination of the validity 
of the contract, as dependent upon its being "founded 
upon an adequate consideration" within the meaning 
of that language as employed in the act, is the exercise 
of a judicial function. If such consideration is found 
to be inadequate within the meaning of the act, the 
proper tribunal can exercise the judicial power to 
cancel and terminate it as a court in equity might 
do under proper circumstances. But while a judicial 
tribunal can construe contracts and determine their 
validity and in proper cases abrogate them, it is be-
yond the power of any judicial tribunal or judicial 
function to create new liabilities of the parties. (Hughes 
Company vs. Pulley, 47 Utah 544, 155 Pac. 337; Smith 
vs. Bowman, 32 Utah 43, 88 Pac. 687; Blythe-Fargo 
Co. vs. Free, 46 Utah 233, 148 Pac. 430.) 
The contract is not in apparent conflict with, nor discrimina-
tory as respects, any valid schedule rates, and the Commis-
sion has no power to abrogate this contract until the proper 
procedure prescribed by the act for raising rates has been 
followed. Schedules forty-two and forty-three are not and 
never have been applicable to this contract. 
Much is said by the Commission in the record in 
this case and by the Power Company with reference 
to "standard schedules" of the Power Company. The 
consumers will unequivocally contend that there never 
have been and are not now any lawful standard schedules 
applicable to these contracts or any of them. 
The order to show cause recites that these contracts 
are prima facie not in accordance with the filed tariffs 
of the Power Company. 
It also recites that the contracts are prima facie 
discriminatory and preferential as the rates are not 
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extended to the public generally by the Power Com-
pany in its schedules. 
The Commission has never held any hearing to de-
termine whether the contracts are in point of fact 
unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory. Rates may 
vary where conditions are different. A mere differ-
ence in rates does not show an unlawful preference 
or discrimination in the absence of validly promulgated 
applicable tariff schedules. It has never been shown 
that the contract rate is in itself unreasonable. The 
reasonableness of the rates named in schedules 42 and 
43, has never been passed upon. As a consumer of 
this electric power, it must be, and it has been, con-
ceded that, in point of fact, tW the Utah Copper 
Company, to illustrate, stands, and would have to 
be justly placed, in a class by itself. The principle 
of reasonable classification as a basis for rate dif-
ferences is well settled. Separate classifications are 
commonly made and recognized. Unless the circum-
stances of two or more contracts are substantially, 
similar there is no discrimination. Differentials in 
favor of large consumers, "off peak" hour consumers, 
consumers whose service cost the utility less, long 
hour consumers, constant as against intermittent con-
sumers, consumers in a position to supply their own 
needs, etc., are allowable and common. The Com-
mission has never gone into those questions, and the 
consumer has never been heard upon them. And: 
"That to condemn without a hearing is re-
pugnant to the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment needs nothing but statement. 
Every man is entitled to his day in court be-
fore his rights can be finally disposed of, and 
he cannot be divested of this right by any act 
of the legislature. Due process of law requires 
an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of 
the case, in which proceeding the citizen has 
a right and an opportunity to be heard and to 
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defend, protect, and enforce his rights, by es~ 
tablishing any fact which, under the law, W)•tlcl 
be a protection to him or to his property." 
12 Cor. Jur. 1234. 
Moreover many of these contracts carried special 
considerations other than the rate agreed on, and hence 
could not be said to be discriminatory upon their face 
even as compared with a published schedule. 
Timber Co. vs. Ry. Co., 58 Wash. 604, 
109 Pac. 320; 
Timber Co. vs. Ry. Co., 58 Wash. 604, 
109 Pac. 1020; 
Lghting Co. vs. New York, 162 N. Y. S. 
581. 
In Sultan Ry. & Timber Co. vs. Great Northern Ry. 
Co., 58 Wash. 604, 109 Pac. 320, the court holds and 
says: 
'"The acts of the legislature of this State 
establishing a railroad commission, and provid-
ing for the regulation of freights and fares, will 
be found in St. 1905, p. 145, St. 1907, p. 536 
and St. 1909, p. 191. The acts are too long 
even to epitomize here, but it will be found 
upon examination that they do not in terms pro-
hibit a railway company, except in certain 
specified cases, from changing or altering its 
tariff rates at any time it deems the reason 
sufficient, nor from entering into a contract 
with an individual shipper to carry particular 
goods at a fixed rate for a given time or to 
the amount of a given quantity. The prohibition 
is against discrimination against the hauling 
of one man's goods at a more favorable rate 
than it will haul another's, and against extor-
tionate and unreasonable charges, but it does not 
purport to prohibit the railway company from 
giving a shipper a binding asurance that tariff 
rates on a given commodity will not be changed 
before the end of a fixed period, or before a 
given commodity has been shipped. The effect 
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of the statute in this respect is similar to that 
of the Interstate Commerce Act, concerning 
which the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Cin., N. 0. & Texas & Pac. Ry. vs. Inter-
state Commerce Comn., 162 U. S. 184, 16 Sup. 
Ct. 700, 40 L. Ed. 935, said: 'Subject to the two 
leading prohibitions that their charges shall 
not be unjust or unreasonable, and that they shall 
not unjustly discriminate, so as to give undue 
preference or disadvantage to persons or traffic 
similarly circumstanced, the act to regulate 
commerce leaves common carriers as they were 
at the common law, free to make special con-
tracts looking to the increase of their business, 
to classify their traffic, to adjust and aportion 
their rates so as to meet the necessities of com-
merce, and generally to manage their important 
interests upon the same principles which are 
regarded as sound, and adopted in other trades 
and pursuits.' It is true that in a certain sense 
there are three parties to contracts of this 
nature-the carrier, the shipper, and the State. 
The interest of the first two is at once apparent; 
that of the latter consists in seeing that the 
contract is not discriminatory, or oppressive 
on the shipper, or so far improvident on the 
part of the carrier as to impoverish it, and thus 
prevent it from performing its functions as a 
carrier. But, subject to these requirements, we 
see no reason why the railway company may not 
now contract for the carriage of freights as 
freely as it was wont to do before the passage 
of the Commission acts. The record fails to 
show that the contract in question is in any man-
ner discriminatory or extortionate, or that it 
is unduly oppressive on the carrier. As we 
have said elsewhere, the record is silent on these 
matters, other than it was shown that the com-
pany had established a public rate betW:een these 
points conside'l'ably higher than the contract 
rate. But this is not sufficient to justify the 
court in setting aside the contract rate on the 
ground of its i'YII:.Ldequacy. While in an action 
between the carrier and a member of the gen-
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eral public over the reasonableness of a freight 
charge it would be some evidence of the justness 
of the charge, conclusive perhaps in the absence 
of any other showing, to show that the rate 
exacted was the published rate and the rat~ 
charged every one for a similar service, it i~ 
not evidence wlhen the purpose is to set aside 
a rate created by contract. As between the 
carrier and the other party to the contract, the 
carrier must establish its claim of inv,alidity by 
direct evidence of the fact. 
"It is unnecessary in this proceeding that we 
consider the effect of the contract on rates 
to be charged to other shippers desiring to 
ship between the same points. Since the railway 
company is forbidden to discriminate in its 
charges between shippers, it could not, of 
course, charge other shippers a greater rate 
for a like or similar service. But this does 
not necessarily mean that the rate charged 
must be the contmct rate. It will be remem-
bered the respondent as an inducement to the 
contract surrendered a right, and it may be 
that the value of the surrendered right can be 
taken into considemtion in fixing the public 
rate, but this question we expressly refuse to 
decide." 
And on rehearing ( 109 Pac. 1020) it is held that: 
1. The rule that a contract by a carrier to transport 
goods for less than the published rate is illegal, has 
no application where there is a consideration for 
the contract, in addition to and independent of the 
freight rate agreed upon, so that the rate is not 
necessarily discriminatory. 
2. Laws 1905, c. 81, Laws 1907, c. 226, and Laws 
1909, c. 93, which establish a railroad commission 
and provide for the regulation of freights and fares, 
will not be construed to have a retroactive effect, so 
as to affect previously existing valid contracts, in 
the absence of some indication that such was the 
legislative intent. 
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The court says at page 1021 : 
"A petition for a hearing en bane has been 
filed in this case, in which the appellant earnest-
ly insists that our former opinion ( 109 Pac. 
320) is in direct conflict with the decision of the 
Supreme Court of the Untied States in the case 
of Armour Packing Co. vs. United States, 209 
U. S. 56, 28 Sup. Ct. 428, 52 L. Ed. 681. It 
seems to us, however, that this case is readily 
distinguishable from the case cited on two 
grounds : First, because there was here a con-
sideration for the contract, in addition to and in-
dependent of the freight rate agreed upon, so 
that the rate is not necessarily discriminatory: 
and, second, beoause the contract was entered 
into before the passage of the railroad com-
mission act and the amendments thereto, and 
there is nothing in the latter acts tendt"ng to 
show that the legislature intended to abrogate 
previously existing valid contracts, conceding 
that it had the constitutional power to do so." 
Instead of assuming that the lower contract rates 
were unreasonable and discriminatory, it should have 
assumed that the lower rates were the proper ones 
and that the higher schedule rates were prima facie 
unreasonable and invalid. 
N. N. & M. V. Ry. vs. Brick Co., 109 Ky. 
408; 59 s .. w. 332; 
Martin vs. Ry. Co. (Iowa), P. U. R. 
1917B 883. 
Certainly there was, and is, and could be no dis-
crimination on the face of these contracts, unless 
schedules 42 and 43 were and are applicable to them. 
The saving clause in the statute, even if it does not 
deprive the Commission of the power to abrogate them, 
at least established and continued their prima facie 
validity until the rates therein were lawfully raised and 
the contracts lawfully abrogated. The Power Company 
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recognizes this position and has been acting upon it by 
billing at the contract rates for over two and a half 
years since the act was passed. The Commission recog-
nizes it by having sat by for over a year and permitted 
the Power Company to operate and bill its consumers 
under these contracts. 
This Court recognizes this in the decision in the 
Traction Company case, 173 Pac. 556. Other courts have 
so held. 
In Manitoc vs. Traction Co., 145 Wis. 158, 129 N. W. 
925, the court holds and says: 
"It is contended that this law has superseded 
the contract involved in this suit and that there-
fore the contract no longer has any binding force 
or effect. We do not think so. The statute 
worked no change in existing rates. It simply 
provided that all rates should be reasonable, and 
left to the Railroad Commission the power to 
determine the fact as to whether or not a given 
rate was reasonable. When that determination 
was reached the law became operative upon the 
particular rate called in question, and the rate 
arrived at then became the lawful rate and con-
tinued so until set aside in the manner provided 
by the law. The Railroad Commission has made 
no determination in the case before us ; at least, 
if it has, it is no part of the record. Until that 
determination is made, the contract is in force. 
When it is made, the contract is superseded, if 
the rate is changed." 
In State ex rel. Raymond Light & Water Co. vs. Public 
Service Commission of Washington, et al, 83 Wash. 130, 
145 Pac. 215, it is held: 
Public Service Commission act (Laws of 1911, p. 538), 
which prohibits the granting of unreasonable preference 
or making discriminations between persons or corpora-
tions by water companies, section 34 of which provides 
that nothing in the act shall prevent any water com-
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pany from furnishing its product under any contract 
in force at the date of the act at the rate fixed in such 
contract, but that the Commission may, in its discretion, 
order such contract to be terminated, does not, in the 
exercise of the police power of the State, declare void 
or voidable a contract by which a water company agreed 
to furnish water free to certain mills for the period of 
49 years, and the Commission's only power with refer-
ence to such contract is to direct the water company to 
terminate it by proper proceedings, if it finds that the 
contract prevents the company from rendering proper 
service. 
Even if the Commission had jurisdiction to declare 
such contract void, it could not do so before giving the 
parties thereto an opportunity to be heard. 
Where the public service commission ordered a water-
works company to terminate a contract by which it had 
agreed to furnish water to certain mills free for 49 
years, after a hearing of which the mill companies had 
no notice, and later the mill companies intervened and 
showed that the contract was executed in consideration 
of the transfer by the mills to the water company of the 
water plant, though there was no reservation of the 
right to use the water in the deed of transfer, it was not 
abuse of the Commission's discretion to set aside the 
former order directing the termination of the contract. 
The ceurt says at page 216, 217 and 218: 
"The lower court apparently based its judg-
ment upon the conclusion that the contracts en-
tered into between the water company and the 
mill companies in the year 1904 were avoided 
by the act of 1911 (Laws of 1911, p. 538, relat-
ing to the public service commission), because 
these contracts were contracts for free water to 
these companies for a period of 49 years, and 
for the further reason that the deed by which 
the waterworks of the mill companies was trans-
ferred to the water company did not contain a 
86 
reservation of water, but transferred the whole 
rights of the mill companies to the water com-
pany, and that the public service com:q1ission, in 
making the first order, had jurisdiction of the 
parties and authority to cancel these contracts 
for free water. 
The respondent in a voluminous brief, in an-
swer to voluminous briefs filed by the appel-
lants, states that there are but three questions 
in the case, as follows: First, had the public 
service commission jurisdiction over the persons 
of the mill companies in making the original 
order terminating the contracts between the mill 
companies and the water company; second, had 
the commission jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of the contracts between the interveners 
mill companies and the respondent water com-
pany ; and, third, had the commission the legal 
right to terminate these contracts in the exercise 
of its police power? 
"It is argued by the respondent that the public 
service commission had jurisdiction to terminate 
these contracts in the exercise of the police 
power of the State. If the contracts were con-
tracts which the State in the exercise of its 
police power, had a right to terminate, and which 
the State had declared void, as were the contracts 
in the case of Cowley vs. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 
68 Wash. 558, 123 Pac. 998, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
559, or in the case of State ex rel. Webster vs. 
Superior Court, 67 Wash. 37, 120 Pac. 861, Ann. 
Cas. 1913D, 78, or in Louisville & Nash. Rd. Co. 
vs. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 31 Sup. Ct. 265, 55 L. 
Ed. 297, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 671, we would have 
no doubt of the right of the water company or 
of the public commission to terminate these con-
tracts. But it seems to us that the contracts 
involved in this case do not partake of the nature 
of the contracts in these cases. Conceding that 
there was no reservation of any part of the water 
on the part of the mill companies when the trans-
fer of the water system was made to the water 
company, and that simple contracts were entered 
into by which the water company agreed to fur-
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nish water to these mill companies for a period 
of 49 years, we are still satisfied that the Com-
mission act in question does not make these con-
tracts, or contracts .of this character, either void 
or voidable, because at section 34 of the Com-
mission act (Laws of 1911, p. 561) the act pro-
vides: 
"'Nothing in this act shall be construed to pre-
vent any gas company, electrical company or 
water company from continuing to furnish its 
product or the use of its lines, equipment or 
service under any contract or contracts in force 
at the date this act takes effect, or upon the 
taking effect of any schedule or schedules of rates 
subsequently filed with the Commission, as herein 
provided, at the rates fixed in such contract or 
contracts: Provided, that the Commission shall 
have power, in its discretion, to direct by order 
that such contract or contracts shall be termin-
ated by such company as and when directed by 
such order. * " * * ' 
"The act in prior sections provides that water 
companies shall not make or grant any undue or 
unreasonable preference or advantage to any 
person or corporation, that there shall be no dis-
crimination between patrons, and then provides, 
as quoted above, that nothing in this act shall 
prevent any water company from continuing to 
furnish its product or service under any con,. 
tract in force a,t the date this act takes effect. It 
seems plain, therefore, tha,t it was the intention 
of the act that contracts of the character of these 
were not declared illegal, or even voidable, be-
cause they are expressly excepted. It is trut! 
the section then provides that the Commission 
shall have power, in its discretion, to direct by 
order that such contract or contracts shall be 
terminated by the company party thereto, and 
that thereupon such contract or contracts shall 
be terminated as and when directed by such 
order. This simply means that, if a contract 
has been entered into, it is within the power 
of the public service commission, in its discretion, 
to order that such contracts shall be terminated 
88 
by the company in the manner directed by the 
public service commission. It was intended, no 
doubt, that, when a contract of the character of 
these in question is detrimental to the services 
of the company furnishing water, the public 
service commission, if it finds this to be a fact, 
may direct the termination of such contract. It 
would be for the parties to the contract to ter-
minate it. If it was a void contract, it might 
be terminated without damages. If it was valid 
and binding contract, before it could be termin-
ated, damages would necessarily be assessed. It 
could not be reasonably contended that if a public 
service corporation, furnishing water to a city, 
had acquired by purchase the right to take a 
certain portion of a stream for the purpose of 
furnishing water to its patrons, and it should 
eventuate that the whole stream was necessary, 
the public service commission would have the 
power to require the owner of the stream to de-
liver it to the public service corporation without 
compensation. The public service commission 
could only direct that the public service corpora-
tion should acquire the stream by proper and 
legal methods. And so, in this ca,se, these were 
valid contra,cts when entered into, upon valid and 
good considerations. The Commission act, as 
above stated, exempts these contracts from the 
operation of the statute, except that the public 
service commission, in the exercise of its dis-
cretion, may require the companies, or the parties 
to the contracts, to terminate them. By reas.on 
of this exception in the statute, we are satisfied 
that these contracts are neither void nor voidable. 
They were valid and binding obligations which 
the statute does not attempt to avoid, but ex-
pressly exempts. 
"Upon the question of jurisdiction, we are 
satisfied that the public service commission had 
jurisdiction to determine the questions presented 
upon the original application between the citi-
zens of Raymond and the water company. It 
had a right, no doubt, to inquire into the quantity 
and quality of the water furnished to the citi-
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zens and the facilities for furnishing water. It 
was authorized to inquire into the reasonableness 
of the rates, and for that purpose to inquire 
whether water was being furnished free or other-
wise. And, under its powers in this respect, it 
might require the water company to desist from 
furnishing free water. But we are satisfied that 
the public service commission was not authorized 
to set aside the contracts in question, first, be-
cause the statute does not give the public service 
commission that authority; and, second, even if 
the statute did give this authority, the bene-
ficiaries under the contracts were clearly entitled 
to a hearing upon that question. We think the 
order of the public service commission first made 
must be construed as directing the water company 
to terminate the contracts, and did not in itself 
terminate the contracts." 
To the same effect is: 
Portla;nd Ry. vs. Commission, 56 Ore. 468, 
105 Pac. 709. 
Each contract filed was in itself a schedule. It must 
be presumed that at the time the contracts and schedules 
were filed they together furnished to the Power Com-
pany a fair return upon its investment. The contracts 
must stand until they are abrogated for inadequacy of 
consideration after a hearing by a competent tribunal. 
So clear is this that it may be said that the Power 
Company has admitted and the Commission has ruled 
that Schedules 42 and 43 are inapplicable to these 
contracts. 
The contract rate was and continues to be the lawful 
rate just as much as the schedule rate. 
In the case of Ohio & Colorado Smelting & Refimng 
Co. vs. Public Utilities Commission of Colorado (No. 
9458), just decided and not yet reported, the Supreme 
Court of Colorado, in reversing an order of the Com-
mission of that State undertaking to abrogate a contract 
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passed upon this very question, held that the burden of 
showing the inadequacy was on the Power Company 
and not on the consumer. And the court said: 
"The sufficiency of the rate prescribed to pro-
duce a fair profit upon the value of the property 
employed in the business is to be strongly pre-
sumed. The burden of showing its confiscatory 
character rests, therefore, upon the complaining 
company. Lincoln Gas Co. vs. Lincoln, 223 U. S. 
349. The presumption must be correspondingly 
stronger where the rate rests upon a contract 
between the parties, understandingly entered 
into." 
The statute (Sec. 4784, Sub. 2, C. L. 1917) em-
powers the Commission to permit departures from filed 
schedules. 
That being true, it is indeed passing strange to find 
the Commission, acting apparently on its own initiative, 
calling upon the holders of pre-existing contracts, which 
the law pronounces valid, to justify their continuance, 
when no one has complained of them. Wherein lies the 
fairness and impartiality of that line of procedure. We 
fail to see it, and so did the Illinois Commission which 
promptly announced that it was not their policy to in-
quire of their own initiative into contracts entered 
into prior to the passage of the act creating the Com-
mission. 
Re Tampico Telephone Co. (Ill.), P. U. R. 
1915-A, 24. 
In the case of In re New York Steam Company, 
Public Utilities Reports, 1918-B, p. 866, it is held that 
a public utility cannot, by the filing of a new schedule, 
abrogate rate contracts lawfully made, pursuant to a 
former schedule, for a fixed term at specified rates and 
for a minimum quantity of consumption, on the theory 
that such contract rates would be discriminatory and 





unlawful under the new schedule; and a new schedule 
is unjust, unreasonable and unlawful to the extent that 
it fails to provide a separate classification for such prior 
contracts. 
Why is a consumer over whom the Commission has 
no direct jurisdiction, called upon to justify a contract 
which the law declares to be prima facie reasonable and 
valid? Why not wait until the Power Company, or 
some other consumer, files a protest or complaint as 
required by the Act. There may be a reasonable expla-
nation, but it has not occurred to us. 
Now let us see how these schedules 42 and 43 came 
to be filed and what their effect is: 
Subdivision 2 of Section 4784, C. L. 1917, provides: 
"Under such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe, every public utility other 
than a common carrier shall file with the Com-
mission within such time and in such form as the 
Commission may designate, and shall print and 
keep open to public inspection schedules showing 
all rates, tolls, rentals, charges, and cl.assificar 
tions collected or enforced, or to be collected or 
enforced, together with all rules, regulations, 
contracts, privileges, and facilities which in any 
manner affect or relate to rates, tolls, rentals, 
charges, classifications, or service. Nothing t"n 
this section contained shall prevent the Commis-
sion from approving or fixing rates, tolls, rentals, 
or cha.rges, from time to time, in excess of or less 
than those shown by said schedule." 
Section 4785, C. L. 1917, provides: 
"Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no 
change shall be made by any public utility in any 
rate, fare, toll, rental, charge, or dassification, 
or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating 
to or affecting any rate, toll, fare, rental, charge, 
classification, or service, or in any privilege or 
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facility, except after thirty days' notice to the 
Commission and to the public as herein provided. 
Such notice shall be given by filing with the Com-
mission and keeping open for public inspection 
new schedules then in force, and the time when 
the change or changes to be made in the schedule 
or schedules then in force, and the time when 
the change or changes will go into effect. The 
Commission, for good cause shown, may allow 
changes without requiring thirty days' notice 
herein provided for, by an order specifying the 
changes so to be made and the time when they 
shall take effect, and the manner in which they 
shall be filed and published. When any change 
is proposed in any rate, fare, toll, rental charge, 
or classification, or in any form of contract or 
agreement, or in any rule, regulation, or contract 
relating to or affecting any rate, toll, fare, rental, 
charge, classification, or service, or in any privi-
lege or facility, attention sha;ll be directed to such 
change on the schedule filed with the Commission, 
by some character to be designated by the Com-
mission, immediately preceding or following the 
item.'' 
Section 4830, C. L. 1917, provides: 
"No public utility shall raise any rate, fare, toll, 
rental, or charge or so alter any classification, 
contra;ct, practice, rule, or regula,Uon as to result 
in an increase in any rate, fare, toll, rental, or 
charge, under any circumstances whatsoever, ex-
cept upon a showing before the Commission and 
a finding by the Commission that such increase 
is justified. 
"Whenever there shall be filed with the Com-
mission any schedule stating an individual or 
joint rate, fare, toll, rental, charge, classification, 
contract, practice, rule, or regulation increasing 
or resulting in an increase in any rate, fare, toll, 
rental, or charge, the Commission shall have 
power, and it is hereby given authority either 
upon complaint or upon its own initiative without 
complaint at once and if it so orders without 
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answer or other formal pleadings by the inter-
ested public utility or utilities, but upon reasor~r 
able notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning 
the propriety of such rate, fare, toll, rental, 
charge, classification, contract, practice, rule or 
regulation, and, pending the hearing and the de-
cision thereon, such rate, fg,re, toU, rental, charge, 
classification, contract, practice, rule, or regula-
tion shall not go into effect; provided, that the 
period of suspension of such rate, fare, toll, rental, 
charge, classification, contract, practice, rule, or 
regulation shall not extend beyond 120 days 
beyond the time when such rate, fare, toll, rental, 
charge, classification, contract, practice, rule, or 
regulation would otherwise go into effect unless 
the Commission, in its discretion, extends the 
period of suspension for a further period not 
exceeding six months. On such hearing the 
Commission shall establish the rates, fares, tolls, 
rentals, charges, classifications, contra.cts, prac-
tices, rules, or regulations proposed, in whole or 
in part or others in lieu thereof, which it shall 
find to be just and reasonable. All such rates, 
fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, con-
tracts, practices, rules, or regulations not so sus-
pended shall, on the expiration of thirty days 
from the time of filing the same with the Com-
mission, or of such lesser time as the Commission 
may grant, go into effect and be the established 
and effective rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, 
classifications, contracts, practices, rules, and 
regulations, subject to the power of the Com-
mission, after a hearing had on its own motion 
or upon complaint as herein provided, to alter 
or modify the same." 
On April 8, 1918, over a year after the Act had been 
in effect, the Commission issued its "Tariff Circular 
No. 3," requiring the Utilities to file their tariff sched-
ules by June 8, 1918. That Circular carried the express 
mandate that: 
"Whenever any change is made in any rate, 
resulting in an advance of such rate, such change 
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shall be denoted by the symbol 'A' shown in 
connection with rate changed, and on the same 
page shall be shown a footnote giving reference 
to such symbol and explaining its use, thus: 'A' 
denotes advance." 
At that time the Power Company had not filed any 
tariff schedule whatsoever. Over six months passed, 
and still no schedules were filed. 
On Oct. 23, 1918, the Commission issued its order 
known as "Supplement No. 1 to Tariff Circular No. 3." 
That order called attention to the statute (Sub. 2, Sec. 
4784, C. L. 1917) as requiring the Utility Corporation to 
file its "schedules" and also its "contracts" with the 
Commission. 
Thereafter and in November, 1918, the Power Com-
pany filed with the Commission those individual con-
tracts and also schedules 42 and 43, together with its 
"general rules and regulations." 
No hearing was had by the Commission on either the 
contracts or the schedules, or the rates therein named. 
No finding whatsoever was made by the Commission 
respecting them. No notice of the filing thereof was 
given to anybody. The Commission simply received 
them and directed its secretary to file them. 
Schedules 42 and 43 did not carry any symbol "A," 
or any footnote or any other sign, word or syllable de-
noting any change in any rate therein embraced, much 
less any advance in any such rate, or any rate what-
soever of the Power Company. 
But those schedules did carry the statement that those 
rates were only applicable to contracts subject to the 
"Rules and Regulations of the Company" on file with 
the Commission. Section 46 of those "Rules and Regu-
lations of the Company" gave the consumer the option 
of cancelling the contract .on thirty (30)' days notice 
to the company. 
This cancellation provision is not in the contracts 
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between the consumers and the Power Company. The 
contracts are for a definite period of years from their 
dates. 
It is perfectly obvious that those schedules do not 
cover the contracts in question, and even if they do, 
that such schedules were not designed or intended to 
and could not operate to raise the rates in those con-
tracts automatically or render the contracts illegal, 
invalid, discriminatory or preferential. 
It is needless to comment on the importance or serious-
ness of the matter now under consideration. It is 
inconceivable that any court is going to hold that a 
power company or a commission, by the mere filing of 
a pre-existing schedule in force concurrently with the 
contracts, could thereby ex parte and without a hearing 
or notice, stick its hands in the pockets of the consumers 
and deliberately rob them of millions of dollars for 
the profit of the Power Company. That may be the 
result these consumers are up against; but if so, it is 
not common sense, common honesty, common justice or 
common law, and having made the world safe for 
democracy it would be high time something were done 
to make democracy safe for the world. The assumption 
is that by filing a piece of paper with the Commission, 
the Power Company can voluntarily and arbitrarily 
repudiate its solemn and binding obligations, and more 
than that, can sandbag its patrons at will and auto-
cratically filch from the pockets of its consumers for 
its profit millions of dollars. The assumption is that 
the public,-and these consumers are a part of the 
public,-are at the untrammeled mercy of the Power 
Company. It is no longer even a question of all the 
traffic will bear, but is merely all that the Power Com-
pany desires, as the theory is that the Power Company 
has- its consumers hog-tied by contracts which they 
cannot break, but which the Power Company, by making 
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love to the assistant& of the Commission, can ignore or 
modify to suit itself. 
Let us illustrate the gravity of these questions by an 
illustration in dollars and cents. 
The contract between the Utah Copper Company and 
the Power Company calls for 31,000 horsepower at the 
rate of $27.50 per horsepower per annum, equivalent 
to a rate of payment of four and two hundred and eight 
one-thousands mills ($0.004208) per kilowatt hour. 
In the year 1918 these contracts were operated under. 
If schedules 42 and 43 applied to them there was an 
automatic increase of rate on all the contracts amounting 
to $1,107,258.50. 
In 1918 the Copper Company used 197,776,655 kilowatt 
hours for which it paid the Power Company $958,925.73. 
If schedule 42 and 43 applied to this contract, then there 
was an automatic increase of that amount to $1, 635,-
596.94, or a difference of $676,671.21. The rate of in- ' 
crease on this 31,000 horsepower contract would have 
been 43 per cent. 
Those schedules were not and are not and could not 
have been applicable to these contracts. 
The result of giving those schedules any applicability 
to these contracts is, on its face, so startling as to shock 
the conscience of us all, and make us pause and inquire 
whether the statute is so automatically sweeping as the 
consequence must assume. A blanket horizontal increase 
of over a million dollars a year, or the income on $10,-
000,000, or 25 per cent of the Power Company's invest-
ment, without the permission of the Commission, and 
without determining the necessity for or reasonableness 
of the increase, or any hearing being afforded interested 
patrons, may sound like General Order 28 of the United 
States Railroad Administration p:i'omulgated under the 
war power in the hour of our national peril, but it does 
not sound like the Public Utilities Act of Utah, and it 
does not sound like the General Order of this Com-
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mission overthrowing such an increase as to the short 
line railroads released from Federal control. 
Those schedules and these contracts were filed with 
this Commission in response to the order supplement 
No. 1 to Tariff Circular No. 3. They were not filed as 
new schedules initiating or inaugurating new rates. 
They were shown to be the schedules in effect March 1, 
1917, prior to the passage of the Act. 
The Commission has no power to change the rates in this con-
tract or in any way to interfere with this contract. 
We have already discussed the constitutioanl power 
of the Legislature to abrogate or impair pre-existing 
contracts in the exercise of the police power. However, 
it was clearly within the rights of the Legislature to 
delegate to the Utilities Commission such power or 
jurisdiction as its wisdom or choice dictated: and, con-
versely, it was clearly within the right of the Legislature 
to withhold from the Commission such power or juris-
diction as its wisdom or choice determined. (Gas. Co. 
vs. Commission, 224 N. Y. 156, 120 N. E. 132.) 
It was within the exclusive province of the Legislature 
to determine who, when, by whom, and to what extent 
pre-existing contracts of public service corporations 
should be brought within the operation of the Act. 
Neither the Commission nor the courts are concerned 
with the wisdom or policy of the statute. (Inter. Har-
vester Co. vs. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199.) 
So we pass from the existence of the power to the 
question whether it has been exercised in this State. We 
inquire whether the Legislature has directly abrogated, 
impaired or interfered with this contract. We inquire 
whether the state has exercised its right to impair this 
contract; and then we next inquire whether the Legis-
lature has delegated to the Public Utilities Commission 
the power to abrogate, impair or supersede this contract. 
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Each and every one of these last enumerated inquiries 
must be answered in the negative. 
Chapter I of the Utilities Act creates the Commission. 
Chapter II defines the utilities declar~d to be subject to 
the jurisdiction and regulations of the Commission and 
the provisions of the Act. Chapter III prescribes the 
duties of Public Utilities. 
Section 4783 requires all charges made by any Public 
Utility to be just and reasonable. 
Subdivision 2 of Section 4784 provides that: 
"Under such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe, every public utility other 
than a common carrier shall file with the Com-
mission within such time and in such form as the 
Commission may designate, and shall print and 
keep open to public inspection schedules showing 
all rates, tolls, rentals, charges, and classifications 
collected or enforced, .or to be collected or en-
forced, together with aU rules, regulations, con-
tmcts, privileges and facilities which in any 
manner affect or relate to rates, tolls, rentals, 
charges, classifications, or service. Nothing in 
this section contained shall prevent the Commis-
sion from approving or fixing rates, tolls, rentals, 
or charges, from time to time, in excess or less 
than those shown by said schedule." 
1t has to be noted that that section of the act dif-
ferentiates by its express language between general 
"schedules" showing all rates, etc., and separate "con-
tracts" relating to rates. In short, that section upon its 
face recognizes that there may be existing contracts 
relating to rates not embraced within the general sched-
ules of the utility. 
Section 4785 provides that: 
"Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no 
change shall be made by any public utility in any 
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rate, fare, toll, rental, charge, or classification, 
or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating to 
or affecting any rate, toll, fare, rental charge, 
classification or service; or in any privilege or 
facility, except after thirty days' notice to the 
Commission and to the public as herein provided. 
Such notice shall be given by filing with the 
Commission and keeping open for public inspec-
tion new schedules stating plainly the change or 
changes to be made in the schedule or schedules 
then in force, and the time when the change or 
changes will go into effect. The Commission, for 
good cause shown, may allow changes without 
requiring thirty days' notice herein provided for 
by an order specifying the changes so to be made 
and the time when they shall take effect, and the 
manner in which they shall be filed and published. 
When any change is proposed in any rate, fare, 
toll, rental, charge or classification, or in any 
form of contract or agreement, or in any rule, 
regulation or contract relating to or affecting any 
rate, toll, fare, rental, charge, classification, or 
service, or in any privilege or facility, attention 
shall be directed to such change on the schedule 
filed with the Commission, by some character to 
be designated by the Commission, immediately 
preceding or following the item." 
That section likewise specifically recognizes that there 
may be existing contracts fixing rates aside from the 
general schedules of the utility. 
Subdivision 3 of Section 4787 is a compilation of Sub-
division C of Section 5 of Article III of the original 
act. In the original act that subdivision of that section 
provided that: 
"No comomn carrier subject to the provisiOns 
of this Act shall, directly or indirectly, issue, give 
or tender any free ticket, free pass or free re-
duced-rate transportation for passengers between 
points within this State, except to its officers, 
agents, employes, attorneys, physicians and sur-
geons, and members of their families; to minis-
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ters of religion, traveling secretaries of railroad 
men's religious associations, or executive officers, 
organizers or agents or railroads employes' mu-
tual benefit associations giving the greater portion 
of their time to the work of any such associa-
tions; inmates of hospitals or charitable or eleemo-
synary institutions, and persons exclusively en-
gaged in charitable or eleemosynary work, and 
persons and property engaged or employed in 
educational work or scientific research or in 
patriotic work, when permitted by the Com-
mission ; to indigent, destitute and homeless per-
sons and to such persons when transported by 
charitable societies or hospitals, and the necessary 
agents employed in such transportations; to in-
mates of the National homes or State homes for 
disabled volunteer soldiers, and of soldiers' and 
sailors' homes, including those about to enter and 
those returning home after discharge, and boards 
of managers of such homes; to necessary care-
takers of livestock, poultry, milk or fruit; to 
employes on sleeping cars, express cars and to 
linemen of telegraph and telephone corporations; 
to railway mail service employes, United States 
internal revenue officers, post office inspectorljl! 
customs officers and inspectors and immigration 
inspectors when traveling in the course of their 
official duty; to newsboys on trains, baggage 
agents, witnesses attending any legal investiga-
tion in which the carrier is interested, persons 
injured in accidents or wrecks and physicians and 
nurses attending such persons; provided, that the 
term 'employes,' as used in this section, shall 
include furloughed, pensioned and superannuated 
employes, persons who have become disabled or 
infirm in the service of any such carrier, ex-
employes traveling for the purpose of entering 
the service of any such carrier, and the remains 
of persons dying while in the employment of any 
such carrier; and the term 'families', as used in 
this section, shall include the families of those 
persons heretofore named in this proviso, and the 
families of persons killed, and the widows during 
widowhood, and minor children during minority, 
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of persons who died while in the service of any 
such carrier; and provided, further, that no free 
ticket, free pass or free or reduced-rate trans-
portation shall be issued, given or tendered to any 
officer, agent or employe of a common carrier, 
who is at the same time a shipper or receiver of 
freight, unless such officer, agent or employe 
devotes substantially his entire time to the service 
of such carrier; and provided, further, that the 
members of the Public Utilities Commission, their 
officers and employes, shall be entitled, when in 
the performance of their official duties, to free 
transportation over the lines of all common car-
riers, and to free use of the lines of all telegraph 
and telephone companies within this State. 
"Nothing in this act contained shall be con-
strued to prohibit the issue by express corpora-
tions of free or reduced-rate transportation for 
express matter to their officers, agents, employes, 
attorneys, physicians and surgeons, and members 
of their families, or the interchange of free or 
reduced-rate transportation for passengers or ex-
press matter between common carriers, their 
officers, agents, employes, attorneys, physicians 
and surgeons and members of their families, 
where such common carriers are subject in whole 
or in part to the jurisdiction of the Commission 
or of the Interstate Commerce Commission; 
provided, that such express matter be for the 
personal use of the person to or for whom such 
free or reduced-rate transportation is granted, 
or of his family; nor to prohibit the issue of 
passes or franks by telegraph or telephone cor-
porations to their officers, agents, employes, at-
torneys, physicians and surgeons, and members 
of their families, or the exchange of passes or 
franks between such telephone and telegraph cor-
porations, or between such corporations and such 
common carriers, for their officers, agents, em-
ployes, attorneys, physicians and surgeons, and 
members of their families; nor to prohibit free 
or reduced rate service by other public utilities 
to its officers, directors and employes; nor to 
prevent the carrying out of contracts for free or 
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red1wed rate passenger transportation or other 
utility service heretofore made, founded upon 
adequate consideration and lawful when made; 
nor to prevent a common carrier from transport-
ing, storing or handling, free or at reduced rates, 
the household goods and personal effects of its 
employes, or persons entering or leaving its 
services, and of persons killed or dying while in 
its service." 
In short, the original act specifically provided that 
"nothing in this act shall be construed * * * to prevent 
the carrying out of contracts for free or reduced-rate 
passenger transportation or other public utility service 
heretofore made, founded upon an adequate consideration 
and lawful when made." 
It is to be noted that this provision of the act, as 
incorporated in the original act, was not the mere tail-
end .of the preceding proviso; but was a separate and 
distinct and independent patragraph by itself. 
In the compilation of 1917, subdivision 3 of Section 
4787, the language is the same, except that the words 
"nothing in this act contained" have been changed to 
read "nothing in this title contained." And the com-
pilers, instead of giving this provision of the act a 
separate paragraph, as was done in the original act, 
continued it as a part of the preceding paragraph. How-
ever, upon the most elemental principles of statutory 
construotion, it must be assumed that there was no 
intention, by reason of these slight changes, in the 
compilation, to effect any change in the original statute. 
Section 4788 provides that: 
"Except as in this section otherwise provided, 
no public utility shall charge, demand, collect, or 
receive a gre.ater or less or different compensa-
tion for any product or commodity furnished or 
to be furnished, or for any service rendered or 
to be rendered, than the rates, tolls, rentals and 
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charges applicable to such products or com-
modity or service as specified in its schedules 
on file and in effect at the time, nor shall any 
such public utility refund or remit, directly or 
indirectly, in any manner or by any device, any 
portion of the rates, tolls, rentals and charges 
so specified, nor extend to any corporation or 
person any form of contrG!ct or agreement, or any 
rule or regulation, or any facility or privilege 
except such as are regularly and uniformly ex-
tended to all corporations and persons; provided, 
that the Commission may by rule or order estab-
lish such exceptions from the operation of this 
prohibition as it may consider just and reasonable 
as to each public utility." 
Section 4789 prohibits a utility from granting any 
unreasonable preference, advantage or difference in 
rates or service. 
Chapter IV prescribes the authority of the Commission 
over public utilities. 
Section 4800 provides that: 
"Whenever the Commission shall find after 
hearing that the rates, fares, tolls, rentals, 
charges or classifications, or any of them, de-
manded, observed, charged, or collected by any 
public utility for any service or product or com-
modity, or in connection therewith, including 
the rates or fares for excursion or commutation 
tickets, or that the rules, regulations, practices 
or contracts, or any of them, affecting such 
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, or classifica-
tions, or any of them, are unjust, unreasonable, 
discriminatory or preferential, or in anywise in 
violation of any provisions of law, or that such 
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, or classifica-
tions are insufficient, the Commission shall 
determine the just, reasonable, or sufficient 
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifica-
tions, rules, regulations, practices, or contracts 
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to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall 
fix the same by order as hereinafter provided. 
"The Commission shall have the power to in-
vestigate a single rate, fare, toll, rental, charge, 
classification, rule, regulation, contract, or prac-
tice, or any number thereof, or the entire sched-
ule or schedules of r,ates, fares, tolls, rentals, 
charges, classifications, rules, regulations, con-
t'racts, and practices, or any number thereof, of 
any public utility, and to establish, after hearing, 
new rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifi-
cations, rules, regulations, cont'racts, or practices, 
or schedule or schedules, in lieu thereof." 
Chapter V provides for the procedure before the 
Commission. 
Section 4829 provides that: 
"Any public utility shall have the right to com-
plain to the Commission on any of the grounds 
upon which complaints are allowed to be filed 
by other parties, including the fairness, reason-
ableness, or adequateness of any schedule, classi-
fication, rate, price, charge, fare, toll, rental, 
rule, regulation, service, or facility of such public 
utility, and the same procedure shall be adopted 
and followed as in other cases except that the 
complaint may be heard ex parte by the Commis-
sion or may be served upon any parties desig-
nated by the Commission." 
It is to be noted that that sections omits the word 
ucontracts." 
Section 4830 provides that: 
"No public utility shall raise any rate, fare, 
toll, rental, or change or so alter any classifica-
tion, contract, practice, rule, or regulation as to 
result in an increase in any rate, fare, toll, rental, 
or charge, under any circumstances whatsoever, 
except upon a showing before the Commission 
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and a finding by the Commission that such in-
crease is justified. 
"Whenever there shall be filed with the Com-
mission any schedule stating an individual or 
joint rate, fare, toll, rental, charge, classifica-
tion, contract, practice, rule or regulation in-
creasing or resulting in an increase in any rate, 
fare, toll, rental or charge, the Commission shall 
have power, and it is hereby given authority 
either upon comnlaint or upon its own initiative 
without complaint at once and if it so orders 
without answer or other formal pleadings by 
the interested public utility or utilities, but upon 
reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing con-
cerning the property of such rate, fare, toll, 
rental, charge, classification, contract, practice, 
rule, or regulation, and, pending the hearing and 
the decision thereon, such r,ate, fare, toll, rental, 
charge, classification, contract, practice, rule, 
or regulation shall not go into effect; 
provided, that the period of suspension of such 
rate, fare, toll, rental, charge, classification, 
contract, practice, rule, or regulation shall not 
extend beyond 120 days beyond the time when 
such rate, fare, toll, rental, charge, classifica-
tion, contract, practice, rule, or regulation would 
otherwise go into effect unless the Commission, 
in its discretion, extends the period of suswn-
sion for a further period not exceeding six 
months. On such hearing the Commission shall 
establish the rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, 
classifications, contracts, practices, rules or regu-
lations proposed, in whole or in part or others 
in lieu thereof, which it shall find to be just and 
reasonable. All such rates, fares, tolls, rentals, 
charges, classifications, contracts, practices, 
rules, or regulations not so suspended shall, on 
the expiration of thirty days from the time of 
filing the same with the Commission, or of such 
lesser time as the Commission may grant, go 
into effect and be the established and effective 
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, 
contracts, practices, rules, and regulations, sub-
ject to the power of the Commission, after a 
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hearing had on its own motion or upon complaint 
as herein provided, to alter or modify the same." 
It must be conceded that the general provisions of 
the act are broad enough to confer upon the Commis-
sion the power to abrogate pre-existing contracts but 
there is a limitation imposed upon that authority by the 
provision of the act to the effect that 
"Nothing in this act shall be construed * * * 
to prevent the carrying out of contracts for free 
or reduced-rate passenger transportation or other 
public utility service heretofore made, founded 
upon an adequate consideration and lawful when 
made." 
And we submit that that portion of the act just 
quoted is a limitation upon the authority of the Com-
mission and deprives it of any power to abrogate or 
impair this contract, and operates as the interposition 
of a legislative barrier between the power of the Com-
mission and the secredness and inviolability of this 
contract. 
The contract between the Power Company and the 
Consumer Company was certainly one "heretofore 
made" within that provision of the act. That act did 
not become effective until March 8, 1917, and the con-
tract in question was made prior to the passage of 
the act. 
We will later discuss the import and the meaning of 
the words "founded upon adequate consideration," and 
for the time being will assume for the next succeeding 
portion of this argument that any given contract was 
"founded upon an adequate consideration," within the 
meaning of that phrase as employed in the act. 
It is equally clear that the contract was "lawful when 
made." Its object and purposes were lawful and it 
did not contravene any constitution or statutory pro-
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vision or any rules of common law. This is too plain 
for argument. No one has ever claimed nor can any-
one ever seriously claim that this contract was not 
lawful when made. 
It is therefore as clear as the noon-day sun, that 
this contract falls within that provision of the statute, 
and the protection thereof, whatever that protecion 
may be, if it was "founded upon an adequate con-
sideration." 
The Power Company argues that this was not a 
contract for "free service." That is true. The Power 
Company argues that it was not a contract for "reduced 
rate" service. In this respect the argument of the 
Power Company proceeds along the following line of 
thought: 
"It is not enough that the contract shall have 
been at a low rate, and valid when made. As 
is held by all the authorities, the subject of public 
utility service is one which may be freely con-
tracted about until the legislature prescribes 
rules governing the rendering of such service, 
and contracts therefor, and any contract for 
such service is valid when made. As free service 
is not here involved, to bring this contract within 
the excepted provision, it must have been, first. 
for reduced rate service. Reduced rate service 
is service at less than standard or schedule rate 
for the same class of service. At the time that 
this contract was made (Jan. 1, 1913), the Utah 
Power & Light Company had no schedules avail-
able for power service in such quantities, and 
under such conditions, as demanded by the con-
sumer, and in fact had no standard power sched-
ules, but conducted all its power business under 
contract. The rate quoted to the consumer and 
included in the contract, had no reference to any 
schedule, and was not a reduction from any 
schedule. The contract was a special contract, 
but not in any sense a reduced rate contract.'' 
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That argument or suggestion is untenable upon its 
face. There are three obvious answers, to it, to wit: 
1. In the first place, the facts stated in it are not 
true because it is a matter of common knowledge that 
from its very inception in September, 1912, the Power 
Company had schedules of rates. 
2. In the second place, this act took effect on March 
8, 1917, and at that time, as the Commission knows 
from its own files, the Power Company had in effect 
standard schedules of rates. In fact, schedules 42 and 
43, the very schedules that are here involved, state upon 
their face that they had been issued and made effective 
on March 1, 1917, before the act became effective. If 
this contract is for a "reduced rate" as compared with 
those schedules, since they had been filed with the 
Commission, it was equally one for a "reduced rate," 
as compared with those schedules before they were 
filed with the Commission and before the passage of the 
Act itself. It is the same contract and the same set 
of schedules. If it is not a contract for a "reduced 
rate," then that is an end of this matter and the Com-
mission is no further concerned with it. If it is a 
contract for a "reduced rate," as compared witlr those 
schedules, then it was one for a "reduced rate" within 
the meaning of that provision of the statute under 
consideration. 
3. In the third place, the statute in dealing with 
schedules and tariffs of the utilities, in the very nature 
of things was only dealing with the schedules and 
tariffs thereby required to be thereafter filed by the 
Utility Company. The words "reduced rate" in the 
Act, necessarily mean a "reduced rate" as compared 
with a schedule filed pursuant to the Act. It can mean 
nothing else; hence, this contract was for a reduced 
rate within the meaning of the statute. 
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In this connection it would be interesting to note that 
such an argument would absolutely destroy the Com-
mission's attempted jurisdiction over this contract. 
That argument of the Power Company asserts that the 
Power Company "had no schedules available for power 
service in such quantities and under such conditions, as 
demanded by the Htak ·~t,Pt\c£ ije Q ny." They had 
schedules 42 and 43. Hence, that is equivalent to the 
assertion and admission that schedules 42 and 43 are 
not applicable to the class of service furnished by the 
Power Company to the consumer. This is exactly what 
we contend for and is a thought that we shall hereafter 
more fully develop. If it is sound, it ends these pro-
ceedings. 
Let us pass, therefore, to a consideration of the effect 
of that part of the act, providing that: 
"Nothing in this act shall be construed" so as 
"to prevent the carrying out of contracts for free 
or reduced rate passenger transportation or other 
public utility service heretofore made, founded 
upon an adequate con.sideration and lawful when 
made." 
It was entirely competent for the legislature to make 
the statute either retroactive, or prospective, or both, 
in its operation. Likewise, it was entirely competent 
for the legislature to insert in the act a provision 
determining the construction to be placed upon the act. 
25 R. C. L., 987-1047-1049; 
University vs. Richards, 20 Utah 457; 
Stockdale vs. In.s. Co., 87 U. S. 323, 22 L. 
Ed. 348. 
This provision of the act is itself an interpretation 
clause. It furnishes the rule to govern the courts and 
the Commission in the application of the act. Such 
interpretation clauses are not uncommon. As is said in 
25 R. C. L. 987: 
And 
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"Such clauses are often introduced from ex-
cessive caution and for the purpose of preventing 
a possible misinterpretation of the act by includ-
ing therein that which was not intended." 
"Where, in an act, it is declared that it shall 
receive a certain construction, the courts are 
bound by that construction, though otherwise the 
language would have been held to mean a dif-
ferent thing." 
25 R. C. L. 1049. 
In Stockdale vs. Insurance Co., 87 U.S. 323, 22 L. Ed. 
348, the court says, at page 331 : 
"Both in principle and authority it may be 
taken to be established, that a legislative body 
may by statute declare the construction of pre-
vious statutes so as to bind the courts in refer-
ence to all transactions occurring after the 
passage of the law, and may in many cases thus 
furnish the rule to govern the courts in trans-
actions which are past, provided no constitutional 
right of the party concerned is violated." 
And the court further says at page 332: 
"The paragraph we have been considering was 
not in its essence an attempt to construe a 
statute differently from what the courts had 
construed it, for no construction on this subject 
had been given by any court. Nor was it an 
attempt by construing a statute to interfere with 
or invade personal rights, which was beyond the 
constitutional power of Congress." 
The words in this part of the act are clear and un-
equivocal and, as said in Motion Picture Patents Co. 
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vs. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 61 U. S. (L. Ed.) 416, 
at 418: 
"Their meaning would seem not to be doubt-
ful if we can avoid reading into them that which 
they really do not contain." 
The act plainly and unequivocally says that nothing 
contained in the entire act shall prevent the carrying 
out of contracts of the kind named. That interpreta-
tion clause fixes the policy and purpose of the act and 
distinctly states its design and intent. Its language 
is mandatory that the act shall not be construed to 
embrace the contracts enumerated or prevent their 
being carried out. It was a plain recognition of the 
existence and validity of pre-existing contracts. It 
clearly contemplated that nothing contained in the act 
should work any change in or supersede pre-existing 
contracts of the class mentioned. It recognized the 
continued binding force of such contracts as constitut-
ing bargains which in equity and good conscience the 
Utility Company should not be permitted to break. It 
recognized the injustice of interfering with those con-
tracts. It distinctly excepted from its operation con-
tracts which otherwise might have been held to have 
been within the operation of the act. It was a specific 
exemption of the contracts enumerated. Its language 
on its face is plain. Its phraseology is simple and free 
from ambiguity. We are not concerned with the wisdom 
or policy of the plain provision of the act. 
Harvester Co. vs. U. S., 234 U. S. 199; 
Caminetti vs. U. S., 61 U. S. (L. Ed.) 192; 
Brewer vs. Bougher, 14 Pet. (39 U. S.) 
178, 198. 
Is there anything in that language of the act which 
would justify a court or this Commission to disregard 
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its plain provisions? Is the language employed there 
such as to lead to the conclusion that the framers of 
the Act did not intend what they said? 
To read into that section of the Act words of limita-
tion and reservation would usurp the legislative pre-
rogative and create and invent a command to these 
consumers which the legislature never gave nor in-
tended to give. The Act is plain on its face. The 
exemption is absolutely in terms. It says that nothing 
contained, not merely in that section but in the entire 
act, should be construed to prevent the carrying out, 
not of some contracts, but of any contract of any kind 
or character, made before the passage of the act and 
founded upon an adequate consideration and lawful 
when made. Is a court or the Commission going to 
engraft upon the generality of that language a reserva-
tion or exception as to some contracts not therein 
contained? As said in Howard vs. Illinois Central Ry., 
217 U. S. 463, 52 L. Ed. 297: 
"This would require us to write into the 
statute words of limitation and restriction not 
found in it." 
Again: 
"Where the legislative body makes no excep-
tion to a general and clear declaration of its will, 
the conclusive presumption is that it intended 
to make none, and it is not the province of the 
courts to do so." 
Mr. Sutherland, in his work on Statutory Construc-
tion, Sec. 236, uses the following language: 
"If the legislature has expressed its intention 
in the law itself with certainty, it is not ad-
missible to depart from that intention on any 
extraneous consideration or theory of construc-
tion." 
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It must be assumed that the legislature knew that 
many of these contracts had been made and were in 
existence. It must be assumed that the legislature 
knew that even a public service corporation may law-
fully waive a full return on its investment. (In re N. J. 
Gas Co., P. U. R. 1918-A, p. 20.) It must be assumed 
that the legislature knew that the Power Company and 
its predecessors in interest had made many such con-
tracts with consumers, both parties acting in absolute 
good faith. It must be assumed that the legislature 
knew that many of those contracts were essentially only 
experimental contracts for the purpose of reaching a 
basis for future charges. Even though this might 
ultimately result in giving for the term of the contract 
a better rate to a few customers than was given to 
other customers, it must be assumed that the legis-
lature knew that many industries of the State had 
sprung into existence on the faith of these contracts. 
It must be assumed that the legislature knew that the 
success of many industries of this State depended upon 
the continuance of these contracts. One of the con-
ditions of successful business,-one of the things which 
induces new industries,-is the ability to provide an 
advance for the certainty of future expenditures, in-
cluding among them, the cost of power. It must be 
assumed that the legislature knew that fact and that 
the only way of securing such certainty was by making 
contracts, and that such certainty had been insured, or 
attempted to be insured, by the making of these definite 
term contracts for definite rates, and that on the faith 
thereof immense amounts of money had been invested 
in industrial enterprises in this State. 
Unquestionably, the intention and purpose of the 
legislature was to protect and preserve the good faith 
and integrity of those contracts which had helped de-
velop the industrial resources of the State through the 
investment of money made in reliance upon them. 
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It must be assumed that the legislature knew that 
by March, 1917, the Power Company had, through these 
very contracts, elminated competitive industrial steam 
plants, and obtained the money wherewith to gobble up 
all the available water power sites in the community, 
and thereby had acquired not only a virtual, but an 
actual, monopoly on the generation and distribution 
of electrical power in the State. It was the clear intent 
of this portion of the act that the Utility Company should 
not be given a strangle hold on the industries of this 
State by reason of such industries having foregone their 
privilege of generating their own power, in reliance upon 
these contracts. It must also be assumed that the sacred-
ness of contracts was known to the legislature to be one 
of the fundamental notions of common justice inherent in 
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence-so sacred, that that prin-
ciple had been stowed away in the casket of the con-
situation for safe keeping; and that while it had the 
power to evade that principle, the dictates of law, 
justice and common honesty rendered it inexpedient 
and undesirable to exercise that power. 
It must also be assumed that the legislature knew 
that although there was no constitutional inhibition 
against retrospective legislation, nevertheless such laws 
have always been looked upon as unjust and oppressive. 
The legislature knew that ordinarily a statute should 
be given only a prospective operation. It knew, how-
ever, that some courts had given statutes of this 
character a retroactive operation. It knew that other 
courts had ruled that legislation of this character should 
in all justice not be given a retroactive operation to 
invalidate pre-existing contracts. 
Interurban Ry. vs. Commission, (Ohio), 
120 N. E. 830; 
Ra.ilway Co. vs. Coal Co., 79 Ill. 121; 
Timber Co. vs. Railwa;y Co., 58 Wash. 604, 
109 Pac. 320; 
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Timber Co. vs. Railway Co., 58 Wash. 604, 
109 Pac. 1020; 
Lighting ·co. vs. N. Y., 162 N. Y. S. 581; 
Superior vs. Telephone Co., 141 Wis. 383, 
122 N. W. 1023. 
In Public Service Elec. Co. vs. Board of Public Utility 
Com'rs, 88 N. J. 603, 96 Atl. 1013, it is held that: 
The provisions of the act concerning public utilities, 
P. L. 1911, p. 380, Sec. 18: (a) that no public utility 
"shall make" any unjust or unreasonable, unjustly dis-
criminatory or unduly preferential rate, or (d) give, 
directly or indirectly, any undue or unreasonable prefer-
ence or advantage to any person, corporation or locality, 
are prospective, and not retroactive. 
Statutes are to be given prospective and not retroact-
ive effect, unless their language makes them retroactive 
and admits of no other construction. 
The agreement made in 1898 between the city of 
Plainfield and the Plain field Gas & Electric Light Com-
pany, whereby the latter, in consideration of the passage 
of a certain ordinance by the former, designating certain 
streets and highways in that municipality through and 
upon which posts or poles of the lighting company might 
be placed and maintained, etc., contracted that it, its 
successors and assigns, would at all times light by elec-
tricity free of charge the common council chamber and 
certain buildings and offices occupied for city purposes, 
is enforceable against the Public Service Electric Com-
pany, which subsequently took over the rights and 
privileges and assumed the duties and obligations of the 
Plainfield Gas & Electric Light Company, notwithstand-
ing the provisions of P. L. 1911, p. 380, Sec. 18 (a) 
and (d). 
The legislature cannot impair the jurisdiction of a con-
stitutional court by preventing its exercise or creating a 
co-ordinate authority. 
At pages 1014-1015 the court says: 
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"The language of section 18 of the act concern-
ing public utilities (P. L. 1911, p. 380), is that: 
" 'No public utility as herein defined shall: 
(a) Make, impose or exact any unjust or un-
reasonable, unjustly discriminatory or unduly 
preferential * * * rate,' etc., or '(d) make 
or give, directly or indirectly, any undue or un-
reasonable preference or advantage to any person 
or corporation or to any locality,' etc. 
"This language, it will be observed, is entirely 
prospective and not at all retroactive. 
"It has been decided over and over again that 
statutes are to be given prospective and not retro-
active effect, unless their language makes them 
retroactive and admits of no other construction. 
See Citizens' Gaslight Co. vs. Alden, 44 N. J. Law, 
648; Williams vs. Brokaw, 74 N. J. Eq. 561, 70 
Atl. 665; Frelinghuysen vs. Morristown, 77 N. J. 
Law 493, 72 Atl. 2; Plahn vs. Givernaud, 96 
Atl. 40. 
"By the convention of the parties in 1898 the 
city of Plainfield acquired the right to have free 
lighting by electricity of certain of its buildings, 
offices, etc., from the Plainfield Gas & Electric 
Company, whose successor, the Public Service 
Electric Company, afterwards took over its prop-
erty and franchises subject to its burdens. Thus 
arose, and has continued, the obligation of the 
lighting company to the city under a purely con-
tractual relationship. The language of the statute 
against unjust discrimination and unreasonable 
preference is that they 'shall' not be made or 
given, and there is no language indicative of an 
intent on the part of the legislature to make pro-
vision that contracts already in existence shall 
come under the ban of this prohibition. The word 
'shall' is an irregular auxiliary verb, and used 
with the verb 'make' is a verb phrase, which in 
this statute is used to prohibit a contingent 
future event. See State vs. Griffin, 85 N. J. Law 
613, 616, 90 Atl. 259. It is perfectly clear that 
the statute is without retroactive effect, and that 
it cannot operate upon the contract of 1898, 
which, concededly, was lawful when made. There 
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is therefore no question in the case as to the 
State's power to impair or abrogate a contract to 
which a municipality or the public are parties. 
"The legislature cannot impair the jurisdiction 
of a constitutional court, either by preventing its 
exercise or creating a co-ordinate authority. Flan-
igan vs. Guggenheim Smelting Co., 63 N. J. Law 
647, 650, 44 Atl. 762; Smith vs. Livesey, 67 N. J. 
Law 269, 51 Atl. 453; Ex parte Thompson, 96 
Atl. 102, 106." 
The legislature could not know wha,t construction our 
courts might put upon the act as respects this retro-
active operation upon pre-existing contracts. And to 
remove any doubt whatsoever as to what the legislative 
intent was, there was inserted this provision, that 
nothing contained in the act and all of its should be 
construed to prevent the carrying out of these pre-
existing contracts founded upon an adequate consider-
ation and lawful when made. 
In opposition to these views it will proba:bly be con-
tended on the basis of the decision in the case of Salt 
Lake City vs. Utah Light & Traction Co., (Utah), 173 
Pac. 556, that: 
1. That decision emasculated this provision 
of the act and read it out of the statute; and 
2. This provision of the act was a mere per-
mission to the utility and not a limitation on the 
power of the Commission ; and 
3. That this provision of the act should be 
limited in its effect to the preceding provisions in 
that one section of the act; and 
4. That the only contracts excepted are those 
made upon special considerations of a similar 
nature to that involved in the Motley case therein 
referred to. 
Let us therefore examine that decision and analyze it. 
In analyzing that case we must remember that a de-
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cision is only an authority for the actual point decided. 
The law of stare decisis is well settled. 
In Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 83, it is said: 
"All judgments, however, are supposed to 
apply the existing law to the facts of the case; and 
the reasons which are sufficient to influence the 
court to a particular conclusion in one case ought 
to be sufficient to bring it or any other court to 
the same conclusion in all other like cases where 
no modification of the law has intervened. There 
would thus be uniform rules for the administra-
tion of justice, and the same measure that is meted 
out to one would be received by all others. And 
even if the same or any other court, in a subse-
quent case, should be in doubt concerning the cor-
rectness of the decision which has been made, 
there are consequences of a very grave character 
to be contemplated and weighed before the experi-
ment of disregarding it should be ventured upon. 
That state of things when judicial decisions con-
flict, so that a citizen is always at a loss in regard 
to his rights and his duties, is a very serious evil; 
and the alternative of accepting adjudged cases 
as precedents in future controversies resting upon 
analogous facts, and brought within the same rea-
sons, is obviously preferable. Precedents, there-
fore, become important, and counsel are allowed 
and expected to call the attention of the court to 
them, not as concluding controversies, but as 
guides to the judicial mind. Chancellor Kent says: 
'A solemn decision upon a point of law arising in 
any given case becomes an authority in a like 
case, because it is the highest evidence which we 
can have of the law applicable to the subject, and 
the judges are bound to fellow that decision so 
long as its stands unreversed, unless it can be 
shown that the law was misunderstood or mis-
applied in that particular case. If a decision had 
been made upon solemn argument and mature 
deliberation, the presumption is in favor of its 
correctness, and the community have a right to 
regard it as a just declaration or exposition of 
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the law, and to regulate their actions and con-
tracts by it. It would, therefore, be extremely 
inconvenient to the public if precedents were not 
duly regarded, and implicitly followed. It is by the 
notoriety and stability of such rules that profes-
sional men can give such advice to those who con-
sult them, and people in general can venture to 
buy and trust, and to deal with each other. If 
judicial decisions were to be lightly disregarded, 
we should disturb and unsettle the great land-
marks of property. When .a rule has once been 
deliberately adopted and declared, it ought not 
to be disturbed unless by a court of appeal or 
review, and never by the same court, except for 
very urgent reasons, and upon a clear manifesta-
tion of error; and if the practice were otherwise, 
it would be leaving us in a perplexing uncertainty 
as to the law.' " 
In 26 A. & E. Encyc. Law (2 Ed.) 169, it is said: 
"The language used in the opinions of the court 
must be construed in the light of the circum-
stances connected with each case. Its. influence 
and weight as a precedent are also largely depend-
ent upon them. The language in argument or 
findings may have a restricted or enlarged inter~ 
pretation by reason of its connection with a spe-
cific statements of facts. Also the opinion and 
decision of a court must be read and examined as 
a whole in the light of the facts upon which it is 
based, and not applied by picking out particular 
parts or sentences. The facts are the foundation 
of the entire structure, which cannot with safety 
be used without reference to the facts. The de-
cision is only an a;uthority for what it actually 
decides and cannot be quoted for a proposition 
which may seem to follow logically from it." 
In 15 Cor. Jur., 939, it is said: 
"Judicial precedents are valuable only in so far 
as they state definite rules for guidance in future 
similar cases. The authority of a former decision 
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as a precedent must be limited to the points act-
ually decided on the facts before the court." 
In 15 Cor. Jur., 940, it is said: 
"In determining whether or not an issue has 
been previously adjudicated, the court will be 
governed by the record in such previous trial, and 
not by the assumption by counsel on argument 
thereof that the issues therein embraced were the 
issues which are raised in the subsequent action." 
In 15 Cor. Jur., 941, it is said: 
"Mere abstract questions of the law cannot be 
made the subject of litigation, so that, when once 
determined, the determination must be applied in 
all subsequent litigation between other and differ-
ent parties merely because the same question of 
law is involved. The positive authority of a de-
cision is co-extensive only on the facts on which it 
is founded, and it can apply only in subsequent 
cases in which the issues are similar. Accord-
ingly, in applying the rule of stare decisis to a 
former decision, the language of the opinion in 
the earlier case must be construed with reference 
to the particular facts presented in that case." 
In Salt Lake City vs. Utah Light & Traction Co., 
(Utah), 173 Pac. 556, the facts were that Salt Lake 
City was a municipal corporation. Section 8 of Article 
XII of the State Constitution prohibited the construc-
tion and operation of a street railroad within the limits 
of any city without the consent of the local authority 
having control of the streets proposed to be occupied for 
such purposes. The city had given the Traction Com-
pany its consent to the laying of tracks in the city by an 
ordinance wherein the rates of fare to be charged by 
the street railway company for commutation tickets 
were fixed. That ordinance was passed prior to the 
enactment of the Utilities Act and was accepted by the 
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Traction Company. On the application of the Traction 
Company the Utilities Commission raised the rate for 
such commutation tickets and the city sued out a writ 
to review the action of the Commission, contending that 
the franchise ordinance was a contract and that it 
fell within the provision of the act above quoted pro-
tecting contracts made prior to the passage of the act, 
founded upon adequate consideration and lawful when 
made. The Traction Company, as shown by its brief in 
that case, contended that (1) the franchise was not a 
contract at all, and (2) that the power to prescribe 
rates is governmental and not contractual, and hence, 
that rate provisions of a franchise ordinance were not 
contracts; and (3) that if they were contracts they were 
contracts of a peculiar nature in that and because, while 
they were contractual in form, they were in the last 
analysis an exercise of a governmental power and not a 
contractual power; and ( 4) that hence franchise ordi-
nance contracts did not fall within the exemption of the 
statute; and, lastly, ( 5) that the exemption in the 
statute was a mere permission to the utility and not a 
limitation upon the power of the Commission. 
The Supreme Court held that the City had no con-
stitutional power under Section 8 of Article XII of 
the Constitution to enter into any contract respecting 
the fixing of the rates of the railway company; and 
further held that in giving its consent to the laying 
of the tracks in the form of a franchise ordinance, 
the city could do nothing that would deprive the legis-
lature of the power to fix rates expressly given it by 
Section 15 of Article XII of the Constitution; however, 
the Supreme Court held that the franchise ordinances, 
after acceptance by the Traction Company, possessed 
the elements of a contract, and treated it as such. 
Nevertheless, the court, upon the authority of Home 
Telephone Co. vs. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265, 53 L. Ed. 
176, and Brummit vs. Ogden Water Works Co., 33 Utah 
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289, 93 Pac. 829, recognized that these so-called fran-
chise contracts emanated from the sovereign power of 
the State and were special privileges, and in the last 
analysis are really governmental, rather than con-
tractual, in their nature. And the Supreme Court con-
tinually kept this distinction in mind by constantly 
limiting its language and ruling to "rates fixed in 
franchise ordinances." At pages 561 and 562 the 
court says: 
"Plaintiffs, however, also insist that the com-
mutation tickets are not within the purview of 
the Utilities Act, but are excluded therefrom 
by a certain exception found in subdivision 'c' of 
Section 5 of Article III of that act. It is there 
provided: 
" 'Nothing in this act contained shall be 
construed * * * to prevent the carry-
ing out of contracts for free or reduced 
rate passenger transportation or other pub-
lic utility service heretofore made, founded 
upon adequate consideration and lawful 
when made.' 
"The foregoing provisiOn is found among the 
exceptions in favor of the employes and respect-
ing agreements with other utilities. While the 
language of the exception is not as clear as it 
could have been made, yet it is manifest that 
it was not intended to refer to the rates fixed in 
franchise ordinances. In our opinion the mani-
fest purpose of the legislature was to prevent 
an injustice like that in the case of Louisville, 
etc., Ry. Co. vs. Motley, 219 U. S. 467, 31 Sup. 
Ct. 263, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 671, in which case 
life passes were issued to Motley and his wife 
upon a valuable consideration received by the 
railroad company. In that case the Supreme 
Court of the United States held that under the 
act of Congress of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 
Stat. 379, as subsequently amended (U. S. Comp. 
St. 1916, Sec. 8563, et seq.), common carriers 
123 
were prohibited from transporting either freight 
or passengers except at the regular rates, which 
had to be paid in cash. Under that decision, 
therefore, the Motleys were prohibited from 
riding on their passes, although they had paid 
for them before the congressional act had been 
passed. Moreover, it sometimes happens that 
passes are issued in payment for right of way 
and other privileges granted by the owners of 
land to common carriers. Under the Motley 
decision, however, all such passes would be void 
regardless of the consideration that the owners 
had paid to the common carriers. The legislature, 
therefore, very properly, and, as we think, wisely, 
excepted such cases from the operation of the 
Utilities Act in so far as intrastate business is 
concerned.· That is all that was attempted, and 
all that was done, by the adoption of the ex-
ception aforesaid. This contention must there-
fore likewise fail." 
It is clear, therefore, from that language that that 
decision is not an authority for the suggestion that 
it has emasculated the exemption provision of the act 
and read it out of the statute. It recognized, in the 
language of University vs. Richards, 20 Utah 457, 
that: 
"This clause is unusual and was evidently in-
serted for a purpose." 
Clearly, the court had in mind a distinction between 
a franchise ordinance contract under which the city 
paid nothing to the railway company and where the 
rates involved were not rates to be paid by one of 
the contracting parties to the other, but were merely 
rates applicable to the general public. There IS a 
clear distinction between such franchise ordinance 
contracts of a municipality and contracts made by 
private individuals or corporations and even contracts 
made by a municipality in its proprietary right as a 
' property owner. 
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This distinction is clearly brought out by the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin. 
The Wisconsin public utility law contained a pro-
vision that "the finishing by any public utility of any 
product or service at the rates and upon the terms 
and conditions provided for in any existing contract," 
was not inhibited. Under that statute it was held, in 
City of Superior vs. Douglas County Telephone Co., 
141 Wis. 363, 122 N. W. 1023, that where there was 
an offer by a telephone company operating in a city 
to render service to the city which the city could 
receive for the use of its officers in the public pusi-
ness and for the convenience of the public, in exchange 
for a privilege of value which the city could and did 
grant subject to legitimate conditions, which were 
accepted by the company, a valid contract between 
the company and the city was made which was pro-
tected by that exemption in the act. And the court 
said at page 1026: 
"Such privilege may well have been considered 
so specially valuable to the company as to be 
a fair equivalent for the free service, so called, 
that is free as regards appellant rendering any 
direct pecuniary consideration therefor." 
On the other hand, in City of Kenosha vs. Kenosha 
Home Telephone Co., 149 Wis. 338, 135 N. W. 848, 
it was held that where the state law authorized tele-
phone corporations to use the streets of municipalities, 
subject only to their police regulations, an ordinance, 
which granted a telephone company the right to use 
the streets in consideration of free telephone service 
to the municipality, is not a contract, for the municipal-
ity could not barter the exercise of its police t;>ower 
for free telephones. The court said : 
"As a State agency it had no power to enter 
into a contract not subject to amendment by 
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the public utility law. City of Manitowoc vs. 
Manitowac & NCYrthern Traction Co., 145 Wis. 
13, 129 N. W. 925; City of La Crosse vs. La 
Crosse Gas & Electric Co., 145 Wis. 408, 130 
N. W. 530. 
"Much reliance is placed by the plaintiff upon 
the case of Superior vs. Douglas Telephone Co., 
141 Wis. 363, 122 N. W. 1023. That was a 
case where the City of Superior in its proprie-
tary character entered into a contract for free 
telephones with an existing telephone company 
operating under a charter from the State. No 
attempt was made by the city to confer any 
franchise, or right to operate any telephone 
system, upon the telephone company. The city 
and the telephone company, prior to the passage 
of Chapter 499, Laws of 1907, entered into 
a contract-nota part of any franchise granted 
or attempted to be granted-whereby the tele-
phone company, for a valuable consideration, 
agreed to maintain a certain number of free 
telephones in the City of Superior. The city 
had paid the consideration by permitting altera-
tions to be made in its city hall and buildings 
as requested by the telephone company, and it 
was held the passage of the public utility law 
did not affect the contract, since Section 
1797m-91 thereof expressly provided that 'the 
furnishing by any public utility of any product 
or service at the rtaes and upon the terms and 
conditions provided for in any existing contract 
executed prior to April 1, 1907, shall not con-
stitute a discrimination within the meaning 
specified.' It is obvious the case at bar does 
not come within the principle applied or the 
section referred to in the Superior case." 
It is perfectly obvious that the decision in the Trac-
tion Company case did not touch or deal with the con-
tention made that the exemption provision of the 
act was a mere permission to the Utility and not a 
limitation on the power of the Commission. That 
question was not decided, discussed or passed upon. 
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In support of that suggestion the Traction Co. cited, 
and it may be presumed that the Power Company here 
represented by the same counsel, will cite: 
Denver Ry. vs. Englewood (Colo.), 161 
Pac. 151; 
Benwood vs. Commission, 75 W. Va. 127, 
83 S. E. 295, L. R. A. 1915C 261; 
Sewerage Co. vs. Collingwood (N. J.), 102 
Atl. 901; 
Winfield vs. Commission Co. (Ind.), 118 
N. E. 531; 
Pawhuska vs. Gas Co. (Okla.), 166 Pac. 
1058. 
But none of those cases are in point because the stat-
utes of those states differed materially from ours. 
The case of Denver Ry. vs. Englewood (Colo.) supra, 
has absolutely nothing to do with this question because 
the Colorado act did not contain any such provision 
exempting pre-existing contracts at all. 
In Winfield vs. Commission, supra, the Indiana stat-
ute simply provided that: 
"Every public utility is required to furnish 
reasonably adequate service and facilities. The 
charge made by any public utility for any service 
rendered or to be rendered either directly or in 
connection therewith shall be reasonable and just, 
and every unjust or unreasonable charge for such 
service is probihited and declared unlawful ; pro-
vided, that nothing in this act contained shall, 
authorize any public utility during the remainder 
of the term of any grant or franchise under which 
it may be a.cting a,t the time this act takes effect 
to charge for any service, in such grant or fran-
chise contracted, exceeding the maximum 'mte or 
rates therefor, if a,ny, that may be fixed in such 
grant or fra,nchise." 
Clearly that provision of the act was directed ex-
pressly at the Utility. It did not authorize the Utility 
to do anything and the court merely said, at page 537: 
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"It is argued that the proviso in said section is 
one of limitation of power, preventing the Com-
mission from increasing rates above maximum 
contract rates during the contract term. In sup-
port of this argument it is said that it would be 
absurd to hold that the legislature had by this 
proviso intended to prevent utilities companies 
from charging more than the maximum fixed by 
their contracts, because the contract is sufficient 
limitation. With this supporting statement we 
agree; but we cannot agree that this leads to a 
conclusion that the limitation is upon the Com-
mission. Utility companies cannot charge in ex-
cess of their contract rates unless the State con-
sents. The first clause in section 7 suggests such 
a consent in that it declares that for the required 
service the charge of such companies shall be just 
and reasonable, and that every unjust and un-
reasonable charge is unlawful. This might be 
construed, though not with much force, as a con-
sent of the State that such companies may charge 
just and reasonable rates, though in excess of 
contract rates, because a contract rate being un-
just is unlawful. Lest such construction might 
be attempted, the legislature added the proviso to 
section 7 as a limitation on the utility companies. 
The proviso was written into the law as a limita-
tion upon the utility companies to prevent such 
liberal construction being made by such com-
panies." 
The case of Sewerage Company vs. Collingwood, supra, 
is not in point at all and has nothing to do with the 
question under consideration. 
In Pawhuska vs. Gas Co., supra, it appeared that in 
1913 the City granted the Gas Company a franchise. But 
that franchise was subject to an act approved March 
25th, 1913, expressly empowering the Commission to 
establish gas rates. So the Commission had the power 
at the time of the granting of the franchise to establish 
gas rates. In 1915 the Legislature passed another act 
extending the jurisdiction the permission and it was 
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merely held, that the provisiOn in the act of April 
2nd, 1915 (Laws 1915, c. 200,' p. 407), "that this act 
shall not abrogate any existing contract, or affect or 
change the terms or conditions of any francihse granted 
by any municipal corporation prior to and in effect 
April 28, 1913," merely qualifies the direct legislative 
mandate of that act to "all persons, firms or corpora-
tions furnishing gas in all municipalities having a 
population over five hundred to do so through standard 
meters at meter rates," and does not effect the power 
of the Corporation Commission under the provisions of 
the act of March 25, 1913 (Laws 1913, c. 93, p. 150), to 
establish rates not inconsistent with such direct mandate. 
The case of Benwood vs. Commission, supra, is not in 
point because the West Virginia statute contained ab-
solutely no provision saving contracts as does ours 
It may be remarked in passing that the statutes of 
New York, Ohio and Washington contained provisions 
that nothing in the act should be construed to prevent 
the carrying out of contracts, subject to an expressed 
provsio, however, that the Commission shall have the 
power in its discretion to direct by order that such 
contracts be terminated. 
The language of our statute is so broad and compre-
hensive that it must be a limitation on the power of the 
Commission. It is not addressed to the Utility or the 
consumer at all. It is addressed only to those tribunals 
authorized to "construe the act," that is ,to the Com-
mission and the courts. 
And while it is true, as said in the Traction Company 
case that: 
"The foregoing provision is found among the 
exceptions in favor of employees and respecting 
agreements with other utilities;" 
nevertheless it is well settled law, that: 
"The construction of a statute can ordinarily be 
in no wise affected by the fact that it is sub-
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divided into sections or titles. A statute is passed 
as a whole and not in parts or sections and is 
animated by one general purpose or intent. Con-
sequently the several parts or sections of an act 
are to be construed in connection with every 
other part or section and all are to be considered 
as parts of a connected whole and harmonized, if 
possible, so as to aid in gaving effect to the in-
tention of the lawmakers." 
25 R. C. L., p. 1009. 
The language of the exemption is not confined to the 
section in which it is found, but expressly says that 
nothing in the entire act shall be construed as stated. 
It is plain in this respect, the language means nothing 
less than that no part of the act, under wlwtever chapter 
or section it may be found, shall be construed to prevent 
the carrying out of contracts at the time stated. It ex-
cepts and excludes such contracts from the operation of 
the entire act, and every part thereof. It was designed 
to avoid the injustice and oppression consequent upon 
interfering with vested property rights. It was intended 
to point out that the abrogation of such contract was not 
one of the duties imposed on the Public Utility under the 
act. The language is general and all embracing in its 
scope. 
In the language of Arnett vs. Donohue, 168 Ind. 180, 
80 N. E. 153: 
"A further consideration, which is not without 
importance here, is the fact that the opening 
language of the proviso is specific, rather than 
general. There is no mistaking the force of the 
language used. But, not content with this, the 
Legislature went farther, and provided that 'noth-
ing herein slwll be construed as affecting the con-
trol or management of the police department in 
any city or cities now or hereafter operating under 
the laws establishing such board of police com-
missioners.' It was said by Frazer, C. J., in Smith 
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vs. State, 28 Ind. 321, 325: 'Where z'n an act lt is 
dee!ared that z't shalt receive a certain construe-
Non, the courts are bound by thmt con.struetion 
though otherwise the language would have beer{ 
held to mean a different thing.' " 
The saving clause embraces the entire act and every 
part thereof. It is not in the form of a mere proviso, 
but is affirmed by the Legislature as an independent 
proposition applicable alike to every other part of the 
act. The scope of the saving clause is so broad that it 
must be held to extend beyond the section in which it is 
found and to embrace the entire act. Its language is 
such that it manifestly extends far beyond the section in 
which it is found. 
The Legislature delegated to the Commission power 
only in cases where it did not impair the obligation of 
the contracts saved from the operation of the act. The 
language of the saving clause, or interpretation clause, is 
plain. 
As said in Caminetti vs. U. S., 61 U. S. (L. Ed.) 192, 
at page 196: 
"If the words are plain, they give meaning to 
the act, and it is neither the duty nor the privilege 
of the courts to enter speculative fields in search 
of a different meaning." 
So the rule has been stated as follows : 
And 
"If the language be clear, it is conclusive and 
there can be no construction where there is noth-
ing to construe." 
United States vs. Hartwell, 6 Wall. (73 U. 
U. S.) 385, 396. 
"The intention of the Legislature is to be col-
lected from the words they employ. Where there 
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is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room 
for construction." 
United States vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (18 
U. S.) 76, 95. 
Effect must be given to every word of the statute. 
Effect must be given to this provision of the statute and 
to every word thereof. It is well settled law that when 
one provision of a statute treats specially and particu-
larly of a subject matter it over-rides general terms and 
expressions found in other parts of the act. 
36 Cyc., 1130, 1131; 
United States vs. Jackson, 143 Fed. 783; 
Sanford vs. King, 18 So. Dak. 334; 
Mertens vs. Moore, 108 Md. 636, 71 Atl. 
460; 
Donnelly vs. Hobe, 106 Wis. 411, 82 N. W. 
336; 
King vs. Armstrong, 9 Cal. App, 368, 99 
Pac. 527; 
Prout vs. Notan, 71 Nebr. 136, 98 N. W. 
657; 
Miller vs. Donovan, 3 Cal. App. 325, 35 
Pac. 159; 
25 R. C. L., 1011; 
County vs. Cornell, 53 Nebr. 556, 74 N. W. 
59; 
Bank vs. Parrott, 125 Gal. 472, 58 Pac. 164. 
To state the proposition enumerated in those cases 
in another form, it is that: Where there are in a statute 
specific provisions relating to a particular subject, such 
provisions govern as to that subject as against general 
provisions in other parts of the statute, though the 
latter, standing alone, are broad enough to include the 
subject to which the more particular provisions relate. 
Or, as stated in still another form, where a statute 
includes both a particular and also a general enactment 
which in its most comprehensive sense would include 
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what is embraced in the particular one, the particular 
enactment must be given effect, and the general enact-
ment must be taken to embrace only such cases within 
its general language as are not within the provisions of 
the particular enactment. 
In Bartlett vs. Trenton, 38 N. J. Law, 64, the court, in 
construing a tax statute which provided that nothing in 
said act contained shall be construed so as to destroy, 
impair or take away any right or remedy acquired or 
given by any act thereby repealed, says : 
"That the general clause will not affect the 
previous particular enactment, is supported by 
Smith vs. Bell, 10 M. & W. 378; Pretty vs. Solly, 
26 Beav. 611, and cases therein cited. 
"When the intention of the lawgiver, which is to 
be sought after in the interpretation of a statute, 
is specifically declared in a prior section as to a 
particular matter, it must prevail over a subse-
quent clause in general terms, which might, by 
construction, conflict with it. The Legislature 
must be presumed to have intended what it ex-
pressly stated, rather than that which might be 
inferred from the use of general terms." 
Another argument that the Power Company makes on 
this question is that predicated upon the dictum of the 
Supreme Court in the Traction Company case in refer-
ence to the Motley decision. And it will be argued that 
the words "adequate consideration" mean a "special con-
sideration." In short, it will be argued that to make the 
contract one "upon an adequate consideration" it must 
have been more than the mere obligation to take and 
pay for the service and must have contained an addi-
tional special consideration of such a character that if 
the contract were abrogated substantial injustice would 
result. 
There is absolutely not a word of that character in 
the saving clause of the act. It says, an "adequate," not 
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a "special" consideration. However, if that view were 
taken, many of the contracts in question would fall 
within it. In many of the contracts in question, there 
was a special consideration for the contract in addition 
to and independent of the rate agreed upon. In many 
of them there were absolute conveyances of property, 
such as water powers, steam plants, etc. In other words, 
there were leases of property, such as steam plants, etc., 
to be used by the Power Company as emergency plants. 
These were special features of special value to the Power 
Company. Moreover, many of the consumers were re-
quired by the contract to incur an especially large ex-
pense in the construction of sub-stations and the 
installation of electric apparatus to receive the current. 
In some of the contracts, the consumers are required to 
employ laborers, such as watchmen, at the plaints turned 
over to or leased to the Power Company, without expense 
to the Power Company. In many of the contracts the 
consumer surrendered its right not only to generate 
power itself, but also its right to take additional needed 
power from other producers or sources. Many of the 
contracts gave the Power Company valuable renewal 
options. Clearly these special features of some of these 
contracts take them without the jurisdiction of the 
Commission or the court or anyone else to abrogate 
such contracts or to interfere in any way with the 
rates therein agreed upon. 
Water Co. vs. Commission, 83 Wash. 130, 
145 Pac. 215; 
Timber Co. vs. Ry. Co., 58 Wash, 604, 109 
Pac. 320; 
Timber Co. vs. Ry. Co., 58 Wash. 604, 109 
Pac. 1020; 
Lighting Co. vs. New York, 162 N. Y. S. 
581; 
Middlesex vs. Ry. Co., (N. J.), P. U. R. 
1918 A., 577; 
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Electric Co. vs. Commission, 88 N. J. Law 
603, 96 Atl. 1013. 
The Power Company argued that this proviSIOn of 
the act was a mere permission to the Commission to • 
exercise jurisdiction over the contract, and says this 
must be so because otherwise the general policy or 
purpose of the act would be defeated. That is not 
true. That was a matter for the legislature to de-
termine. The legislature determined the policy of the 
act, and the reservation clause evidences this policy. 
Suppose the legislature had said that the act should 
not take effect until all pre-existing contracts with 
utilities had expired. That would have been no con-
cern of the courts or the Commission and they would 
have had to give efficacy to such expression of the 
legislative will. That, in substance, is exactly what 
the act has done as to these contracts exempted from 
its operation. As to them, it says that the act shall 
not take effect until their expiration. Why was it 
necessary for the legislature to give any such claimed 
special permission to the Commission? It was not 
doing a useless act and the other general provisions 
of the statute, but for this clause, gave the Commis-
sion ample jurisdiction and power. This special clause 
was not needed to give the Commission an added per-
miSSive power. The argument is out of place-it 
cannot be. The last sentence of Section 4788 expressly 
authorizes the Commission to permit departures from 
schedules, and so forth. Then why was it necessary 
to give it the same permissive power in another 
clause? Does such an argument appeal to the trained, 
judicial intelligence? 
The act says that "nothing in the act shall be con-
strued," etc. Is that the language of a permission or 
the language of an inhibition? Logic and reason can 
give but one answer to that question. The negative 
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language was intended to and operates to confine 
and limit the applicability of the act and the jurisdic-
tion of the Commission. Such negative language can-
not possibly be held to expand the act permissively. 
The language is not appropriate or suitable for any 
such purpose. That clause of the statute is a with-
holding of power and not a grant of power. It is a 
recognition of the fundamental principles of the sacred-
ness and inviolability of contractual obligation and is 
a repudiation of the "scrap of paper" doctrine and 
an acknowledgment that might does not make right. 
That clause was inserted in the act to prevent any 
possible misinterpretation of the balance of the act 
by giving it a retroactive application. It furnished 
a governing rule for the Commission and the courts, 
and to them it says "hands off." It is a specific 
exemption of the contracts enumerated from the opera-
tion of the act. What right has the Commission or the 
court to engraft a reservation on the generality of the 
all-embracing language of that exemption? Absolutely 
none. It would be neither just, expedient or lawful. 
We administer the law but do not make it. We must 
respect it and not disregard it. 
We come now to a discussion of the import and the 
meaning of the words "founded upon adequate con-
sideration," as employed in the act. 
In so far as this question is one of fact, it can only 
be discussed or determined upon the merits of a given 
contract. 
A question will arise as to the time with respect to 
which the adequacy of the consideration is to be tested. 
The Power Company urges that it must be tested 
so as to afford it a return on its investment in these 
abnormal times. On the other hand, the consumers 
contend that this must be tested as of the time when 
the contract was entered into. That is the language 
and mandate of the statute which provides that the 
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contract is exempted, if it was founded upon an ade-
quate consideration "W'hen made." There is no am-
biguity about those words "when made." Moreover, 
in the very nature of things, the issue of "adequate 
consideration" must be tested by the condition existing 
at the time the contract was made and if the rate 
was adequate and fair, then in the light of the then 
cost of the service and of the special economies attend-
ing that particular character and volume of service, 
it cannot be said to be inadequate because at a later 
period during the life of the contract increasing ma-
terial and 1 or labor costs or changing conditions 
had brought the cost of performing the contract up 
to or beyond the prices realized therefor. 
Elliott vs. Trust Company, 178 Ill. App. 439. 
The adequacy of the consideration must necessarily 
be tested as of the time and date when the contract 
was made. 
1 Page Con. (2 Ed.) Sec. 640; 
Aldrich vs. Aldrich (Ill.), 122 N. E. 472; 
Drefahl vs. Bank, 132 Ia. 563, 107 N. W. 
179; 
Horn vs. Beatty, 82 Miss. 504, 37 So. 
833; 
Campbell vs. McLaughlin (Mp.), ~05 
s. w. 18. 
Years of the life of this contract are still unexpired 
and no one can guess what the relation between pro-
duction cost and revenue under the contract may be 
ih its after life, nor whether, if viewed in retrospect 
after its completion, the entire charge would or would 
not be adequate return for the entire service. 
To test the question of adequacy at any period or 
periods after the execution of the contract would be 
to erect varying standards for varying intervals, with 
the result that at some periods the contract would be 
• 
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valid and at other periods deficient; at some periods 
the consideration would be adequate, at other periods 
inadequate; at some periods the charges subject to 
change, at others protected against change. This will 
not do. The power of the Commission either reaches 
or does not reach the contract. 
In Columbus Ry. Pow,er & Light Company vs. City 
of Columbus, (U. S.), 63 L. Ed. 416, 'it is held: 
Substantial Federal questions sufficient to sustain 
the original jurisdiction of a Federal district court 
are presented by a bill which seeks to enjoin the con-
tinued enforcement of street railway franchise ordi-
nances fixing rates, on the ground that such rates, be-
cause of increased operating costs and decreased net 
revenues, due to war conditions and an increased wage 
scale fixed by the War Labor Board, are inadequate 
and confiscatory, and that to compel street railway 
operation at unremunerative rates is to take the prop-
erty of the street railway company without due proces11 
of law. 
If a party charges himself with an obligation possible 
to be performed, he must abide by it unless perform-
ance is rendered impossible by the act of God, the law, 
or the other party. Unforeseen difficulties will not 
excuse performance. Where the parties have made 
no provision for a dispensation, the terms of the con-
tract must prevail. 
Increased street railway operating costs and de-
creased net revenues due to war conditions and to 
an increased wage scale fixed by the National War 
Labor Board, though rendering unremunerative the 
street railway fares fixed by municipal franchise ordi-
nances which, by acceptance, became valid contracts, 
mutually binding for the twenty-five year term namea 
therein, do not absolve the street railway company 
from the obligations of its contract so as to justify 
it in surrendering its franchises and excuse it from 
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giving service at the rates so fixed-especially where 
it cannot be said that, taking all the years of the term 
together, the contract will prove unremunerative. The 
court says at page 422 : 
"It is undoubtedly true that the breaking out 
of the World War was not contemplated, nor 
was the subsequent action of the War Labor 
Board within the purview of the parties when 
the contract was made. That there might be 
a rise in the cost of labor, and that the contract 
might at some part of the period covered be-
come unprofitable by reason of strikes or the 
necessity for higher wages, might reasonably 
have been within their contemplation when the 
contract was made, and provisions made accord-
ingly. There is no showing in the bill that 
the War or the award of the War Labor Board 
necessarily prevented the performance of the 
contract. Indeed, as we have said, there is 
no showing, as, in the nature of things, there 
cannot be, that the performance of the contract, 
taking all the years of the term together, will 
prove unremunerative. We are unable to find 
here the intervention of that superior force 
which ends the obligation of a valid contract 
by preventing its performance. It may be, and, 
taking the allegations of the bill to be true, it 
undoubtedly is, a case of a hard bargain. But 
equity does not relieve from hard bargains sim-
ply because they are such." 
The real controversy on this phase of the matter 
will ultimately turn upon whether that expression in 
the limiting clause of the act means merely such a 
consideration as would support a contract and pre-
vent its being held void for total lack of consideration, or 
whether the words "adequate consideration" mean 
something more than that and import the necessity 
for a special consideration, and if so, a special con-
sideration of what nature, or whether if it does not 




a rate consideration representing an equivalent or an 
approximate equivalent for mutual value received so 
as to be deemed adequate, or whether the considera-
tion should be held adequate unless it was such that 
a court of equity might set aside the contract for 
inadequacy of consideration. 
On these questions, we will not, at this time, do 
more than state the position which the consumers 
will take, without citing detailed authorities, as this 
brief has already been extended beyond what was 
originally intended. The consumers will contend: 
1. That all that is required is a good and valuable 
consideration sufficient to support the contract in 
law, and that a written contract carries with it a 
presumption of the adequacy of the consideration and 
that the burden of showing a want of such a considera-
tion is on him who seeks to void the contract. 
2. It will be further contended that these contracts 
have elements of indeterminate value agreed upon 
by the parties of a nature such that it is impossible 
to say that the consideration was inadquate. 
3. It will be further contended that that which 
the parties acting in good faith believed and regarded 
as adequate at the time the contract was entered into, 
must be treated as adequate. Persons competent to 
contract are free to make such terms as they choose. 
If the parties to these contracts in good faith and 
without any fraud or mistake, agreed upon a valuable 
consideration which they at the time regarded as a 
mutually valuable consideration and equivalent, it is 
not for the Commission or the courts at this time to 
inquire into the wisdom of such a consideration or 
the profit or loss subsequently arising out of the 
transaction. 
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4. It will be further contended that any considera-
tion is adequate which is not so disproportionate to 
the relative values involved as to shock one's sense 
of that morality and fair dealing that should always 
characterize transactions between man and man. 
5. It will be further contended that the adequacy 
of the consideration must be tested by the inducements 
which operated on the minds of the parties in making 
the contract. It is a relative expression as to which 
the parties acting in good faith and not as a mere 
sham, were entitled to determine for themselves. 
6. It will be contended that these contracts carry 
considerations of such a special character as require 
the exercise of judgment to determine their value and 
that what the parties agreed upon as adequate, unin-
fluenced by fraud or deception, must be regarded as 
adequate. 
7. It will be further contended that many of these 
contracts have a special consideration of a special 
nature over and above the rate agreed to be paid for 
the service. 
8. It wilf be further contended that in any event 
the statute contemplates that the consideration cannot 
be declared inadequate unless it is such that a court 
of equity would set aside the contract for inadequacy 
of consideration. 
It is obvious that each and every one of these con-
tentions might be amplified at length, but as the purpose 
of this discussion is not to secure a determination of 
the questions, but only to suggest their imposibility as 
bearing upon the undesirability or impropriety of their 




The foregoing considerations show the gravity and magnitude 
of the questions involved, which should not be passed 
upon or foreclosed by this court until after a full hearing 
by every contract consumer upon the facts of his individual 
case; and they should not be passed upon at this time. 
It would seem, therefore, that either the court should 
summarily dismiss this writ at this time, or else the 
other special contract holders, for their own protection, 
must and should be allowed similar writs, and the whole 
matter deferred and argued out by everyone, with no 
decision by the court on the pending applications until 
everyone interested has had a full opportunity to present 
his own case, to the end that the court may be fully 
advised as to every angle of every question involved, and 
thereby, in deciding one case, avoid doing an injustice 
to another contract-holder in another case. 
The alternative writ should be quashed as having been 
improvidently issued, and the application for a perma-
nent writ should be denied, on the ground of the 
adequacy of an other existing remedy, without any 
determination of the jurisdiction of the Commission or 
of the questions involved on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DICKSON, ELLIS, LUCAS & ADAMSON, 
As Amicus Curiae . 
